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Rousseau’s Confessions is controversial and influential since its first publication. Besides 
the dispute over the relationship of Rousseau’s autobiographical and philosophical works, 
by adopting the same title as the famous autobiography in the Christian tradition, 
Augustine’s Confessions, the effect is striking. However, few scholars were interested in 
their relationship and they write only a few lines about them or do not focus upon the key 
idea of Rousseau’s thought, the natural goodness of man, which contradicts the Christian 
doctrine of Original Sin.  Rousseau promises to delineate his self-portrait as a man 
according to nature in his autobiography in contrast to the picture of a born sinner saved 
by God’s mercy in Augustine’s Confessions. By comparing with Augustine’s 
Confessions, it is clear that Rousseau’s understanding of human nature and the source of 
evil reject the traditional Christian view. It is Rousseau’s ingenuity to compose his 
Confessions structurally and thematically analogous to Augustine’s Confessions to refute 
Augustine’s theology and convey his answer to the problem of secular society. I 
demonstrate their relationship by comparing them according to their structural and 
thematic similarities. This study will contribute to the study of the relationship between 
modernity and Christianity and that between secularization and religion. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Modernity and Christianity 
When Bill Clinton acknowledged his relationship with Monica Lewinski in 1998, 
many Americans accepted his “confession” because of his sincerity. They thought that 
although he without doubt committed immoral behavior, having an improper intimate 
relationship with a woman outside marriage, he was a good man and a good president. I 
want to say this is a classic example of the separation between natural goodness and 
moral goodness in contemporary American history of politics. Nowadays, sincerity is 
often prior to morality. 
The culture of sincerity, or the ethics of authenticity, prevails in our society today. 
This thought has taken shape from different sources but they are echoes from Rousseau, 
the champion of sincerity and advocate of the principle of natural goodness of man. If we 
want to know the culture of sincerity, we need to trace it back to its source to see how it 
arose. It is clear that the principle of natural goodness of man contradicts the Christian 
doctrine of original sin, according to which man is a sinner at birth. In this thesis, I will 
investigate the relationship between Rousseau’s philosophy and Augustine’s theology, or 
in other words, between modernity and Christianity.  
The relationship between modernity and Christianity, however, is controversial. 
With a view of the eschaton and God’s providence in mind, Karl Löwith claims that the 
modern philosophy of history is actually Christian eschatology clothed with a secular 
outfit. “Philosophy of history originates with the Hebrew and Christian faith in a 
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fulfillment and it ends with the secularization of its eschatological pattern.”1 The idea of 
progress, the central notion of modernity, is a secular face of Christian eschatology. 
However, Michael Gillsepie in his book, The Theological Origin of Modernity, continues 
Blumenberg’s argument that “modernity takes form within the metaphysical and 
theological structure of the tradition ….[it] arose not in opposition to or as a continuation 
of the medieval world but out of its rubble.”2 When the struggle between Scholasticism 
and Nominalism in the sixteenth century ruined the metaphysical and theological 
worldview which sustained the medieval world, thinkers at that time proposed new 
answers to the new society and filled the intellectual void left by the now-feeble medieval 
philosophy and theology. Modernity is neither a disguised Christianity nor its 
continuation. Thus modernity has its legitimacy but with its concealed theological origin. 
Nonetheless, and putting aside their disagreement, both Löwith and Gillespie agree that 
we cannot understand modernity without Christianity. I do not intend to go further into 
the debate between them but want to bring out the question of the relationship between 
modernity and Christianity. What is the relationship between modernity and Christianity? 
Is modernity a break from, or a continuation of, Christianity? I situate my thesis in the 
context of this conceptual framework. I take Rousseau as a major thinker of modernity to 
study the relationship of his philosophy and Christian thought. I argue the foundational 
principle of his system, the natural goodness of man, is a reply to Augustinian ethics and 
political theology based upon the doctrine of Original Sin. But in determining whether 
                                                
1 Löwith, Karl, Meaning in History, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949, p.2. 
2 Gillespie, Michael Allen, The Theological Origins of Modernity, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2008, p. 12. 
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Rousseau’s thought is a reaction to and a break from Christianity or a modified form of 
Christianity, it is important to relate Rousseau’s philosophy to Christian thought and 
bring out his Christian interlocutor. 
 
 4 
CHAPTER ONE  TWO CONFESSIONS 
 
In this chapter, first, I will discuss whether Rousseau is a modern philosopher and 
the relationship of his thought with Christianity. Rousseau’s philosophy is related to 
Christianity, but is it a debased version as Maritain criticizes? It is important to find out 
his Christian interlocutor. Then I will introduce my argument of the relationship between 
Rousseau’s Confessions and Augustine’s Confessions. It involves the investigation of the 
genesis of Rousseau’s Confessions. Besides his motivation of self-justification, Rousseau 
wanted to depict a self-portrait, which portrays a man according to nature in the 
Confessions. His self-portrait serves as a new criterion of human nature. This new 
criterion is clearly against the Christian doctrine of original sin. Although Rousseau had 
defended the principle of natural goodness against Archbishop Beaumont’s criticism in a 
letter, he wanted to deal directly with Augustine, the founder of the doctrine of original 
sin in his autobiography, which serves as a new medium to portray his self-portrait. It is 
the reason why he picked Augustine’s Confessions. But scholars doubt his knowledge of 
Augustine. In turn, I will reply to the challenges to Rousseau’s knowledge of Augustine 
by showing the quotations of Augustine in his works and his reading of Jansenists. After 
that, I will review scholars’ opinions of the relationship between two the Confessions to 
justify the theme of the dissertation. I situate the theme of the dissertation in the debate 
regarding grace and nature, which dominates the theological discourse in the eighteenth 
century. This chapter is concluded with the structure of the comparison of the two 
Confessions in the following chapters. 
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1. Is Rousseau a Modern Christian Philosopher? 
But first of all, can we say Rousseau is modern? If modernity amounts to the 
triumph of reason and human progress, then Rousseau is not on the list of modern 
philosophers. His First Discourse is a violent assault on the progress of sciences and arts. 
He laments loss of the ancient republican virtues in modern society. However, he was not 
suggesting a return to the ancient Greek city-state. He claimed that the source of virtue is 
not reason but the heart—man has to listen to the voice of nature in his heart. There, he 
criticizes both the idea of progress and the triumph of reason. Nevertheless, if the 
meaning of modernity is to champion the free self-assertive individual and inalienable 
human rights, then Rousseau is very modern in his Second Discourse and On Social 
Contract. In admitting that the ancient golden age is irretrievable, his Second Discourse, 
following Hobbes’s method, illustrates the development of man from the state of nature 
to the formation of civil society based upon the social contract. The free, self-sufficient 
man in the state of nature becomes the measure of a good political regime. Similarly, his 
project in Social Contract suggests how the citizen, living in accordance with the general 
will, can be as free as the natural man in the state of nature. On the one hand, Rousseau 
was a radical critic of the triumph of reason and progress. On the other hand, he still 
grounded modern society on the free, self-assertive individual. We see the tension 
between his nostalgia for ancient republican virtues of the citizen and his radical 
affirmation of the free and self-assertive individual man. His philosophy, however, 
pushes modernity forward and it in particular foments the emergence of modern France. 
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This is the reason why Leo Strauss regarded Rousseau’s thought as the initiator of the 
second wave of modernity.1  
What about the relationship of his thought with Christianity? I will deal with this 
question in detail later but can note some points now. Rousseau does not repudiate 
Christianity nor set up a totally secular society. Christian thoughts play an important role 
in his person and his works. He claimed to be a Christian, a disciple of Jesus. He said in 
the Letter to Beaumont, “I am a Christian, and sincerely Christian, according to the 
doctrine of Gospel. I am Christian not as a disciple of the Priests, but as a disciple of 
Jesus Christ.”2 He believed in God and was a follower of Jesus but he did not belong to 
any institutional Church, either Calvinist or Roman Catholic. He admired Jesus and lived 
up to the spirit of what Jesus says. He praised Jesus as a man greater than Socrates.3 
However, for Rousseau, Jesus is neither the Son of God nor his personal savior. Looking 
closer, his Christian belief differs from either the Calvinist or the Catholic tradition. This 
is also reflected in his works. The concept of the natural goodness of man, the foundation 
of his thought, clearly rejects the Christian doctrine of original sin. The profession of 
faith by the Vicar Savoyard in Émile is a manifesto of naturalized Christianity. In 
addition to his belief in the existence of God, he says, “bear in mind that the true duties of 
religion are independent of the institutions of men; that a just heart is the true temple of 
the divinity; that in every country and in every sect the sum of the law is to love God 
above everything and one’s neighbor as oneself; that no religion is exempt from the 
                                                
1 Strauss, Leo, “The Three Waves of Modernity,” An Introduction to Political Philosophy, Ten Essays by 
Leo Strauss, ed. Hilail Gildin, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1989, pp. 89-94. 
2 Beaumont, p. 47. 
3 Franquières, pp. 269-270.  
 7 
duties of morality… that inner worship is the first of these duties; and that without faith 
no true virtue exists.”4 Religion only becomes the foundation of morality and its function 
is to help man to be a good man and a good citizen. Accordingly, the heart is the 
sanctuary where man encounters God and thus neither revelation nor institutions are 
needed for knowing and worshipping God. Not only did Rousseau deviate from 
orthodoxy, he also severely criticized the institutional Church, and in particular, the 
Roman Catholic Church. He named it the religion of priests that divides societies into 
two leaders, two legislative systems, and two fatherlands.5 The religion of priests 
prevents a Christian from being a pious man and citizen at the same time.  
Not surprisingly, Rousseau’s writings do not escape Catholic criticism. Jacques 
Maritain, standing in the Catholic tradition, rebuked Rousseau’s Christianity as a debased 
Christianity.6 He criticized Rousseau for naturalizing Christianity and lining up with 
Pelagianism. Rousseau’s anti-intellectual stance and quietist spirituality7 overemphasize 
religious sentiment as the essential element of Christianity. Maritain calls Rousseau the 
father of Modernism, but Maritain’s criticism should be understood in the context of the 
threat of Modernism to the Catholic Church in the early twentieth century.8 Maritain is 
right that we can trace the root of anti-intellectual and sentimental modernism beyond 
                                                
4 Emile, pp. 311-312. 
5 SC, Book IV, Chapter VIII, p. 219. 
6 Maritain, Jacques, Three Reformers, Luther-Descartes-Rousseau, Greenwood Press, Westport, 
Connecticut, 1970, pp. 140-164.  
7 Quietism was a Christian heresy in the Seventeenth century. It exaggerates the perfection and the 
passivity of contemplative life. Quietists suppressed all other activities, including moral and intellectual 
activities, and became indifferent to any objects of love other than God. It was proposed by Miguel de 
Molinos in Italy but was condemned as heresy in 1687. Quietism became popular in France in the 
Seventeenth century by the influence of Mme Guyon Marie de la Motte. Rousseau’s ecstatic experience of 
the sentiment of existence in the imagination is redolent of Quietist spirituality. 
8 Maritain, Three Reformers, p. 157. 
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Friedrich Schleiermacher and back to Rousseau. My questions are: What makes 
Rousseau “debase” Christianity? Is his “debased” Christianity a “natural” child of 
traditional Christianity? Is his secular society portrayed in the Social Contract a last 
conquest of Gospel? Finding his Christian interlocutors is helpful to our study. Working 
through Rousseau’s works, it is his Confessions that clearly leads us to Augustine’s 
Confessions, one of the greatest works in Christian literature. But there is no easy 
consensus about this statement among scholars. 
 
2. The Relationship Between Two Confessions 
At the prefatory note of his Confessions, Rousseau claimed, “I am forming an 
undertaking which has no precedent, and the execution of which will have no imitator 
whatsoever.”9 While he proclaimed a revolutionary and unique project in history, the title 
of his book leads us to think of another work with the same title; that is, St. Augustine’s 
Confessions. As Jean Guéhenno said, “it cannot be doubted that when he [Rousseau] 
chose his title, he was thinking of the Confessions of St Augustine.”10 If Rousseau was 
truly making a unique, historical project, why did he adopt a title that is the same as 
another popular autobiography? Some scholars suggest that Rousseau’s Confessions, 
other than the title, has nothing to do with Augustine’s Confessions. Ronald Grimsley 
argued that the only event related to Augustine in Rousseau’s Confessions suggests 
                                                
9 Confessions, p. 5. 
10 Guéhenno, Jean, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans. by John and Doreen Weightman, vol. two, Columbia 
University Press, 1966, p. 141. Lionel Gassman also mentions the similar point. He says that Rousseau by 
the title of Confessions invites the readers to compare two popular Confessions in his time, namely, 
Augustine’s Confessions and Duclo’s Confessions du Comte de ***. Gossman, Lionel, “The Innocent Art 
of Confession and Reverie,” Daedalus, 107 (1978), p. 60. 
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Rousseau’s limited knowledge of Augustine, likely from secondary sources. Furthermore, 
although Rousseau borrowed the title from Augustine’s Confessions, this does not prove 
that Rousseau had made a serious study of Augustine.11 Grimsley is not alone to doubt 
the comparison. Jacques Voisine said that apart from taking the same title, Rousseau’s 
Confessions has nothing to do with Augustine. To Voisine, it is a secular version of the 
story of religious conversion. If Rousseau wanted readers to relate his Confessions to 
Augustine’s, he would have compared his Confessions to Augustine’s, not—as he does in 
the Neuchâtel Preface—to Cardan’s De Vita Propria or to Montaigne’s Essais.12 D. G. 
Wright also objected to this comparison. He agreed that there are some similar episodes 
in the two Confessions, but “given the common biblical source for each of these writers, 
and given that Rousseau has already demonstrated a strong investment in the Eden story 
in his earlier writings,” Wright rejected that Rousseau’s Confessions is a reply to 
Augustine’s.13 I, however, hold a different position from theirs and argue that Rousseau, 
by using the same title, deliberately put the two Confessions together as a reply to 
Augustinian theology. 
Despite his explicit initiative in the title, Rousseau only mentioned Augustine 
once in the Confessions. He quoted Augustine in a discussion with a young priest about 
Catholic catechism in Turin. At that time, his knowledge of Augustine, coming from a 
                                                
11 Grimsley, Ronald, “Book Review on Ann Hartle’s ‘The Modern Self in Rousseau’s Confessions, A 
Reply to St. Augustine’,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 23, no. 4 October 1985, p. 592. 
12 Voisine, Jacques, “Confessions,” Dictionnaire de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, publié sous la direction de 
Raymond Trousson et Frédéric S. Eigeldinger, Honoré Champion, Paris, 2006, pp. 156-157. 
13 Wright, D. G., “Rousseau’s Confessions: The Tragedy of Teleology,” Journal of Social and Political 
Thought, vol. 1, no. 4, January 2003, note 6. http://www.yorku.ca/jspot/4/rousseau.html 
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Jansenist, Le Sueur’s book, was very limited.14 It is evident that Rousseau did not know 
Augustine’s thought well at that time. But that does not suggest that Rousseau would not 
study Augustine’s work in his later life. Indeed, I will demonstrate Rousseau’s 
knowledge of Augustine in the later part of this chapter. Furthermore, the potential 
audience for Rousseau’s Confessions would likely be familiar with Augustine’s 
Confessions, as it was republished in a variety of translations throughout the Seventeenth 
and the Eighteenth centuries. Put differently, readers would inevitably ask why Rousseau 
took the popular title of Confessions. Guéhenno said in Rousseau’s biography that “it is 
very strange that he should make no mention of them…. but he is shrewd enough to leave 
us the initiative to think of the comparison.”15 By adopting the same title, it is obvious 
that Rousseau was leading the readers to compare him with a saint in the Western 
Christian Church. We can know more about Rousseau’s purpose in writing from the 
genesis of his autobiography. 
 
3. Rousseau’s Confessions  
i.  Its Genesis 
In 1759, Rousseau decided to totally renounce high society and the composition 
of books, as writing for trade and mingling with the literary people did not agree with his 
inborn talent and inclination. In spite of his plans for retirement, he did not want to totally 
abandon his pen. His publisher, Rey, had been pressing him to write the memoir of his 
life for a long time. However, Rousseau was not interested in writing a simple memoir of 
                                                
14 Confessions, p. 55. 
15 Guéhenno, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, II, p. 141. 
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his life that was only a factual record of his life events without frankness in it. Rousseau 
“resolved to make them into a unique work by means of a truthfulness without precedent, 
so that at least once a man could be seen as he was inside.”16 Although he knew that his 
pubic image was so little like his own, he did not aim to write the memoirs of his life as 
an apology. Rather, he was interested in showing to the public the transparent self that 
consisted of good and bad, because he believed that even the best man in the world has 
some vicious parts in his interior. He was passionate to show the new criterion for the 
good man. He then dedicated his leisure to reflecting on his history and began to collect 
letters and papers to help his memory.17 This period was the first stage of the genesis of 
Confessions. Rousseau, however, did not really pick up a pen to write his autobiography 
for another six years, until 1765-66.  
In January 1765, he was deeply troubled by the pamphlet, The Sentiment of the 
Citizens, which revealed he abandoned his children to the orphanage. He immediately 
wrote a defensive note on the pamphlet in which he evaded the issue,18 but he later gave 
up publishing it.19 In fact, Rousseau enjoyed a good public reputation, where people 
trusted him as a virtuous person. The publication of the pamphlet did not push him to 
defend his reputation but his conscience did not give him peace—his inner voice asked 
him to justify himself. On the 13th of January, he wrote to Duclo telling him that he was 
resolved to write his autobiography. He decided to reveal himself to the public and let the 
readers make their own judgment of him. Rousseau said, “But I have a great deal to say 
                                                
16 Confessions, p. 433. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Guéhenno, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, II, p. 134. 
19 Ibid., p. 144. 
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and I will say it all; I will not omit any fault of my own, or even any evil thought. I will 
describe myself as I am; the bad will in almost every instance eclipse the good…”20 
Rousseau insisted on the complete frankness in his autobiography. He had already 
decided the title of the book: The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, containing a 
detailed account of the events of his life and of his private thoughts in all the situations in 
which he has found himself.21 It is worth noting that he named this project “Confessions” 
instead of “Memoir.” It is clear that he was undertaking a novel project in which he 
totally revealed his inner self, good and bad, to his readers.  
It seems his proximate reason for writing Confessions was self-justification. 
Nevertheless, it is not necessary for self-justification to confess and reveal his entire inner 
self to the public. There must be a deeper underlying reason. In the Sentiment of the 
Citizen, Rousseau was judged as debauched by the pamphlet’s author because Rousseau 
abandoned his children to the orphanage. In other words, the pamphlet accused Rousseau 
according to then-contemporary moral principles. If Rousseau wants to justify himself he 
had to prove either that he has done nothing wrong or that the author’s principles are 
wrong. For the former, he cannot deny that he has abandoned his children to the 
orphanage. He had left behind his responsibilities as a father; he could only take the latter 
direction of argument. According to the Christian natural law tradition in the Eighteenth 
century, moral goodness is based upon nature. Rousseau endeavored to show the readers 
a new natural law of morality in his autobiography. Thus, although he had done harm to 
himself and others, he remained good. This complete truthfulness of self in his 
                                                
20 Guéhenno, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, II, p. 138. 
21 Ibid. 
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autobiography serves as the criterion of the good man and so his effort at self-
justification. 
 
ii. The Self Portrait: A Man According to Nature 
Rousseau explained his purpose in the prefatory note of the Confessions, “I wish 
to show my fellow a man in all the truth of nature; and this man will be myself.”22 
According to the Christian natural law tradition, man, who acts according to nature, must 
be good. But Rousseau had done both good and bad in his past. How can he be a good 
man according to nature? He said, “Whether nature has done well or ill in breaking the 
mold in which it cast me, is something which cannot be judged until I have been read.”23 
In other words, a person who wants to judge Rousseau has to know him entirely by 
reading his whole life; they have to read the Confessions. Rousseau presented the 
Confessions as the book about his whole life that he would show to God in the Last 
Judgment. Thus, this autobiography for Rousseau is not so much an account of what he 
had done, good and bad, as it is the revelation of his interior. Did Rousseau know his 
heart completely?24 First, nobody knows the human heart better than God does. As God 
said to Samuel in the Bible, ‘Do not look on his appearance or on the height of his 
                                                
22 Confessions, p. 5. 
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knows of himself and there is another part of which he does not know unless God illuminate him. Thus, He 
says, “You, Lord, are my judge.” (X, v, 7) 
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stature, because I have rejected him; for the Lord does not see as mortals see; they look 
on the outward appearance, but the Lord looks on the heart” (1 Samuel 16:7, emphasis 
added). Rousseau’s claim to reveal everything about himself was his intent to unveil his 
interior as only God could see. But it is impossible to compare oneself with God. Who 
can claim that he knows himself as God does, if it is only the omniscient God who is the 
Judge of human beings?  
Without knowing the objective true self, Rousseau could only appeal to the 
truthfulness of his sincerity. “I have shown myself as I was, contemptible and low, when 
I was so, good, generous, sublime when I was so.”25 However, Rousseau insidiously 
replaced God with himself to be the judge of man. He said, “I have unveiled my interior 
as Thou hast seen it Thyself.”26 What Rousseau meant by that is that he with this 
sincerity could know himself as God does and could be the judge of his goodness. Thus, 
sincerity, like divine truth, becomes the criterion for the judgment of man. He told his 
readers the good and the evil he has done, with the same frankness he would before 
God’s judgment, showing his interior, as God would see it. If the readers want to judge 
Rousseau, they have to follow his criterion. He asks his readers, “Let each of them in his 
turn uncover his heart at the foot of Thy throne with the same sincerity; and then let a 
single one say to Thee, if he dares: ‘I was better than that man.’”27 This echoes the 
passage in the Gospel according to John, which narrates the story of a woman who has 
been caught in adultery (John 8: 1-11). According to the Mosaic Law, this woman should 
                                                
25 Confessions, p. 5. 
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be stoned to death. Jesus asks the crowd, “Let anyone among you who is without sin be 
the first to throw a stone at her.” As they are all sinners, the crowd leaves quietly without 
throwing a stone. Then, there remain Jesus and the woman. Jesus is the only one who has 
the authority to condemn her, but he does not condemn her and only asks her not to sin 
again.28 According to the gospel, God is the only Judge of human beings. We, as sinners, 
have no right to judge one another. In Rousseau’s Confessions, unlike the gospel, the 
audiences, not God, are the judges who have the right to condemn Jean Jacques. 
However, if they follow Rousseau’s path and uncover their hearts then they will find that 
they are the same as Rousseau. Both the audiences and Rousseau, who morally have done 
good and bad, are the same. No one can claim that he or she is better than others. 
However, the self-portrait of Rousseau in the Confessions is of a man who is good 
according to nature. Other than writing for self-justification, his self-portrait as a 
naturally good man is his purpose in writing. He endeavored to delineate the natural 
goodness of man as the new principle for judgment of human being. But this is clearly 
opposed to the Christian doctrine of original sin, which states that man is born sinful. 
Rousseau reflected on the natural goodness of man in all his writings but he speaks it 
explicitly in the mouth of the Vicar Savoyard in Émile.29 This evoked the argument 
between Rousseau and Archbishop Beaumont, which helps us to know Rousseau’s 
criticism of the doctrine of original sin. 
 
                                                
28 Pierre Courcelle also mentions this argument and says that Rousseau substitutes Jesus with himself. 
Courcelle, Pierre, Les Confessions de Saint Augustin dans la tradition littéraire. (Paris : Etudes 
Augustiniennes, 1993), p. 459. n. 3. 
29 Beaumont, p.28. 
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iii. Against the Doctrine of Original Sin 
In 1762, after the publishing of Emile, Christopher Beaumont, the Archbishop of 
Paris, condemned Rousseau in his pastoral letter. The main criticism was about his 
principle of natural goodness of man in Emile. Archbishop Beaumont objected that 
Rousseau did “not at all recognize the doctrine of the Holy Scripture and of the Church 
touching the revolution that has happened in our nature.”30 The Archbishop was clearly 
talking about the doctrine of original sin, which is in direct disagreement with Rousseau’s 
principle of the natural goodness of man. In his response, Rousseau stated that “the 
fundamental principle of all morality about which I have reasoned in all my Writings and 
developed in this last one with all the clarity of which I was capable, is that man is a 
naturally good being, loving justice and order; that there is no original perversity in the 
human heart, and that the first movements of nature are always right…I have shown that 
all the vices imputed to the human heart are not natural to it.”31 He stated his belief that 
the natural goodness of man is the fundamental principle of all morality and serves as the 
basis of all his writings. It is not surprising that Archbishop Beaumont criticized 
Rousseau in his pastoral letter, saying Rousseau’s idea of the natural goodness of man is 
anti-Christian.  
In the Letter to Beaumont, Rousseau refuted the Archbishop’s accusation and 
criticized the doctrine of original sin under three different aspects; namely, theological, 
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philosophical, and sacramental.32 He first challenged the theological foundation of the 
doctrine and asserts that it is not clearly mentioned in the Scripture. Under the influence 
of Calvin’s theology, Rousseau only accepted doctrine based on Scripture. He said, “It is 
not certain, in my view, that this doctrine of original sin, subject as it is to such terrible 
difficulties, is contained in the Scriptures either as clearly or as harshly as it has pleased 
the Rhetorician Augustine and our theologians to construct it.”33 Rousseau did not deny 
the narrative of Adam’s sin in the Scripture. It is true that there is a narrative of the first 
sin of Adam and Eve, but it is not clear whether their sin would transmit to their 
descendants such terrible consequences. In other words, for Rousseau, this doctrine is 
only a product of speculation by which, as merely rhetoric, Augustine and other 
theologians have explained the antecedent sinful bondage on human beings. If this 
doctrine is not based upon the Scripture, it loses its authority for Rousseau. Moreover, 
this doctrine only confuses the faith and veils the truth.34  
Besides the problem of the theological foundation of the doctrine, Rousseau also 
queried its philosophical argument. God created man, who consists of body and soul; but 
according to the doctrine of original sin at Rousseau’s time, guilt arises when the body 
leads the innocent and pure soul to commit the moral sin. If God condemns man to hell 
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because of his bodily sin, it is unfair to man as he is created with these sinful bodily 
inclinations. This doctrine contradicts God’s justice and goodness. Rousseau claimed that 
the good and just God could scarcely make men vulnerable to sin and then condemn 
them.35 The doctrine of original sin is a blasphemy for Rousseau. Thus the doctrine of 
original sin is lacking any intrinsic logic. 
Furthermore, Rousseau challenged the effect of the sacrament of baptism, which 
is regarded by the Christian Church as the virtually indispensable means of salvation. 
Rousseau argued that if original sin is the cause of sins for Adam’s descendants, and if all 
their sins, including original sin, are cleansed by the grace of baptism, then a person 
emerging from the water in the baptismal font is like a newborn Adam coming from the 
hand of God. However, the newly baptized Christian will contract new impurities again. 
It amounts to saying the grace of baptism pales in the face of the power of sin. Rousseau 
asked, “Isn’t the blood of Christ powerful enough yet to erase the stain completely, or is 
it rather an effect of the natural corruption of our flesh, as if God—even independently of 
original sin—had quite deliberately created us corrupt in order to have the pleasure of 
punishing us?”36 Rousseau saw from the consequences of baptism that original sin is not 
the source of our sin. Otherwise it would contradict the saving power of Christ and the 
goodness and justice of God. There is one more question left. If original sin is not the 
source of our sin, then what is the significance of the sacrament? Do we need sacrament 
for salvation? Rousseau challenged not only the doctrine of original sin but also the need 
of the sacrament for salvation. 
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The doctrine of original sin as accounting for the human likelihood of sinning is 
based on the Garden of Eden story in Genesis 3. However, Rousseau decried the doctrine, 
saying it fails to explain why Adam sinned at all.  Rousseau refuted this doctrine: “You 
say we are sinners because of our first father’s sin. But why was our first father himself a 
sinner?”37 The authority of the Scripture has not satisfied rational inquiry into the 
rationale of the first sin. If we sin because of the sinful inclination caused by our first 
father, then how did the first father sin in the innocent state? He asserted, “Original sin 
explains everything except its own principle.”38 In short, Rousseau held that the doctrine 
of original sin fails to answer the problem of evil. 
Rousseau violently assailed the doctrine of original sin in the Letter to Beaumont. 
Since the Archbishop condemned Rousseau by means of Pascal’s argument, that there is 
a mixture of baseness and greatness in human heart, Rousseau did not reply to 
Augustine’s argument of original sin in the letter.39 There is without doubt a clear conflict 
between the doctrine of original sin and Rousseau’s conception of the natural goodness of 
man. To justify the new principle of morality, the natural goodness of man, refuting the 
doctrine of the original sin is strategically correct. Rousseau therefore needed to confront 
the author of chief theological account of the doctrine, Augustine of Hippo. In the 
Christian tradition, there are, of course, some Church fathers before Augustine who made 
use of the idea of original sin. They, however, had not developed it into a theological 
system. Augustine’s polemics about grace and human merit, in answering Pelagius, 
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“distinguished with the more sharpness and insistence than his predecessors the 
punishment and the guilt.”40 Every man, who inherited guilt from Adam, can be saved 
only by God’s grace. The Councils of Carthage and of Orange endorsed Augustine’s 
theology of grace and original sin later. Since then, the idea that man inherited guilt at 
birth, as the punishment of Adam’s sin, has become the mainstream of Christian 
anthropology. But why did Rousseau pick Augustine’s Confessions? Augustine stated his 
doctrine of original sin throughout his anti-Pelagian writings and, for example, in Book 
Fourteen of the City of God. Why did Rousseau not choose those works? It is because the 
genre of Confessional literature matches both Augustine and Rousseau’s purpose in 
writing an autobiography.  
 
iv. The Genre of Confessional Literature  
Augustine wrote his Confessions during 397-401 AD. There were two events that 
caused the genesis of his Confessions.41 First, the old bishop Valerius asked the presiding 
bishop of Numidia to ordain Augustine as an assistant or coadjutor bishop. However, 
Augustine was distrusted, both because of his attacks against the Church before his 
conversion and his Manichean background. Furthermore, the Donatists, the majority of 
the Church in Hippo, were great opponents to Augustine’s ordination. Hence, Augustine 
needed to demonstrate that he was not a hidden Platonist with a Christian face and was a 
qualified candidate to be a bishop. Second, Bishop Alypius, Augustine’s good friend, 
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asked Paulinus, a rich and pious aristocrat from Bordeaux, for a donation of money to his 
diocese. In turn, Paulinus, who was interested in Augustine’s spiritual journey, asked 
Alypius to send him an autobiography of Augustine to reveal how he had come to 
baptism and ordination. Augustine therefore wrote his Confessions first to demonstrate 
his faith in Christ and second to reveal his spiritual journey from fallenness to salvation 
as a testimony to God’s grace.  
With those purposes of writing in mind, the title Confessions consists of three 
meanings; namely, confession of praise, of faith, and of sin. The first part of Augustine’s 
Confessions, Book I to IX, is his autobiographical account from his birth to his 
conversion and baptism. The second part, from Book X to XIII, is about his present 
situation about ten years after finishing the first nine books and the exegesis of Genesis 1-
2:2. The main purpose of his work is to praise God. He began his Confessions with a 
psalm of praise, “You are great, Lord, and highly to be praised (Ps 47:2): great is your 
power and your wisdom is immeasurable” (Ps 146:5).42 This desire to praise asks for the 
knowledge of the praised object. Thus, he then asked, if he does not know God then how 
can he praise Him? How does he know God and where does God dwell in which he can 
know Him? The quest for God became a question of direction for Augustine, who 
realized that his search involved self-discovery as well. Here, Augustine is the first to 
articulate a new path to knowing God as an inner path. In this manner, God reveals 
himself or can be discovered by the knowing self through a process of self-discovery. In 
tracing the inner path of self-knowledge, the Confessions as literature is arguably the best 
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means of expressing the subjects of study. The interlocutor of Augustine’s Confessions is 
God with whom Augustine the protagonist is revealed. Both Augustine and God act as 
agents in the dialogue but they are also objects to be known by both narrator and the 
readers as well. “It is from love of your love that I make the act of recollection. The 
recalling of my wicked ways is bitter in my memory, but I do it so that you may be sweet 
to me, a sweetness touched by no deception, a sweetness serene and content.”43 
His life history is an odyssey of the soul.44 At the outset of the dialogue, 
Augustine found out that his soul lived in a sinful situation since birth. Evil is the given 
state of man. In his adolescence, he was confused by the lusts of sensual desires. He said, 
“It seized hold of my youthful weakness sweeping me through the precipitous rocks of 
desire to submerge me in a whirlpool of vice…I traveled very far from you.”45 Reading 
Cicero’s Hortensius is a turning point of his journey, he says: “The book changed my 
feelings. It altered my prayers, Lord, to be towards you yourself…I began to rise up to 
return to you.”46 From then on, Augustine was exposed to different philosophies, for 
example, Manicheism, Academics, and Aristotle’s Categories. Finally he encountered 
Platonist’s books, by which he overcame the materialistic view of thinking and ascended 
to see the eternal truth. But he was not able to stay there with the truth as he was dragged 
by the force of the sexual habits. Until he read St Paul’s Letters, he recognized the source 
of the struggle of will between two laws is the punishment of original sin and Jesus is the 
incarnate Word of God. At the crucial moment in the garden in Milan, Augustine 
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converted to Christianity by God’s grace. His life history shows how God’s grace works 
in the midst of the weakness of man. Turning back from God by free will is the source of 
evil and an act of sin.  By leaving God through person, man deepens the sinfulness of his 
situation. Because knowing and loving God is a free gift from God, he can only pray to 
God for it and accept it by faith. Augustine’s conversion happened in his mind when he 
surrendered himself to God’s love by faith. In short, he found God in a journey from his 
fallen state to salvation by faith, and he praised God for His mercy. His conversion story 
centers on the fallen nature of man and the source of his sin on the one hand, and a 
personal God of love and mercy on the other. The first and foremost message of his 
Confession, nevertheless, is that God is the highest good of man that alone can make him 
happiness. God’s mercy and grace saves man from his miserable situation. By this 
portrait of the state of man and salvation by grace so as to attain happiness, Augustine’s 
masterpiece delineates a Christian view of human nature.47  
Furthermore, Augustine believed that faith does not amount to a doctrine nor is 
God only an idea. Man is a relational being and by faith attains his happiness in a loving 
relationship with God. When Augustine came across the Platonism and followed the path 
of the intellectual enquiry, he saw the light of the truth but was not able to commit 
himself to live in accordance with it. He then “learned to discern and distinguish the 
difference between presumption and confession, between those who see what the goal is 
but not how to get there and those who see the way which leads to the home of bliss, not 
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merely as an end to be perceived but as a realm to live in.”48 Augustine wanted to show 
the readers the relational aspect of faith. Thus, for him, the genre of confession is proper 
to portray a man who is a relational being and attains his happiness in a loving 
relationship with God. Besides, unlike philosophical and technical theological language, 
the confessional literature stimulates in the readers not their intellectual curiosity but the 
desire to imitate the confessant.  
Stir up the heart when people read and hear the confessions of my past 
wickedness which you have forgiven…Prevent their heart from sinking 
into the sleep of despair…On the contrary, the heart is aroused in the love 
of your mercy and the sweetness of your grace, by which every weak 
person is given power, while dependence on grace produces awareness of 
one’s own weakness.49  
 
Augustine reveals his inner self by confessing his goodness and badness. The readers 
were encouraged by Augustine’s example of how God’s mercy enhanced faith and hope.  
Let us return to Rousseau: why did he choose Augustine’s Confessions as the 
interlocutor for his autobiography? We need to explore further his reason for writing an 
autobiography. Besides the urging of his publisher and the argument of self-justification, 
taking into account his entire body of writings, Rousseau wanted to write in a new 
language that can overcome the shortcomings of philosophical language. Rousseau knew 
that very few readers in Europe understood his Second Discourse and that it also suffered 
from epistemological criticisms.50 Some people criticized that, following Rousseau’s 
theory in the Second Discourse, the prior condition of natural man can no longer be 
reached from the standpoint of current condition of civil man because there is no criterion 
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to distinguish the natural from the conventional; and accordingly, we can no longer 
discern the true condition of natural man. Hence, Rousseau’s argument is self-defeating, 
for he was also a modern man who would not be able reliably to distinguish natural from 
conventional.51 Rousseau understood that his previous work is not immune from his own 
criticisms of philosophical systems. Philosophical language inevitably operates from a 
rational framework, which abstracts from the complexity of existence. In knowing human 
nature, such a framework leads the reader to think, at most, of a thinking self as Descartes 
did. Thus, philosophical language cannot fulfill Rousseau’s purpose. Rousseau had to 
invent a new medium to make his case for the natural goodness of man: thus his self-
portrait in an autobiography. “For what I have to say it would be necessary to invent a 
language as new as my project.”52 This is the purpose of confessional literature. “If I 
want to compose a carefully written work like the other ones, I will not be depicting 
myself, I will be disguising myself. The issue here is my portrait, not a book.”53 If 
Rousseau had written his autobiography in philosophical language, it would inevitably 
have put his life history into a conceptual framework or system and then it would become 
a disguise, not a portrait. Furthermore, the readers following his interior path in such a 
book will only find a thinking self. However, it is the sentimental self that Rousseau 
wanted to portray in his autobiography. Talking about the limitation of his memory, he 
said, “I have only one faithful guide upon which I can count, that is the chain of feelings 
which have marked the succession of my being, and, by means of them, the succession of 
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events which have been their cause or effect.”54 But how can he express the chain of 
feelings in words? The process and the style of writing are the key. He wrote about his 
life events as he felt it and saw it. “By abandoning myself at the same time to both the 
remembrance of the received impression and to the present feeling, I will depict the state 
of soul doubly, namely, at the moment when the event happened to me and at the moment 
when I describe it.”55 Confessional literature, a new language, became the proper medium 
for Rousseau to portray himself as a man according to nature. 
Augustine’s Confessions is an autobiography about human nature corrupted by 
original sin and God’s salvation through grace. In order to refute the doctrine of original 
sin and introduce the naturally good self as the fundamental principle of morality, it is not 
surprising that Rousseau adopted Confessions as the title of his autobiography. Rousseau 
led his readers to compare his portrait of man according to nature with Augustine’s 
Christian portrait of man.  
 
4. Rousseau’s Knowledge of Augustine 
I have illustrated the genesis and the main themes of the two Confessions to 
establish Rousseau’s intention to respond to Augustine’s understanding of human 
goodness. People may wonder whether Rousseau knew Augustine well, because 
Rousseau mentioned Augustine in his Confessions only once, apparently showing his 
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limited knowledge of Augustine.56 But this does not rule out the possibility that Rousseau 
learned more about Augustine in his later life. When Rousseau was in his early twenties, 
he was enthusiastic about Voltaire’s philosophical work, in particular the Philosophical 
Letters. He said, “Although they were assuredly not his best work, it was this one that 
attracted me most toward study, and this nascent taste has not died out since that time.”57 
Rousseau was exposed to Jansenism, a rigorous Augustinianism, in Voltaire’s 
Philosophical Letters.  
Voltaire refuted Pascal’s Pensées in Letter twenty-five.58 Pascal was a Jansenist 
and he explained the miserable human condition in terms of the doctrine of original sin. It 
was obvious for him that there is in man some mighty principle of greatness and at the 
same time some mighty principle of wretchedness. It is the true religion, Christianity that 
knows human nature perfectly and can offer a perfect explanation of this conflict of 
human nature. This explanation is the incomprehensible doctrine of original sin. 
According to Voltaire’s rebuke, Pascal “attributes to the essence of our nature what 
pertains to certain men only…I dare assert that we are neither so wicked nor so miserable 
as he [Pascal] says.”59 It is clear that Rousseau was familiar with the argument against the 
teaching about the wickedness of human nature and the doctrine of original sin in his 
early twenties.  
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Some years later when Rousseau had an accident that brought him close to death 
and gave him time to study, he frequently read books of the Oratory, and of Port-Royal in 
particular, the key institutions of French Jansenists.60 Reading Jansenist books made him 
a half Jansenist. Rousseau, familiar with the strict form of Augustinianism from their 
books, had learned that man was born wicked because of the inherited guilt of the 
original sin. Only God’s grace can save man from his miserable condition. Since God 
predestined who will be saved, no one can be assured of his salvation. This harsh 
theology scared Rousseau and weakened his confidence in salvation. He gradually lost 
his security regarding salvation and feared the eternal damnation of Hell.61 This created a 
conflict between his mind and his conscience. “According to my Jansenists the thing was 
indubitable; but according to my conscience it seemed to me that it was not.”62 He then 
solved this conflict by throwing a stone to a tree. If he hit it then he was saved. 
Prescinding from his way of solving the problem, it is clear that he was much disturbed 
by Jansenism. There is no doubt that Rousseau learned Augustine’s theology of grace and 
original sin by reading Jansenist books. 
Furthermore, certain quotations from Augustine’s writings in Rousseau’s works 
indicate Rousseau’s knowledge of Augustine. In the passages that follow, I shall show 
Rousseau’s rhetorical tactic of using Augustine’s words for his own purposes. 
It is worth noting that Rousseau, in the Letter to Beaumont, quoted directly from 
Augustine’s Confessions to support his argument. Rousseau said that those who have 
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ecclesiastical approval are “being paid by the strong to preach to the weak, they know 
only how to speak to the latter about their duties and to the former about their rights.”63 
Rousseau replied that although he is weak, with the support of Augustine’s argument, he 
had the right to defend himself. He could not help but speak out the truth. “Divine truth, 
says Augustine, is neither mine, yours, nor his, but ours, whom it calls upon forcefully to 
publish it together, on pain of being useless to ourselves if we do not communicate it to 
others. For whoever appropriates for himself alone a good that God wants everyone to 
enjoy loses through this usurpation what he hides from the public, and finds only error in 
himself for having betrayed the truth.”64 Rousseau claims that he, in knowing the truth 
that is for the public good, is obliged to communicate it to others. He took advantage of 
Augustine’s authority to rebuke the Archbishop. This direct quotation of Augustine’s 
Confessions shows that Rousseau at least had the book at hand. 
Furthermore, although Rousseau regarded Augustine as a rhetorician and the 
founder of the doctrine of the original sin, he also respected Augustine as the advocate for 
the intellectual freedom of theology. Rousseau quoted Augustine’s Letter 238 as an 
epigraph to his Letter to the Archbishop: “Be forbearing, if I have spoken plainly, not to 
humiliate you, but defend myself. I have presumed upon your seriousness of purpose and 
your prudence, for you can plainly see how you have put me in the position of having to 
answer you.”65  
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In the second half of his Letter to Beaumont, refuting the Archbishop’s stance of 
the relationship between faith and reason, Rousseau made use of a quotation from 
Augustine’s De Trinitate to support the doctrine of transubstantiation that although the 
language of the doctrine seems to be unintelligible and meaningless, it is a way to express 
the mystery of faith. “I know very well that you still have Saint Augustine as a resource, 
but that amounts to the same thing. After heaping up many unintelligible speeches about 
the Trinity, he agrees they have no meaning. But says this Church Father naively, we 
express ourselves this way not to say something, but in order not to remain silent.”66  
In the Political Economy, Rousseau suggested how to be an ambitious leader: “To 
be just, it is necessary to be severe. Tolerating wickedness that one has the right and the 
power to repress is being wicked oneself.”67  In the 1782 edition, Rousseau added a 
quotation from Augustine’s Letters, “sicuti enim est aliquando misericordia puniens, ita 
est crudelita parcens,” (For just as sometimes there is mercy in punishing, so too there is 
cruelty in sparing,) to support his argument.  
In the Observations, Rousseau mentioned that he was reproached for having 
cultivated the studies he condemned himself. He was accused of the contradiction 
between his conduct and his doctrine. Then he said,  
                                                
66 Beaumont, p. 78. Augustine, De Trinitate, Book 5, Chapter 9. 
67 Rousseau, Political Economy, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 3, p. 150, n.18. Augustine’s 
words are taken from Letters 54 (Pléiade, III, 1397)  
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On this subject, I could relate what the Church Fathers said of the worldly 
Science they scorned and which they nonetheless used to combat the 
Pagan Philosophers. I could cite the comparison they made to the Egyptian 
vases stolen by the Israelites. But I will be satisfied for my final Reply to 
ask this question: If someone came to kill me and I were fortunate enough 
to seize his weapon, would I be forbidden to use it to chase him out of my 
house before I throw it away?68  
 
He is referring to what Augustine said in De Doctrina Christiana Book II, Chapter 40. 
Augustine explained that Christians could make use of the pagan philosophy and the 
material of heathens for Christian purposes according to God, by taking Plato’s 
philosophy and Egypt’s gold and garments as examples. He said, “These, therefore, the 
Christian, when he separates himself in spirit from the miserable fellowship of these men, 
ought to take away from them, and to devote to their proper use in preaching the 
gospel.”69  
Thus, Rousseau, following Augustine, was able to use the same science, which he 
criticizes, for his own purpose. These examples demonstrate Rousseau’s rhetorical tactic 
of using Augustine’s methodology and attitude of doing theology for his own purposes, 
and further indicates his knowledge of Augustine. And Augustine was the Church Father 
he quoted most often in his writings. Moreover, since he disagreed with certain tenets of 
Christian theology, Rousseau quoted Augustine’s work as the target of criticism. 
He also quoted Augustine’s works in his other writings. Rousseau did not agree 
with Augustine’s criticism of the Roman virtues in the City of God, especially, the 
episode where Brutus killed his son out of love for his country. In the Political 
Fragments in Social Contract, he said,  
                                                
68 Rousseau, Observations, p. 40. n. 3. 
69 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, Book II, Ch. 40, Aug. Works.  
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I am annoyed by the jokes St Augustine dared to make about this great and 
beautiful act of virtue. The church Fathers were unable to see all the harm 
they did to their cause by thus tarnishing all the greatest things that 
courage and honor had produced. By dint of wanting to elevate the 
sublimity of Christianity, they taught Christians to be cowardly men 
without…70  
 
Rousseau, as a proponent of Roman virtue, accused Augustine of elevating the 
superiority of Christianity by diminishing Roman patriotic virtues.  
In addition, in the Reveries of the Solitary Walker (written twelve years after the 
Confessions), Rousseau took a different stance from Augustine’s view of God’s justice, 
judgment, and eternal damnation. At the end of the Second Reverie, Rousseau discussed 
his understanding of the plot of persecution in which he, an innocent good man, suffered. 
Hitherto, he regarded his suffering from persecution as the fruit of human wickedness. 
But at the moment of writing, he saw God’s Will behind the scene. The plot of 
persecution for him is so perfect that it is impossible that God’s Providence does not lie 
behind it. He then said, “Swarms of individual observations, either in the past or in the 
present, so confirm me in this opinion that I cannot prevent myself from henceforth 
considering as one of those secrets of Heaven impenetrable to human reason.”71 God 
wills his suffering but Rousseau did not come to a conclusion that his last judgment 
totally relies upon God’s hand. He further said,  
                                                
70 Rousseau, Political Fragments in Social Contract, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 4, pp. 38-
39. Rousseau praises Brutus’s virtue in contrast to natural goodness. “This word virtue signifies ‘strength.’ 
There is no virtue at all without struggle; there is none without victory. Virtue does not consist merely in 
being just, but in being so by triumphing over one’s passions, by ruling over one’s own heart… Brutus 
having his children die might have been only just. But Brutus was a tender father; in order to do his duty he 
lacerated his insides, and Brutus was virtuous.” Franquieres, p. 267. Rousseau shows his admiration to 
Brutus’s virtue in the Final Reply as well. CW vol. 2, p. 123.  
71 Reveries, p. 20. 
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I do not go as far as St. Augustine who would have consoled himself to be 
damned if such had been the will of God. My resignation comes; it is true, 
from a less disinterested source, but one no less pure and to my mind, 
more worthy of the perfect Being whom I adore. God is just, He wills that 
I suffer, and He knows that I am innocent. That is the cause of my 
confidence; my heart and my reason cry out to me that I will not be 
deceived by it.72  
 
Rousseau is referring to what Augustine discussed on human suffering in the Book XX of 
the City of God:73 “As it is, however, there are good men who suffer evils and evil men 
who enjoy good things, which seems unjust; and there are bad men who come to bad end, 
and good men who arrive at a good one. Thus, the judgments of God are all the more 
inscrutable, and His ways past finding out.”74 Augustine concurred that men cannot 
penetrate God’s mind, whose judgments are totally beyond human understanding. Man is 
not able to understand why God allows bad men to enjoy good things in the world, nor 
why a man comes to be saved or damned in the last judgment. No one can claim his or 
her innocence, because every one is made guilty by Adam’s sin. “…No one may escape 
this just and deserved punishment unless redeemed by mercy and undeserved grace.”75 
Man does not have the right to argue against God for salvation, as salvation comes from 
God’s mercy, not man’s merit. So it is just even if God punishes all mankind. “If 
punishment had indeed been visited upon all men, no one could justly have complained 
of the justice of Him who avenges; whereas we have reason to give most heartfelt thanks 
                                                
72 Reveries, p. 21 
73 COD, XX, 1-2, pp. 965-968. 
74 Ibid., XX, 2, p. 968. 
75 Ibid., XXI, 12, p. 1070. 
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to our Redeemer for His free gift in delivering so many from it.”76 Augustine totally 
surrenders himself to God’s will and is consoled that even if God condemns him. God’s 
will is above nature and the limits of human reason. It is not surprising that the God in 
whom Augustine believed is unjust and unreasonable for Rousseau. Thus, for Rousseau it 
did not make sense that God would punish him, who was born naturally good and was 
living according to nature. Although Rousseau did not elaborate Augustine’s thought of 
original sin and salvation by grace in this passage, it is clear he knew Augustine’s 
theology of original sin and grace well, so that he was able to contrast his conviction with 
Augustine’s. 
The quotations above show that Rousseau had read Augustine’s Confessions and 
other writings. It is worth noting that Rousseau made use of Augustine’s words for 
tactical purposes. Rousseau disagreed with Augustine’s philosophy and theology but he 
appreciated Augustine’s attitude towards knowledge and truth. Although Rousseau 
disagreed with Augustine, he quoted his rival’s words by changing their original 
principles for his own purposes, as he did in the Observations.77  
 
 
 
                                                
76 COD, XXI, 12, p. 1070. Augustine explains this idea clearly in his sermon. “Two children are born. If 
you are looking for what is due, they are both contained in the lump ripe for rejection. But why is one 
carried by its mother for grace, while the other is suffocated by its mother in her sleep? Can you tell me 
how one deserved to be carried for grace, how the other deserved to be suffocated by its mother as she 
slept? Neither deserved anything good. But the potter has power from the same lump to make one vessel 
for honorable use, another for disgrace. (Rom 9:21)” (Sermon 26, xii, 13) cf. Admonition and Grace, x, 28. 
77 Paul J. Archambault demonstrates Rousseau’s tactics well in “Rousseau’s Tactical (Mis)reading of 
Augustine,” Symposium, 41:1 (1987:Spring):6-14. 
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5. The Comparison Between Two Confessions 
Despite Rousseau’s taking Confessions as the title of his autobiography, few 
scholars are interested in making comparisons between these two Confessions. Some 
scholars, as mentioned above, do not see any relation between the two books other than 
the title. Other scholars who are interested in the two Confessions put them in a historical 
context for the themes of their studies. William C. Spengemann, for example, is 
interested in the study of the forms of autobiography in history. He regards Augustine’s 
Confessions as the paradigm of autobiography, which consists of historical, 
philosophical, and poetic aspects.78 In Book I to IX, Augustine recounted his past in view 
of the truth beyond time. By this truth he found the meaning of his life and converts to 
God. Then in Book X to XI, he turned the attention to the philosophical questions of 
memory and time in which he reaches the limit of the intellectual knowledge. Without 
faith, he would not be able to reach the truth. In Book XII, his soul rested in God by faith. 
Only faith in God is enough. Spengemann says that although Rousseau retained the 
biographical part of the historical self, his self is revealed not so much in the history 
recounted as in the act of recounting. Rousseau’s Confessions does not belong to 
historical autobiography but philosophical autobiography. In turn, Karl Joachim 
Weintraub studies the value of the individual that is shaped in the interaction between the 
self and the environment, as found in the autobiography. He puts Augustine’s and 
Rousseau’s Confessions in a historical context to show the turn from the Christian self, 
whose value is founded upon God, to the secularized individual who justifies himself to 
                                                
78 Spengemann, William G., The Forms of Autobiography, Episodes in the History of a Literary Genre, 
Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1980. 
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his equals without a sense of original sin.79 The value of an individual for Augustine is 
constituted in the wrestling between God and the self. For Rousseau, the self, rather, 
struggles against the society. And Elizabeth de Mijolla analyzes four different 
autobiographies within a bipolar framework of mimesis and memory. Augustine in his 
Confessions, which tends to be a mimesis, depicted his particular self according to the 
communal tradition of Christian self. Thus, he revealed not so much his singularity as the 
communality of the truth. His personal conversion is only one of the stories of Christian 
conversion. On the contrary, Rousseau’s autobiography, going to the pole of memory, 
shows the readers an elusive self. The truth that Rousseau believed is personal, not 
Christian and communal, neither is it secular and philosophical. Lastly, Ann Hartle writes 
on the modern self in Rousseau’s Confessions, which she regards as a reply to 
Augustine’s Confessions.80 Her focus, of course, is placed on the idea of self. Rousseau’s 
self is self-sufficient in contrast to Augustine’s God-dependent self. Apart from Hartle, 
no scholar explicitly draws comparisons between the two Confessions, and she only 
discusses them in separate chapters, or as different expressions of the idea of the self in 
different eras. Moreover, Rousseau’s natural goodness of the self is not the focus of their 
interest. They have shown the differences between Augustine and Rousseau but fail to 
indicate their relationship. Hartle, I think, is the first to argue that Rousseau’s Confessions 
is a reply to Augustine’s. Nevertheless, she neglects the theme of natural goodness as the 
essential element of the self-portrait according to nature in Rousseau’s Confessions. 
                                                
79 Weintraub, Karl Joachim, The Value of the Individual, Self and Circumstance in Autobiography, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1978. 
80 Hartle, Ann, The Modern Self in Rousseau’s Confessions, A Reply to St. Augustine, University of Notre 
Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1983. 
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6. The Framework of the Study 
In this dissertation, I argue that Rousseau’s Confessions is a reply to Augustine’s 
Confessions on human nature. As the doctrine of original sin is crucial to the theology of 
grace, the framework for this comparison is the debate of nature and grace. What is 
human nature? Is man born good or sinful? Is there a state of pure nature in which man 
can attain his natural goal without the aid of divine grace? Or can man, who by nature has 
no purely natural end of life, attain the supernatural goal, the beatific vision, only by the 
help of God’s grace? This theological debate about nature and grace can be traced back to 
the argument between Augustine and Pelagius. Augustine developed his theology of 
grace to refute Pelagianism. Since the sixteenth century, the distinction between nature 
and grace has been a chief topic of theological discourse. In order to refute the 
Renaissance theories that supposed a purely natural state of man totally independent from 
the concrete historical life of grace, Jansen, whom the Roman Catholic Church 
condemned, had recourse to Augustine’s theology of grace to develop his own rigid 
Augustinianism. He argued that even in the pure state of innocence man is totally 
dependent upon God’s gracious gifts. It is a state of grace. As man can be saved not by 
his merits but only by God’s grace and God saves man according His will, so the 
predestination of the few is an inevitable conclusion. Jansenism prevailed in France in the 
late seventeenth century by the efforts of Antoine Arnault and the Port-Royal Convent. 
Although Jansenism and the Port-Royal Convent were suppressed in mid-eighteenth 
century, their influence had not been expunged. We know that Rousseau had read the 
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work of Jansenists. Although he read Augustine’s work when he was older, the influence 
of Jansenism upon him should not be underestimated.  
A proper study of Augustine’s theology of grace is not possible for this 
dissertation. My focus is on the doctrine of original sin, which plays a significant role in 
the theology of grace. Original sin denotes man’s fall from the state of innocence to the 
state of sin. It involves the question of the motivation of Adam at the moment of the first 
sin in human history, and its consequence: expulsion from the Garden of Eden, the 
inherited guilt of his descendants, and the salvation of Christ.  My research will not 
involve a comprehensive comparison of Rousseau and Augustine. I will not study fully 
how Augustine develops the doctrine of original sin and the theology of grace. Rather, I 
will set up Augustine’s theology of original sin and grace in the Confessions (and other 
works) as a backdrop to put Rousseau’s self-portrait in his Confessions in an appropriate 
contrast. My focus is on Rousseau’s idea of the natural goodness of man in the 
Confessions. I will compare the two Confessions according to some structural and 
thematic similarities. Although I disagree with Ann Hartle’s comparison of the structure 
of two Confessions, I do agree that there are certain structural and thematic similarities 
between them. Hartle uses two diagrams to illustrate the structure of the two 
Confessions.81  
1 Augustine     Rousseau 
 
Books 1-6    Part One Books 1-6 
                      past       past 
Books 7-9        Books 7-9 
      
                                                
81 Hartle, p. 27. 
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Part Two 
Books 10-13 present    Books 10-12 present 
 
2 Augustine     Rousseau 
 
Books 1-7     Books 1-7 
Book 8 – conversion    Book 8 – conversion 
Books 9-13     Books 9-12 
 
In the first diagram, Augustine’s Confessions is divided into the past, from Book 
One to Nine and the present, from Book Ten to the end. In the second, it is divided by 
placing Book Eight on the conversion in the middle. Her diagrams are very rough, 
evoking many disagreements about their accuracy. The unity of Augustine’s Confessions 
is controversial. The relationship between the first ten books and the other three is 
arguable. Why did Augustine write the exegesis on Genesis after his autobiography? John 
Quinn gives a good summary of the suggestions of the unity of the structure of 
Augustine’s Confessions.82 Scholars suggest different paradigms to explain the structure, 
e.g., Father, Son, Spirit; Redemption, Sanctification, Creation. Quinn concludes, 
“Perhaps because the Confessions is more of an informal exposition than a treaties, it 
boasts at best an informal unity, one that writers of late antiquity rated adequate.” 
However, Elizabeth de Mijolla says that certain critics agree with Max Wundt who found 
the key in Augustine’s De Catechizandis Rudibus. She further explains, “There 
Augustine explains that a catechumen should first be taught to see God’s guidance in his 
past life (the parallel to Augustine’s narrative books), then be instructed in the Scriptures, 
                                                
82 Quinn, John M. OSA, A Companion to the Confessions of St. Augustine, Peter Lang, New York, 2002. p.     
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starting with Genesis (the subject of Augustine’s theoretical books).”83 This explanation 
of the unity of the work makes more sense. Accordingly, Augustine’s Confessions is 
divided into two parts, the narrative and the theoretical books. Rousseau, however, did 
not divide his Confession into narrative and theoretical parts. Furthermore, it is difficult 
to fit Augustine’s work into the scheme of past and present. He wrote about his present 
state only in Book Ten and the last three books are on Genesis. And the present for 
Rousseau does not refer to the life events but the feelings at the time of his writing. Even 
if we could figure out the exact structure of how Augustine and Rousseau think, we can 
only see their differences. I cannot find the parallel between two entire books but some 
similarities and parallels in certain books and episodes. Hence, I agree with Hartle’s 
second diagram that Augustine’s Confessions is divided into two parts by placing Book 
Eight in the middle. 
Since there are some structural and thematic similarities between the two 
Confessions, I will deal with the problem of knowledge of nature and the source of evil 
from Book One to Eight in the next four chapters accordingly. The themes of the 
following chapters will be as follows: the preliminary state of man in this world in Book 
One and then the motivation of the theft in Book Two. Then I will deal with the nature of 
evil and the approach to truth in Book Seven, and with the conversion and the source of 
evil in Book Eight. The picture of the good man and the good life after conversion will be 
discussed in chapter six. 
                                                
83 De Mijolla, Elizabeth, Autobiographical Quests, Augustine, Montaigne, Rousseau, and Wordsworth, 
University Press of Virginia, 1994, note, p. 160. 
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CHAPTER TWO THE PRELIMINARY STATE OF MAN AT BIRTH 
 
1. Goodness for Augustine and Rousseau 
Before going into the discussion of two Confessions, it is better to first know how 
Augustine and Rousseau understood goodness. It involves Augustine’s moral theology 
and Rousseau’s understanding of what is natural and moral. Furthermore, both Augustine 
and Rousseau set forth their narrative of autobiography with a prefatory note, which 
articulated their understanding of goodness and the scope of their books. In this part, I 
will compare their prefatory notes and demonstrate the background and the 
characteristics of Augustinian moral theology in contrast to Rousseau’s moral 
psychology. 
 
i. Augustinian Ethics: A Rightly Ordered Love of God 
In the fifth century, due to the vastness of territory of the Roman Empire, the 
morality of individual citizens in the conquered cities was gradually separated from the 
common interest of the empire.1 Unity and peace of the empire were the two principal 
interests of the Emperor. He promulgated laws to ensure the unity and peace of the 
empire and left room for individuals to pursue their own happiness as long as they did not 
transgress the law. The Roman Emperor made use of religion to establish the foundation 
of morality in order to stabilize the empire. Knowing the political purpose and the 
superstitious nature of the Roman religion, the Roman upper classes were looking for an 
                                                
1 MacIntyre, Alasdair, A Short History of Ethics, Routledge, London, 1993, pp. 100-109. 
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alternative morality. “Both Epicureanism and Stoicism are convenient and consoling 
doctrines for private citizens of the large impersonal kingdom and empires of the 
Hellenistic and Roman worlds.”2 Individual citizens were looking for independence and 
self-sufficiency, which both Epicureanism and Stoicism could provide. Epicurean ethics 
regarded pleasure and pain as the norm of human behavior. However, extreme sensual 
pleasure causes pain. Paradoxically, in order to be free from the attachment to pleasure, 
Epicureans suggested that the absence of pain was a greater good than positive pleasure. 
They preferred the tranquility of the mind to the enjoyment of sensual pleasure. The 
highest pleasure for them was not so much the sensual but the spiritual pleasure.  
On the other hand, Stoics emphasized the self-sufficiency of virtues. They 
regarded the order of universe as both physical and divine. This order not only governs 
the physical universe but also the human act. In other words, human act should conform 
to the order of the universe. However, man, distracted by fear and hope, pleasure and 
pain, would act against the order. Stoics strived for the practicing of virtues. For the 
Stoics, virtue is not a means, but an end in itself. “Virtue is a rational disposition, to be 
desired in and for itself and not for the sake of any hope, fear, or ulterior motive.”3 Stoics 
called this state of mind apathy. Despite their apparent differences, Epicureanism and 
Stoicism shared the similar goal of morality, which is the independence and self-
sufficiency of an individual. Nonetheless, these two schools of ethics were not immune 
from criticism. Epicureanism was suitable for the upper class but not the poor who have 
                                                
2 MacIntyre, Alasdair, A Short History of Ethics, Routledge, London, 1993, p. 108. 
3 Laëritus, Diogenes, Lives of the Philosophers, 7, 89. Cited by MacIntyre in The Short History of Ethics, p. 
106. 
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neither the leisure to strive for the peace of mind nor the material to enjoy. Stoicism was 
well accepted by the elites but not the uneducated people who were not able to know the 
order of the universe by reason. Furthermore, both of these two schools of ethics did not 
provide the ground for moral obligation. Augustine noticed their shortcomings and he 
wanted to introduce a Christian answer to these questions: What is the highest good of 
man? Why should man act in accordance with the order of the universe? What would be 
the consequence if man did otherwise? Do sensual pleasure and virtue possess their value 
for themselves? Does ethics need a theological foundation? I will review Augustinian 
ethics against this backdrop. Augustine did not write on ethics systematically. His ethical 
thought is scattered in his different works. Despite that, the main idea and the framework 
of his moral thought had already been articulated in the Confessions.  
 
ii. The Characteristics of Augustinian Ethics 
Augustinian ethics is theological, teleological and eudemonistic. He clearly stated 
in Concerning the Nature of Good, “The highest good, than which there is no higher, is 
God, and consequently He is unchangeably good, hence truly eternal and truly immortal.  
All other good things are only from Him, not of Him…but since every nature, so far as it 
is nature, is good, it follows that no nature can exist save from the most high and true 
God.”4 God is the highest good for man and all things owe their good to God. Augustine 
argued this against Manicheism in On the Morals of the Catholic Church, first by 
                                                
4 Augustine, Concerning the Nature of Good, Against the Manicheans, Chapter One. 
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philosophical arguments and then by the Scripture.5 He started with the question of 
happiness. All men desire happiness that is the fulfillment of the essence of man. But the 
question of the essence of man is controversial. Is it the body or the soul or both? But 
Augustine said no matter what it is; happiness is superior to the essence of man. But it is 
clear that the body itself is not the essence of man as it is animated by the soul. Then 
happiness turns out to be something that is superior to the soul. In addition, Augustine 
brought out the other characteristics of happiness. It is loved and possessed by man and it 
cannot be lost against human will. In other words, happiness is eternal. Man does not fear 
losing it while he possesses it. Hitherto, Augustine argued with philosophical argument 
and later he turned to the revelation in the Scripture.  
At the beginning of the Confessions, Augustine delineated a similar picture of 
happiness by the revealed truth in the Scripture. He began with a verse of Psalm, “You 
are great Lord and highly to be praised.”(Ps 47:2)6 He expressed his desire to praise God 
in whom man finds his happiness. “To praise you is the desire of man, a little piece of 
your creation. You stir man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made us 
for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.”7 God is the ultimate goal of 
human desire, which is the highest good for man. This statement tells us that the desire 
for God is natural and supernatural at the same time. It is natural because it is a desire of 
man to praise God in man. But it is not simply natural, as Augustine said it is God who 
stirs man to enjoy praising Him. This desire is natural and divine. This agreeable 
                                                
5 Augustine, On the Morals of the Catholic Church, 1-7.12. 
6 Aug. Confs., I, i, 1. 
7 Ibid. 
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experience in turn enhances man’s desire to praise God. And praising God is also one of 
the purposes of creation. God is the author of this human desire and its transcendent goal. 
Thus, The first paragraph of Augustine’s Confessions suggests that God is the natural and 
supernatural goal of man. There is no simple and pure natural desire and goal for man. 
All things are related to God. Although the drive of man to this end does not come from 
outside but inside the human heart, it is God who draws man to Him. In Book Ten, 
Augustine described happiness as living in God. “How then am I to seek for you, Lord? 
When I seek for you, my God, my request is for the happy life. I will seek you that my 
‘soul may live’, for my body derives life from my soul, and my soul derives life from 
you.”8 To Augustine, happiness is for the soul to live in God. 
However, unlike Aristotle’s ethics, God, the Ultimate Truth, is not only an object 
of contemplation.9 For Augustine, God is the object of man’s love. The relationship 
between man and God is not only one between a knower and the Truth, but it is also a 
love affair. Love of God is the fundamental drive of human behavior. In On the Morals of 
the Catholic Church, after stating the philosophical argument about happiness, Augustine 
turned to the Scripture to illustrate the loving relationship between God and man. It is 
what Jesus commanded in the Gospel, “Thou shalt love the God thy Lord with all thy 
heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.”(Mt 22: 37)10 And our love of God is 
initiated and guaranteed by the love of Christ. Augustine quoted St Paul, “For I am 
convinced that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor rulers, nor things present, nor things 
                                                
8 Aug. Confs., X, xx, 29. 
9 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1177a20. 
10 Augustine, On the Morals of the Catholic Church, 8. 13. 
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to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able 
to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord.”(Rom 8: 38-39)11 The 
loving relation between God and man is the revolutionary breakthrough of Christianity 
from Greek philosophy. In short, for Augustine, man praises God because of His love of 
man. Every human act is a response of love to God’s love. One of Augustine’s famous 
sayings is “Love and do what you will…let the root of love be within, of this root can 
nothing spring but what is good.”12 Augustine did not mention the salvation and the love 
of Christ at the beginning of the Confessions. It was expressed during his journey of 
philosophical enquiry and faith. 
Augustine only delineated an outline of his ethical thought at the outset of his 
autobiography. There are many questions at stake. Augustine said, “Man, a little piece of 
your creation, desires to praise you, a human being ‘bearing his mortality with him’, 
carrying with him the witness of his sin and the witness that you ‘resist the proud’.”13 
Man, a mortal being, is a little piece of God’s creation. He, on the one hand desires for 
God, his happiness, but on the other hand carries the burden of sin, which hinders him 
from attaining the happiness. Augustine claimed that man carries the punishment of sin, 
which is the witness that God resists the proud. He said in On Free Choice of the Will 
that ignorance and frailty of the will are the inherited punishment of the original sin.14 
Although there is an innate yearning for God in the man’s heart, man does not know his 
proper object of love; other objects of love can fool him. “But who calls upon you when 
                                                
11 Augustine, On the Morals of the Catholic Church, 8. 13. 
12 Augustine, Homily of Epistle of St John, VII, 8; On Nature and Grace, LXX, 84; On Christian Doctrine, 
I, 28 (42). 
13 Aug. Confs., I, i, 1. Emphasis added. 
14 Free Will, III, 18. 
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he does not know you. For an ignorant person might call upon someone else instead of 
the right one.”15 In order for man to praise and love God, he has to know and understand 
Him first. Where and how can man know and love God? What is the indubitable guide of 
his enquiry? How can man attain his happiness? What is the foundation of moral 
obligation for Augustine? Why shall he do what God commands? What will be the 
consequence if he does not observe God’s command? At the outset of the Confessions, 
Augustine set up the stage for the narrative of his life and faith journey. We have seen 
that Augustine made use of philosophical argument and revealed truth in the Scripture to 
depict the good life of man and God as the highest good for man. Nature owes its good to 
God. Natural goodness is inseparable from divine goodness. Moreover, natural is also 
moral. Urged by his mind for finding the truth and by his heart for possessing the proper 
object of love, but carrying the punishment of the original sin, ignorance and weakness of 
will, Augustine’s life was a journey of knowing and loving God. The picture Augustine 
shown is that man is yearning for his supernatural goal out of his natural desire of his 
heart but suffering the burden of sin at the same time. 
 
iii. Natural Goodness of Man in the Second Discourse 
The Confessions is not the first work that Rousseau wrote on the principle of the 
natural goodness of man. He had elaborated it clearly in the Second Discourse and Emile. 
Second Discourse is the most important of his works because it lays down the 
philosophical foundation of his thought. In the Second Discourse, Rousseau put the Holy 
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Scripture aside and proposed a secular account of human historical development in which 
he explained how man left his original condition and became wicked. The man in the 
state of nature is the criterion for judging the good society.16 If the Second Discourse tells 
the story of the human species, Rousseau depicted himself as the new standard for man in 
the Confessions. In contrast to the Second Discourse, his autobiography is the story of an 
individual who falls from natural innocence and strives for the way to happiness in a 
corrupt society. There are some parallel themes between the two works. Since Rousseau 
had demonstrated the fundamental principles of the natural goodness of man in the 
Second Discourse, so that his understanding of the natural goodness of man in the Second 
Discourse sheds light on our analysis before our study of the natural goodness of man in 
Rousseau’s Confessions.  
Rousseau’s concept of goodness and the approach to the study of man are 
different from the classical and the Christian tradition. Since the ancient Greek period, 
philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle, defined reason as the essence of man. Study of 
man amounts to the study of mind. For instance, in Aristotle’s ethics, rational activity is 
the proper function of man.17 Accordingly, happiness consists of the activity of study, 
which is the supreme activity of understanding of the supreme objects of knowledge.18 In 
Augustine’s Confessions, the reader saw the interaction of reason, passions and will along 
his journey of knowing and loving God. Augustine adopted the Platonic tripartite soul, 
which consists of reason, spirit and appetite in his theology. Reason is the noblest part of 
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the soul. Following the Platonic thought, Augustine encountered the eternal truth by the 
ascent of mind. God’s grace strengthened his will to overcome the dragging force of his 
passions and he was able to opt for God in his conversion. The focus of his Confessions is 
the study of the faculties of man. Furthermore, Augustine integrated ethics, philosophy 
and theology in his system. Every human act should act towards God according to the 
natural and divine order. Thus, a moral act is also natural and theological. Moral act leads 
man towards God, the Being, yet immoral act takes man to nothing but non-being. In 
other words, disorder act leads man to nothingness. In the Augustinian system, there is no 
such category of human behavior as amoral between moral and immoral.  
Rousseau, on the other hand, separated natural from moral. In the Second 
Discourse, he first depicted the physical side of natural man as an animal.  
I see an animal less strong than some, less agile than others, but, all things 
considered, the most advantageously organized of all: I see him sating his 
hunger beneath an oak, slaking his thirst at the first Stream, finding his 
bed at the foot of the same tree that supplied his meal, and with that his 
needs are satisfied.19 
 
The desires of a natural man do not exceed his physical needs, which are food, 
woman and rest. In turn, Rousseau introduced the metaphysical side of the natural man 
that makes him different from other animals. They are freedom and perfectibility.20 
Freedom of the natural man, which consists of the freedom of choice and the freedom of 
willing for good, enhances man’s flexibility to shape his soul and his form of life. The 
acts of other animals are bound by their instincts. A pigeon cannot replace its natural diet 
of grain with meat. It will rather starve itself to death in front of a bowl of meat than 
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eating it. Instead, man can adjust his diet to fit the environment for survival. Thus, 
freedom signifies there is much room for development for man. Man is not bound by 
animal instinct to a fixed form of physical behavior. Man changes his form of life with 
respect to the change of environment. However, Rousseau understood that philosophers 
disagree about whether freedom is the essential difference between man and animal. He 
introduced a more specific property of man, perfectibility. 
Perfectibility is a faculty that empowers man to face challenges for his 
development. The faculty of self-perfection is “a faculty which, with the aid of 
circumstances, successively develops all the others, and resides in us in the species as 
well as in the individual.”21 The faculty of self-perfection consists of reason, which 
remains in potency if there is no need to acquire knowledge for self-preservation.  
According to Rousseau, ‘natural’ means whatever is formed by nature without 
human intervention by reason and freedom. The man in the state of nature only listens to 
the voice of nature and follows his natural inclinations instead of following reason. The 
natural inclinations are not limited to physical desires only. Rousseau was interested in 
the inclinations of the soul. After meditating on the first and simplest operations of the 
human soul, Rousseau “perceived in it two principles prior to reason, of which one 
interests us intensely in our well-being and our self-preservation, and the other inspires in 
us a natural repugnance at seeing any sentient being and especially any being like 
ourselves, perish or suffer.”22 Self-preservation and pity are two natural passions prior to 
the development of reason. Although the natural man is ignorant, solitary, and brute-like, 
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he is free, equal, and self-sufficient. The first natural passion, self-preservation, directs 
him to be interested only in himself. He acts only for what he desires but never exceeds 
his physical needs and capacity. His robust body and his flexibility allow him to adapt to 
the environment and to be self-sufficient in the state of nature without any need to 
compete or to cooperate with others. There is little conflict of interest among men, since 
every one is self-sufficient. He has nothing to do with other people. Although sometimes 
he fights violently against others in self-defense, he never has any intention to harm them.  
 The second natural passion, pity prevents man from doing harm to others. He 
finds it repugnant to see other people suffering. Despite his undeveloped reason and 
imagination, the natural feeling of compassion helps the natural man identify himself 
with the suffering of others and discourages him to act violently against others.  
The man in the natural state is an animal with potential for development. “It 
would at first seem that men in that state, having neither moral relations of any sort 
between them, nor known duties, could be neither good nor wicked, and had neither vices 
nor virtues.”23 The natural state of man is amoral and subrational. It is a state before the 
development of human reason, in which man’s self-consciousness emerges from his own 
existence without the distraction of the mind. The sweet sentiment of his own existence is 
the source of his pure self-love, amour de soi. His existence is the primary good so he 
cares only for his preservation. Thus, the primary passion of self-preservation comes out 
of amour de soi. Natural man faces the choice of to be or not to be everyday. Any means 
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that contributes to his preservation in a physical sense is good or otherwise it is bad.24 As 
Rousseau said in the Letter to Voltaire, “But if it is better for us to be than not to be, this 
would be enough to justify our existence.”25 With the emphasis of the sentiment of 
existence, Rousseau turned the focus of his study of man from the human faculties to 
human existence. The natural state of man is good in itself and its value is independent 
from reason. Rousseau told us that reason, an essential human faculty, is not the whole 
but only an important part of human being. Human existence is of fundamental 
significance and is foremost compared to reason. Man is naturally good before his 
becoming morally good. Rousseau introduced a natural arena, which is a new realm of 
human behavior, in addition to moral and immoral realm of man. 
Unlike Augustine, it is worth noting that Rousseau’s good man is natural but 
amoral and irreligious. A moral act must involve reason and will. The natural man is 
amoral since he does not engage with other people intentionally, and acts without 
knowledge and intention. Likewise, a religious act has to be performed intentionally in 
reverence to God.  The natural man is irreligious since his actions and intentions have no 
regard for God. He is naturally good because he is one with his own existence and enjoys 
inner peace with his own existence. Accordingly, the man in the state of nature, without 
any human intervention, listens and follows the voice of his heart, the natural passions, 
self-preservation and pity. Rousseau’s naturally good man is living beyond struggles 
between virtues and vices, or between love of God and love of creatures.  
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Moral relation is formed when men come together for survival. It is paradoxical 
that perfectibility, the natural human potential that helps men to overcome the challenges 
to his survival, leads man to depart from his natural state. While men are developing their 
humanity, they are inevitably denatured at the same time. Due to the change of 
environment, men start to gather for survival and later on families are built. A subtle 
transformation of the soul is going on over time. Consciousness of the self and others, 
which is formed by imaginations, memories, ideas and sentiments, is developing 
imperceptibly in the mind and heart of the natural man. “Everyone began to look at 
everyone else and to wish to be looked at himself, and public esteem acquired a value.”26 
Public esteem instead of self-existence becomes the source of the sweet sentiment of 
existence. The natural amour-de-soi develops into an unnatural or artificial amour-propre 
that engenders jealousy, vanity, ambition, shame, and pride. Man is able to attribute an 
intention to others. Physical harm can be regarded as contempt toward the offended 
person. The denatured passion, however, is not necessarily bad. Conjugal love, coming 
out of amour-propre, “gives rise to the sweetest sentiment known to man.”27 It brings 
men and women together to form families. Natural man’s life remains fundamentally 
simple. His limited needs for what is useful for his survival, do not exceed his faculties, 
which were aided by tools. He would not seize other’s property. Moreover, although his 
artificial passions, such as vanity, shame, and envy emerge, the soul of natural man 
remains integrated. His main concern is still about himself instead of others’ opinion. 
Amour-propre enables him to develop the sweetest sentiment of conjugal love. The 
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artificial passions are restrained by natural pity so he would not do harm to others 
purposefully. He does physical harm to others only for self-defense. Thus according to 
Rousseau, although man in the intermediate state of nature is violent and cruel, with the 
balance of needs and abilities, and the unity of the soul, he is living in the happiest epoch 
during this intermediate state of nature.28  
By acquiring the trade of forging iron and planting wheat, the social relations 
among men, however, undergo a drastic change. Men become more interdependent and 
they divide their labor in order to work and live better. Thus, the criterion of the public 
value is gradually established. Nevertheless, there arises the discrepancy between the 
natural capacities and the public expectation of regard for some people. They either strive 
hard for getting public regards by all means, or are marginalized by the society. Hence, 
the natural inequalities, strong and weak, tall and short, turn into social, economic, and 
political inequalities.  
Here are all natural qualities are set in action, each man’s rank and fate set, 
not only in terms of the quantity of goods and the power to benefit or 
harm, but also in terms of mind, beauty, strength or skill, in terms of merit 
or talents, and, since these are the only qualities that could attract regard, 
one soon had to have them or to affect them; for one’s own advantage one 
had to seem other than one in fact was. To be and to appear became two 
entire different things, and from this distinction arose ostentatious display, 
deceitful cunning, and all the vices that follow in their train.29 
The perverted and denatured soul is divided into being and appearance. Man no 
longer loves his true self but the artificial self as seen through the eyes of others. In short, 
the natural goodness of man rests on the purity of heart in which there is no intention to 
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do harm to others, but amour-propre, which is the sign of the denatured humanity, leads 
man to live outside himself. Man is struggling against the split of the soul for his natural 
wholeness in society. It is against this backdrop that we examine Rousseau’s natural good 
man in the Confessions. 
 
iv. The Characteristics of Rousseauean Good Man and Good Life 
At the beginning of his Confessions Augustine brought out the characteristics of 
his ethical thought, namely, theological, teleological and heavenly eudemonistic. 
Rousseau instead depicted his idea of good life as natural, non-teleological and this 
worldly eudemonistic in the prefatory note of his Confessions. Rousseau’s concept of 
good life and good man is not theological but natural. Rousseau exclaimed at the 
beginning of the Confessions, “I am forming an undertaking which has no precedent, and 
the execution of which will have no imitator whatsoever.”30 It is a strong response to 
Augustine’s Confessions. He rejected the Augustinian version of good life and good man. 
He wanted to show the portrait of a man in all the truth of nature, not God’s will or the 
purpose of the creation of man. He did not mention the relation between God and nature 
here. In turn, Rousseau set the Last Judgment as the stage for judgment of his 
Confessions, the revelation of his interior. It is worth comparing his description of the 
Last Judgment with Augustine’s commentary on the Last judgment according to the Book 
of Revelation in the City of God. Last Judgment will be taking place at the fulfillment of 
time, which is the moment of transformation to eternity when all men are dead. There is 
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no more past or future but the eternal present. God judges people according to what they 
have done in this world, both good and evil. The books of the Scripture and the book of 
the life of each man were opened before God. “The book of the life of each man was 
opened to show which of these commandments [of God] each man had kept or not 
kept.”31 This book recorded all that man has done and thought, including what even his 
conscience did not know. By the divine power, man is able to recall to memory all his 
own works, both good and evil. The knowledge of his life would either accuse or excuse 
his conscience, which erred at times.32 God judges men according to what they have done 
and thought in this world. Those righteous men who loved God and his neighbors 
properly in this world would receive eternal happiness, in which man lives in God and 
praises God for His love forever. On the contrary, those who love themselves above God 
and others would be cast into the lake of fire with the beast and the Antichrist. Last 
Judgment is the last step to eternal happiness. For Augustine, God is the just Judge and 
the ultimate happiness of man, in which his heart rests forever. 
At the scene of the last moment of history, Rousseau skillfully placed God into a 
secondary position in human life. God is not the Judge or ultimate happiness of man 
anymore. At the Last Judgment, Rousseau shall come to see God with the Confessions, 
his autobiography, instead of the book of life prepared by God, which recorded what he 
has done, has thought and has been, both good and evil. Since nobody can remember all 
his life events as God does, Rousseau may forget some events but he sincerely unveiled 
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his interior in his Confessions. Thus the book of Confessions was not so much a record of 
his life events as the history of his interior. Without the aid of the divine power, he 
claimed he saw his interior as God saw it. By that Rousseau meant he knew his heart 
including all the secret thoughts as he always listened to his conscience, which is the 
divine voice. There is no discrepancy between his knowledge of self and his conscience. 
Moreover, Rousseau replaced God with his fellows as the judge and substituted the 
human heart for God’s commandments as the criterion. He asked his fellows to follow his 
inner path to uncover their hearts after listening to his confession in which they will 
realize that they are no better than Rousseau. In short, the criterion of judgment is no 
longer God’s commandment or the natural law but the natural goodness of man made 
known by the heart. All men are equally and naturally good whether men have done 
morally good and bad actions. 
Rousseau portrayed himself as a naturally good man in a corrupted society in the 
Confessions. Life is not a journey of knowing and loving God with the burden of the 
punishment of original sin. Rather, life for Rousseau is a journey of knowing and loving 
his natural self in a corrupt society. Augustine sought for the liberation from sin by 
putting himself into God’s hand. He cannot live without God as no natural goodness can 
be separated from God. Rousseau, instead, sought for the liberation from the amour-
propre to become independent and self-sufficient. Now I will turn my attention to the 
discussion of the preliminary state of man. 
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2. Augustine’s Sinful Infancy and Boyhood 
 
i. A jealous and Greedy Baby 
Is a child born innocent? Is the environment, which forms his mind and character, 
good? Meanwhile, it is undeniable that man is wicked and does evil things to others in 
the society. How does man become wicked? Is man born innocent or wicked? Different 
answers come from different understandings of human nature, which can be theological 
or philosophical. Our concern is with the arguments about the doctrine of original sin; 
about whether man inherits guilt or sinful inclinations from his ancestors or is innocent at 
birth, and then becomes wicked later by imitating bad examples with the consent of his 
free will.  
Augustine in his Confessions put the hermeneutics of Scripture and philosophical 
speculation aside, and took up an experiential approach to this problem based upon his 
personal experience and his observation of other people.  Augustine started his story from 
the first moment of his life in this world. Was Augustine as an infant as innocent as 
Adam in the book of Genesis’s second creation story (Gen. 2.4b-3.24), who lived in the 
Garden of Eden before the Fall in which he acted according to the God-created natural 
order? The central principle of Augustine’s belief, based on the first chapter of the 
teaching of Genesis (1.1-2.4a), is that God is good and all good things come from Him. 
At the beginning of the account of his infancy, Augustine depicted a harmonious natural 
physical order. God created a natural order in which needs and resources are in balance. 
A mother whose breast is filled with milk wants to feed a child, and the baby does not 
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wish more than his mother provides. The baby has only physical needs that are the 
sources of both his sensual pleasure and pain. Both the mother and the baby following 
their natural passion embody a harmonious picture of the natural state.33 Although it 
appears that an infant is innocent and good as a work newly released from the good 
Creator’s hand to the nature, Augustine saw another part of the picture: “Little by little I 
began to be aware where I was and I wanted to manifest my wishes to those who could 
fulfill them as I could not…When I did not get my way, either because I was not 
understood or lest it be harmful to me, I used to be indignant with my seniors for their 
disobedience, and with free people who were not slaves to my interests; and I would 
revenge myself upon them by weeping.”34 Augustine portrayed the natural cries of the 
child when his need is not satisfied as a political struggle between the child and the 
adults, a power struggle between the child’s will and the adult’s will. The child forces the 
adults to follow his will and he punishes them for their disobedience by crying. How does 
the child view his relationship with the adults? Those adults are in fact individually free 
people and they are not obliged to follow the child’s will. The child, however, views 
himself as the ruler of the world. He treats others as his slaves and commands them to 
submit to his will. They are obliged to obey him and he has the power to punish them for 
their disobedience. He becomes a tyrant out of pride and selfishness. From these 
observations arises a question: why is an infant as self-centered as a tyrant if God is good 
and people are living in harmony in the natural order?  
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Augustine affirms that the infant’s selfish behavior is truly a sin. If the infant’s 
tyrannical behavior were good, he would be encouraged to keep it. However, the infant 
eliminates this kind of behavior when he becomes an adult. No one will abandon 
something that is good, and so the tyrannical behavior itself is bad. Augustine denied that 
the infant who punishes the adults who disobey him is innocent. “None is pure from sin 
before you [God], not even an infant of one day upon the earth.”35 Man is a sinner since 
birth. Augustine observed that the child is greedy to suck milk from his mother’s breast 
and even when he has had enough milk; he glares with jealousy and bitterness at his 
brother who is sharing his mother’s milk36 ---behavior contrary to the harmonious natural 
order. According to the natural order, as long as his mother has enough milk for him, a 
child should not be greedy and jealous since he should only care about his true physical 
need. A child never desires more than he needs. Once he is full, no one can force him to 
want more. If not underfed, he should not object to his brother’s sharing. If innocent, he 
would live according to the natural harmonious order. Observing that children are greedy 
and jealous, Augustine concluded that “the feebleness of infant limbs is innocent, not the 
infant’s mind.”37 The body of the baby is so weak that the baby is not able to do wicked 
things, yet his mind is able to have wicked ideas and wishes. His mind is capable of 
reasoning ideas and comparing them. Thus, his jealousy and greed arises from the 
comparison and the competition with his brother. Moreover, he is aware of his power 
over others and so he commands as he wishes. When adults do not satisfy his needs as he 
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asks, he regards their responses as disobedience to his will and he becomes indignant. 
The child is able to attribute the bad intention of disobedience to the people surrounding 
him. Then his cry is not an expression of physical uneasiness but an act of revenge. As an 
infant Augustine was selfish, greedy, and jealous. Augustine suggested that a child is able 
to reason and will freely like an adult. 
However, Augustine told us that he did not have any memory of his infancy.38 His 
infancy narrative was based on his observations of other children and the information 
from his parents. Since man is not able to acquire knowledge without memory, his reason 
was not yet developed in his infancy. Lacking knowledge a child could not do good or 
evil intentionally. Augustine alleges two contradictory wills in the mind of an infant in 
describing a rational child who is greedy and jealous, and an ignorant child who lives 
according to his physical need with no memory. The former, who is concerned only about 
the self without considering others, is sinful, while and the latter, who seeks to satisfy 
physical needs, is innocent. The infant mind is divided into two contradictory parts. 
By observing child’s behavior, Augustine found that a child is born with a hostile 
disposition against others. Therefore, the child, who behaves like an adult, is jealous and 
competes with other babies, and he regards those who do not fulfill his needs as enemies. 
Augustine believes God is good and human beings are created good, but a child who is 
greedy and jealous is not innocent since birth. Augustine asked, “Where and when is he 
innocent?”39 And he said, “ My infancy is long dead and I am alive.”40 There is a 
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continuity of self in time. Although Augustine’s infancy had long since passed, his self 
continued to live. Likewise, if the soul, which is good, exists before birth in the world, it 
is possible that Augustine had been corrupted in a certain period of time and so infant 
Augustine bore this inborn sinful inclination. “Is there some period of time of his life, 
now dead and gone, which precedes his infancy?” Augustine did not have a clear answer 
to the origin of soul and he asked God, “Was I anywhere or any sort of person?”41 There 
must be a turning point, like a fall from the original innocent state, either in his personal 
history or in his ancestor’s personal history. Rather than a child having committed 
personal sin before birth, it is possible that the inherited guilt from his ancestors makes 
the innocent child sinful. Although Augustine did not have a definite answer to the 
turning point, he asserted, “I feel no sense of responsibility now for a time of which I 
recall not a single trace.”42 As he was not responsible for that turning point, therefore his 
ancestor must have committed the sin that became the source of his antecedent bondage 
of sin. 
In Book One, Augustine told us that an infant is inclined to do evil before he is 
able to commit personal sin intentionally with knowledge and freedom. According to 
Augustine’s observation, an infant is hostile to the people surrounding him but what is 
the source of this hostility, and how is it related to God? Augustine did not explain it 
clearly until Book Five. “At Rome my arrival was marked by the scourge of physical 
sickness, and I was on the way to the underworld, bearing all the evils I had committed 
against you, against myself, and against others—sins both numerous and serious, in 
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addition to the chain of original sin by which ‘in Adam we die’ (1 Cor 15: 22). You had 
not yet forgiven me in Christ for any of them, nor had he by his cross delivered me from 
the hostile disposition towards you which I had contracted by my sins.”43 It is the first 
time in the Confessions that he mentioned the original sin of which is distinguished from 
his personal sin.44 Upon his arrival in Rome, he bore the burden of sin due both to his 
personal sin and to original sin. The ignorant child who lives according to his physical 
needs does not commit any personal sin. But the child who is bound by original sin, an 
antecedent bondage, gives in to disoriented desires. But both personal and original sin 
required the forgiveness of Christ. Augustine just brought out the existence of the 
involuntary sinful state of the infant without dealing with the question of the source of the 
antecedent bondage of man in the infancy narrative in Book One. The existence of the 
involuntary sinful state of man indicates the evil condition of the human heart and 
perduring evil. Man is conditioned by sin before committing a personal sin. If every 
human being is born with a sinful state of mind, then the high probability of a sinful 
society would be unavoidable, as people following the inherited sinful inclination would 
create a sinful society.  
 
ii. The Emergence of Pride and Shame 
Augustine then went on telling the readers about the social environment in which 
he learned to pursue wealth and vainglory, and his shame and pride took form. In his 
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boyhood with the development of his reason, he acquired memory, knowledge, and 
language. He entered a society in which people did not love each other but loved to be 
praised by others. As in his infancy, there was a power struggle between young boy 
Augustine and the adults in the society. He was indolent in his studies and loved to play. 
However, his teachers and parents taught him that in order to be successful in this world, 
he should excel in the art of using his tongue to gain access to human honors and to 
acquire deceitful riches.45 As in his infancy, the young boy Augustine was also weak in 
body and social power. If he did not obey the commands of adults, he would be punished. 
He was laughed at and beaten by adults. Shame was greatly painful to him. This physical 
abuse imprinted an indelible mark upon Augustine’s body and mind. Thus, fear of 
punishment became his drive and motivation for study.  
We see from this narrative that young boy Augustine was reluctant to study. He 
was forced to study by the fear of punishment, which did not always work. Augustine 
still did not behave and he loved to play. A positive drive, which is an internal drive that 
leads one to behave out of love should be implanted in him. Later on when Augustine’s 
parents and teachers told him it was good to pursue wealth and glory, Augustine 
commented, “The objective of education the adults had in view was merely to satisfy the 
appetite for wealth and for glory, though the appetite is insatiable, the wealth is in reality 
destitution of spirit, and the glory something of which to be ashamed of.”46 If Augustine 
studied well and gained wealth and glory, he would obtain people’s praise and approval. 
Delight in praise fostered in him the sense of pride that in turn became the positive drive 
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of his study. Praise brought by wealth and glory was at that time his criterion for the good 
life. The education by praise and punishment nurtured only the passions of pride and 
shame. Pride drove him to obtain the praise and approval of others, while shame 
compelled him to hide his faults and his true self. This kind of education directed him to 
yearn for the approval of the society but turned him away from God, the only true good. 
In turn, Augustine did not care how he looked in the eyes of God; driven by pride and 
shame, he only lived in accordance with the opinion of others. 
Furthermore, his teacher encouraged the young Augustine to read Greek and 
Roman literature. He took pleasure in identifying with the characters of the books. He 
wept for the tragic fate of Dido instead of his own fate. The pleasure of reading literature 
kept him away from doing useful things and seeing his correct path and God. The 
identification with the characters of the literature alienated him from himself and God. 
“In reading this, O God my life, I myself was meanwhile dying by my alienation from 
you, and my miserable condition in that respect brought no tear to my eyes.”47 He was 
blind and had lost his way. 
The problem presented by reading fiction is not merely identification with the 
characters but also the content of the books. Most of the Greek and Roman literatures are 
stories about gods and their immoral behaviors. Since the young Augustine identified 
with the characters and took pleasure in them, he gradually accepted the vicious acts of 
gods as moral. Augustine said, “It would be truer to say that Homer indeed invented these 
fictions, but he attributed divine sanction to vicious acts, which had the result that 
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immorality was no longer counted immorality and anyone who so acted would seem to 
follow the example not of abandoned men but of the gods in heaven.”48  Young 
Augustine’s understanding of the true moral order was distorted by the Greek and Roman 
literatures. Augustine gradually accepted the moral standards of Greek gods and followed 
them instead of God. In short, the education he received led him to love only the earthly 
creatures, and he was led astray from God without being fully aware of it. 
 Augustine had demonstrated in Book One that the heart of infant was bound by an 
antecedent bondage to sin and the young boy was living in a sinful environment in which 
the education and the opinions of people pulled him away from God to earthly goods. 
What kind of person did he become when he was living in the involuntary sinful state and 
under hedonistic education? He commented, “For in those endeavors I was the lowest of 
the low, shocking even the worldly set by the innumerable lies with which I deceived the 
slave who took me to school and my teachers and parents because of my love of games, 
my passion for frivolous spectacles, and my restless urge to imitate comic scenes.”49 
Augustine lied to his slaves, teacher, and parents for vanity. He no longer told the truth 
and showed his true being to others. He was far away from his true self and the Truth. “I 
also used to steal from my parents’ cellar and to pocket food from their table either to 
satisfy the demands of gluttony or to have something to give to boys who, of course, 
loved playing a game as much as I, and who would sell me their playthings in return.”50 
His desires for food, sensual pleasure and vainglory drove him to violate the moral law. 
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He stole, lied, and cheated. He exclaimed, “Is that childish innocence?”51 No, those could 
not be just childish misdeeds. They were sins. Augustine violated the moral law and 
social customs and he was blameworthy. Violation of the rules of authority is analogous 
to crime in the society even though the scale of sin is smaller in boyhood. 
On the one hand, Augustine was a student of promise in the eyes of the people in 
the society because he was good at rhetoric. On the other hand, he was the lowest of the 
low. The more he succeeded in society, the lower he drifted from God. Augustine 
concluded, “My sin consisted in this, that I sought pleasure, sublimity, and truth not in 
God but in his creatures, in myself and other created beings.”52 Augustine figured out the 
two objects of his will: one was God, and the other was creature. God should be the goal 
and the criterion of his behavior. It is not that God and creatures are mutually exclusive, 
because creatures are the reflection of God’s glory and may lead man to glorify God. 
Rather it is sin that leads men away from God. For instance, Augustine was endowed 
with many good qualities at birth. However, he was not grateful to God and did not 
ascribe that glory to God. This ingratitude is sinful. It is not creatures themselves but the 
human will that is sinful inasmuch as the perverted will moves man to choose creatures 
instead of God.  
Augustine had demonstrated the paradoxical condition of infancy. Living 
accordingly to the natural physical order, he was ignorant and innocent; being greedy and 
jealous, he suffered the inherited guilt of the ancestors’ sin as illustrated by the 
paradoxical phenomenon of the social environment and the education of his boyhood. 
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“What miseries I experienced at this stage of my life, and what delusions when in my 
boyhood it was set before me as my moral duty in life to obey those who admonished me 
with the purpose that I should succeed in this world, and should excel in the arts of using 
my tongue to gain access to human honors and to acquire deceitful riches.”53 The 
youthful Augustine obeyed his parents and teachers as a moral duty, which, however, 
distracted him from the natural harmonious order and God. Because of the disorder of the 
human community, the more deeply Augustine entered into the stormy society of human 
life, the more he was lost. His soul was totally disoriented living in the society. Augustine 
following Plato depicted his soul as tripartite that consists of appetitive, spirited, and 
rational parts. They chase after creatures instead of God for pleasure, sublimity and truth, 
but they obtain only miseries, confusion, and error. The young Augustine was completely 
lost and disoriented. 
In sum, Augustine, driven by pride and shame and the inborn selfish inclination of 
the heart, lacked the knowledge of the true good. His inability to know and love the 
supernatural end of life, God, resulted in inappropriate relationships with God, oneself 
and others. In Augustine’s picture of sinner the internal human will and the external 
society are sinful, man is unable to get out of the sinful state either by himself or with the 
aid of other people. 
Augustine left us more questions than answers in Book One. What makes a child 
a sinner? How to explain the two forces in the infant’s mind? Whence come the sinful 
inclinations? Did he sin before coming to this world? Is there an evil substance that 
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makes one commit sin? Did he inherit the guilt from his ancestors? What are the sources 
of the self’s inborn inclination and rejection of God in society? Not having resolved these 
questions in Book One, he only set the stage for his discourse of the source of evil. We 
now turn to Rousseau’s boyhood.  
 
3. Rousseau’s Innocent Boyhood 
i. No Intention to Harm 
Augustine, by entering into his soul, was trying to seek God in order to praise 
Him; on the contrary, Rousseau, by entering into his soul, was attempting to unveil 
himself as a standard of judgment. The former was looking for a supernatural end but the 
latter a natural end. Rousseau dealt with the same issues as Augustine but from a very 
different perspective and understanding than that in Book One of his Confessions. Jean-
Jacques, like Augustine and other children, did not have any memory of his infancy. 
Rousseau, however, did not describe his infancy as Augustine does. His conscious life 
story starts from his five to six years old boyhood.54 So human history begins with 
                                                
54 Although Rousseau does not tell us about his infancy, he discusses the question of the “sinful” behavior 
of infant in Émile. He says that child asks adults to grasp the ball for him and cries when his request is not 
accepted. It seems that the effort the child makes appears to us as a sign of the desire to dominate. Abbé de 
Saint Pierre and Hobbes explain it a result of natural vices. But Rousseau does not think so. He regards 
infant’s crying as an expression of his physical discomfort and his need for help. Furthermore, although 
both infant and old man are weak, they do not have same behavior towards the need for help. The old man 
remains peaceful and calm in that situation. It is because the physical conditions of the old man are 
different from those of the infant. The life principle of infancy is developing and tending towards life. On 
the contrary, the old man’s life principle is extinguishing and going towards death. Therefore, destroying is 
more natural to infant’s character and physical condition. This shows that child before developing his 
reason is moved by his physical needs and passions. He does not have any idea of what he is doing. For 
instance, a child grabs a bird as he would grab a stone, and he kills it without knowing what he is doing. 
(Rousseau, Émile, pp. 66-67) Despite his violent act, child is not an inborn sinner. Sin is a conscious act 
against God and others. It requires the consciousness of another being who is endowed with same kind of 
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memory, the sign of the development of reason. Before the development of reason, infant 
Jean-Jacques was a self-centered little animal who cared only about his physical needs. 
He was like the man living in the pure state of nature who had no memory, no sense of 
time, no language, and no intention to do harm. His feelings were prior to his reasoning. 
He said, “I had conceived nothing, I had felt everything.”55 Furthermore, Rousseau 
started his story with the love story of his parents. He inherited from his parents a 
sensitive heart, not guilt from their ancestors’ sin. There is no innate evil in his soul. 
Regarding the external environment, although his birth had cost the life of his 
mother, which was the first of his misfortunes, Rousseau said that he was born in an 
environment of love. He had intimate relationships with his father, aunt, and cousin. 
There was no power struggle between adults and him. His father missed his mother very 
much and saw her in him. When they talked about his mother, they cried together. 
Besides that, together Jean-Jacques and his father would read after dinner some novels 
that his mother left behind. Sometimes, they could never stop until they finished the 
volume and read unto dawn.56 It showed that they cared about each other and shared the 
joy with common interest. When he was not with his father, Jean-Jacques was always 
with his aunt. He was content with watching her embroidering, listening to her singing, or 
just standing beside her. He still remembered the songs that she sang when he was 
                                                                                                                                            
consciousness. Rousseau, unlike Augustine, does not regard wrong-doings of infant as a personal sin since 
the child’s reason, which has not yet developed is not able to be conscious of his self and others. Until the 
boyhood in which reason has been developed, child is not attributed with responsibility of his wrong-
doings. Furthermore, there is no inborn inclination against others in human heart. According to the 
argument in the Second Discourse, before the development of reason, man who is living according to his 
natural passions is naturally good. 
55 Confessions, p. 8. 
56 Ibid., pp. 7-8 
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writing the Confessions. His aunt left with him an affectionate impression.57 Moreover, 
Jean-Jacques poured out his heart to his cousin, Bernard. Jean-Jacques had a very strong 
affection for him. There was no competition between them and they were willing to help 
and share with each other. Their friendship was simple, harmonious, and equal. They 
were united together by their pure love.58 Rousseau showed us through his friendship 
with his cousin that they were children, not immature adults or little men. Although his 
reason had been developed to a certain degree, so far, he had conceived nothing bad. He 
relied on his senses and his natural passions as the basic drives of his behavior.  
Living in an environment of love, everything he saw was good. Since his 
intellectual faculty had not been well developed yet, he never attributed bad intentions to 
others. Accordingly, he would not revenge the disobedience of others. He said, “My 
father, my aunt, my nurse, my relatives, our friends, our neighbors, all who environed me 
did not obey me it is true, but they loved me; and I likewise loved them.”59 Unlike 
Augustine, there was no inborn inclination against God and others in Jean-Jacques’s 
heart. He was living in a harmonious world whose charm he was delighted to see.  
But this does not mean that he had done nothing wrong. Rousseau admitted his 
flaws. “I had the flaws of my age; I was a babbler, a glutton, sometimes a liar. I would 
have stolen fruits, candies, food; but I never took pleasure in doing harm, damage, in 
accusing others, in tormenting poor animals.”60 This list of flaws is similar to 
Augustine’s list of sins at the end of Book One. They are sins according to Augustine 
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because he sought pleasure in creatures instead of God, pursuing the pleasure of natural 
ends but missing the supernatural goal. Rousseau, however, regarded his flaws not as sins 
but as some childish misdeeds. His reasoning is that he never took pleasure in doing harm 
to others. He cared only about his needs and was repulsed to see others suffering. He 
would not benefit himself at the expense of others on purpose. Natural pity restrained him 
from taking pleasure in doing harm to others. The two natural passions were active in his 
heart. Although Jean-Jacques was denatured by the development of his imagination and 
his amour-propre, he was not wicked. A supernatural goal is not the criterion of his 
behavior. To him, telling lies and stealing fruits are not acts of irreverence towards God, 
but only childish misdeeds like the violent behavior of a baby. 
 
ii. The Emergence of Pride and Shame 
Nevertheless, Rousseau asked, “How could I have become wicked, since under 
my eyes I had only examples of gentleness, and around me only the best people in the 
world?”61 This is Rousseau’s “anthropodicy” problem, unlike Augustine’s “theodicy” 
problem.62 Augustine’s theodicy problem is about the conflict between evil man in the 
world and his creator, the good God, but Rousseau’s “anthropodicy” problem is about the 
conflict between man’s goodness and wickedness. The wickedness of man is irrelevant as 
far as God’s goodness and justice are concerned.  Rousseau’s question implies two 
things. First, people around him are good, or the best in the world, as he said. Second, the 
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62 Grant, Ruth W. “The Rousseauan Revolution and the Problem of Evil,” Naming Evil, Judging Evil, ed. 
Ruth W. Grant, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 2006, p. 58. 
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source of wickedness is internal. With respect to the first point, if the people around him 
were really the best in the world, then they should have been immune to corruption in the 
society. In other words, there are good men who can maintain their natural goodness even 
though they are exposed to the toxicity of amour-propre and corrupt social practices. 
How can they be so special?  Or are all people good in the whole society? According to 
Augustine, sinful parents, teachers, and friends surround him and lead him astray from 
God, the supernatural goal. All men accordingly are sinners. Similarly, Jean-Jacques 
claimed that those people who have developed their amour-propre are the cause of his 
denaturation. I think Rousseau wanted to say that Bossey was a place like the Second 
Discourse’s intermediate state of nature in which people, with developed ideas and 
sentiments, still living a simple life with needs not exceeding their faculties and so they 
were not wicked people. Both they and Jean-Jacques were naturally good in their hearts; 
even though they might harm others on occasion, they did not take pleasure from it.63 
Rousseau said that among them he had less vanity.  In other words, they had vanity and 
Jean-Jacques had relatively less vanity than they had. They were not as naturally good as 
the man in the pure state of nature but they were not completely wicked yet.  
At sixteen, Jean-Jacques, however, was lost, confused, disoriented and unhappy. 
Rousseau said, “Thus I reached my sixteenth year, restless, discontent with everything 
and with myself, without the tastes of my station, without the pleasures of my age, 
devoured by desires whose object I did not know, crying without any reason for tears, 
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sighing without knowing what for.”64 He calumniated Marion for stealing the ribbon and 
ruined her reputation and career when he worked at Mme de Vercellis’ place. Later on in 
Paris, Rousseau found all men including himself wicked, and evil prevailed in society. At 
the threshold of full entry into society, Rousseau asked what makes a naturally good man 
wicked if the people around him are naturally good.  
Rousseau then set forth on his search to find the answer to the “anthropodicy” 
problem and how it is related to internal factors. If the people around him were good, 
then the source of evil had to come from within. Does this corollary contradict the 
previous affirmation that Jean-Jacques did not have any innate inclination against others? 
Not necessarily, because in Rousseau’s system external factors interact with internal 
factors dialectically. It is the relationship among good men that foments the wickedness. 
 Living in the loving environment of Bossey was a happy age for Jean-Jacques.65 
“Tender, affectionate, peaceful feelings formed its foundation. I believe that no individual 
of our species has ever naturally had less vanity than I did.”66 He had less vanity than 
other people in society, although just like the natural man in the intermediate state, Jean-
Jacques’ amour-propre was sprouting imperceptibly and pushing him further towards 
inequality and vice.67 Recalling Augustine’s case as regards to the development of 
amour-propre, Augustine’s parents and teachers cultivated his amour-propre on purpose 
by encouraging him to chase after wealth and vanity. They used mockery as a 
punishment to push Augustine to study hard. Seeking praise and approval from others 
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became the criterion of his conduct. Reading Greek legends led to morality that was 
vicious and alienated him from God. The senses of shame and pride then became the 
dominant impetus behind Augustine’s life. Likewise, Jean-Jacques’ father, aunt, and 
relatives also fostered his artificial passions, but they did not do it deliberately. Reading 
the lives of Greek and Roman heroes with his father nurtured a free and republican spirit, 
and inspired a great love of fatherland in Jean-Jacques’s heart.  He identified with the 
characters whose lives he read. For instance, when he was recounting the novel during a 
meal, in identifying himself with the character, he took up a chafing dish to impersonate 
the character.68 Until the incident of the aqueduct, Jean-Jacques was not aware of the 
sense of vanity. This happened when he was living with M. Lambercier in Bossey. He 
dug a trench under the earth to direct water from M. Lambercier’s walnut tree to his 
willow. Jean-Jacques saw the building of an “aqueduct” as a great glory. While 
Lambercier was watering his plant, he saw two basins of water. He soon discovered Jean-
Jacques’ little trick. The great aqueduct ended up in pieces. Jean-Jacques imagined 
himself in this anecdote as a Roman hero who fought against the giant and constructed a 
great system of aqueducts. “Until then I had had fits of pride at intervals when I was 
Aristides or Brutus. This was my first well-marked movement of vanity.”69  
His yearning to be loved is the source of his shame. Although everything in 
Bossey was nourishing Jean-Jacques’ natural inclination, a desire for being loved entered 
him insidiously. “To be loved by everyone who approached me was my keenest desire.”70 
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Rousseau did not tell us why and how it happened. It seems that the desire for being 
loved developed “naturally” in social relationships. It is just like the Second Discourse, 
when the sense of public value enters the natural men’s mind and heart as they are 
singing and dancing around the tree. It is delightful to be loved by the whole world. This 
desire subsequently evolved into a sense of shame. Jean-Jacques wanted to be loved by 
everyone and so he was afraid to displease anyone, especially someone he cared about. 
Disappointing Mlle Lambercier was more painful than failing and being punished in 
public. Rousseau said he was very sensitive to shame.71  
In sum, the boyhood of Jean-Jacques was different from the infancy and the 
boyhood of Augustine. He did not have any innate inclination against others. His amour-
propre was restrained by compassion, so he did not take pleasure in doing harm to others. 
He was living in a loving environment and the people around him were good. He was not 
yet able to attribute bad intentions to others. Imagination and ideas, sentiments and 
artificial passions grew with his body and mind. Although Jean-Jacques was denatured, 
he was not yet vicious.  
 
4. Inherited Guilt and Personal Fall 
The infancy and the boyhood narratives in both Confessions are related to the 
issues of inherited guilt and innately sinful inclination. Their respective infancy and 
boyhood narratives have different implications for the debate. In Augustine’s eyes, an 
infant is sinful at birth. The jealousy and greed of a baby reflects the sinful inclinations of 
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his heart. A child is born into a sinful world in which he driven by his disordered desires 
chases after earthly pleasures instead of God. Augustine was taught to strive for earthly 
success in order to receive praise from others. So Augustine asserted that a child is not 
born innocent and then becomes wicked in the sinful world by imitation. An infant 
inherited a sinful inclination from his ancestors, including Adam, his parents and the 
society. Augustine agreed with Job in the Old Testament: “For none is pure from sin 
before you, not even an infant of one day upon the earth.” (Job 14:4-5)72 It seems that in 
Book One Augustine showed that a child who entangled with sins and driven by sinful 
inclinations would highly probably tend to commit sin. However, he is not guilty, as he 
has not yet committed personal sin.73 Although Augustine did not mention original sin or 
inherited guilt in his infancy narrative, he illustrated its meaning as an infant suffers from 
the antecedent bondage of sin. Later on, Augustine depicted a child who not only 
inherited sinful inclinations in his heart and is surrounded by a sinful social environment, 
and a child inherited guilt before he commits a personal sin due to the sinful inclinations 
and the bad examples in the society. Although an infant is free from personal sin since he 
cannot act against God and others with knowledge and will, he is guilty because of his 
inherited sin. He inherited guilt from his ancestors as the consequence of Adam’s sin. 
Hence he is not exempted from the need for Christ’s salvation. In his Anti-Pelagian 
letters, Augustine clearly said, “Even that sin alone which was originally derived unto 
men not only excludes from the kingdom of God, which infants are unable to 
enter…unless they have received the grace of Christ before they die, but it also alienates 
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them from salvation and everlasting life which cannot be anything else than the kingdom 
of God, to which fellowship with Christ alone introduces us.”74 The inherited guilt is a 
sin that is in need of redemption by Christ. It intrinsically affects human existence so that 
human nature is in fact corrupt. The inherited guilt is a given condition of human beings.  
The antecedent bondage of sin is not contracted from the external environment, 
which sets bad examples to the innocent child.  Augustine claims that an infant does not 
sin by imitation, but is subject to the penalty of the true guilt of Adam’s sin. “Moreover, 
if Christ alone is He in whom all men are justified, on the ground that it is not simply the 
imitation of His example which makes men just, but His grace which regenerates men by 
the Spirit, then also Adam is the only one in whom all have sinned, on the ground that it 
is not the mere following of his evil example that makes men sinners, but the penalty 
which generated through the flesh.” 75 According to Augustine’s adoption of Paul’s 
analogy of Christ and Adam in Romans, 5: 12-19, all human beings including the 
newborn babies are liable to sin and death from Adam and depend on God’s grace for 
their salvation. Augustine emphasized the real guilt of infant in order to safeguard the 
universal salvation through Christ. Therefore, only those infants who have received the 
grace of Christ through baptism can be freed from the damnation of sin. An infant is 
saved as a sinner. “Now, inasmuch as infants are not held bound by any sins of their own 
actual life, it is the guilt of original sin which is healed in them by the grace of Him who 
saves them by the laver of regeneration.”76  
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Rousseau told us another story of the preliminary state of human being in his 
boyhood narrative. An infant is born innocent and he is not able to commit personal sin, 
since he has not developed his reason yet. Rousseau did not recount his infancy because 
he did not have any memory of it. The ability of attributing bad intentions to others is still 
a potential in which there is only a very low probability of being actualized. Thus, young 
boy Jean-Jacques did not punish adults for their disobedience because they loved each 
other. He was living according to the natural order by following his natural passions. 
Although, independent of the false accusation the aqueduct event caused his vanity, his 
innocent childhood serenity was ended by the false accusation of Lambercier. Thereafter, 
he departed further from the natural state. Accordingly, a child before the age of reason is 
innocent and free from the antecedent bondage of guilt. Rousseau in Emile said, “We 
[Protestant] hold that no child who dies before the age of reason will be deprived of 
eternal happiness…. Reason tells us that a man can be punished only for the mistakes of 
his will, and that an invincible ignorance could not be imputed to crime.”77 Rousseau 
holding the Protestant position rejected the Augustinian argument that a child who is not 
able to commit any wrongs willingly will be damned to limbo because it is contrary to 
reason.  
It is clear that Augustine’s picture of his infancy and boyhood is different from 
Rousseau’s, as is his understanding of goodness and the good man. As shown in the story 
of his conversion, Augustine struggled between good and evil, namely, love of God and 
love of creatures; between soul and body; between service to God and giving in to sexual 
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pleasure; between virtues and vices; and between truth and falsehood. God is the ultimate 
Good and all His creatures are good as long as they relate their goodness to God. Thus, a 
good man is one who loves God above all creatures and prefers soul to body, abandons 
sexual pleasure for the sake of serving God, and searches for and follows the truth. 
Creatures that separate themselves from God deviate from their human journey to God. 
Augustine was blind to the true destiny of human life. In order to be virtuous and holy, he 
had to control his passions and to try not to enjoy merely sensual pleasure without 
glorifying God. Augustine illustrated clearly how even after his conversion, he was still 
tempted by the pleasures related to the five senses and to intellect and pride that dragged 
him away from God.78 In Augustine’s view, a good man is virtuous and saintly. 
Goodness amounts to moral goodness and religious goodness, which are attainable only 
with God’s grace. On the contrary, natural goodness for Rousseau is distinguished from 
moral and spiritual goodness because in Rousseau’s view, a good man is one who lives 
according to his natural passions, self-preservation and pity; morality and religion are not 
the relevant factors. 
I have demonstrated how Rousseau replied to Augustine’s inherited guilt of an 
infant in the two Confessions. We are going to deal with the story of the Fall in which 
man lost his original innocence. Both Augustine and Rousseau re-interpreted the story of 
the Fall in their Confessions in order to find out the cause of the Fall of mankind. 
Augustine analyzed the story of the theft of a pear in Book Two to investigate the 
motivation of sin. The setting of the story is similar to the story of the Fall in the Bible. 
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Rousseau also told the readers about his theft when he was an engraving apprentice. But 
it is not the story of his Fall. Rather, his fall from innocence happened at the instance of 
being falsely accused by M. Lambercier. Hence I will put the incident of calumniation 
first then followed by the stories of theft. 
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CHAPTER THREE  THE MOTIVATION OF DOING WRONG  
 
1. The Motivation of the Theft of the Forbidden Fruits and that of Pears 
 At the end of Book One, Augustine acknowledged that his infancy and boyhood 
were not innocent. He stole from his parents’ cellars and he was a glutton, guilty of 
cheating, vainglory, and loved playing games too much. He was passionate for spectacles 
and prone to the restless urge to imitate comic scenes. He admitted that he did possess 
some good qualities too. He took delight in the truth, he hated to be deceived, and he 
developed a good memory. He concluded from the recognition of these good qualities 
that God, his Creator, is good, therefore he is good, “They are good qualities, and their 
totality is my self. Therefore he who made me is good, and he is my good, and I exult to 
him, (Ps. 2: 11) for all the good things that I was even as a boy.”1 If he were good then 
what is the cause of his sin? He said, “My sin consisted in this, that I sought pleasure, 
sublimity and truth not in God but in his creatures, in myself and other created beings.”2 
He targeted the finite creatures, instead of the infinite Creator, and did not ascribe any 
credit to God. Augustine took the parts, the creatures, instead of God, as the whole. God 
was not the center and the goal of his life. He was a sinner because he went astray from 
God. What is at stake is the motivating source for his behavior. Augustine told us that 
there was an inborn sinful inclination in his heart. Due to his family and his education, 
pride and shame became the fundamental motors of his activity. His bad education misled 
him to regard the parts as the whole. However, the sources of the inborn sinful inclination 
                                                
1 Aug. Confs., I, xx, 31. 
2 Ibid. 
 83 
and the sinful family and social environment remained an unsolved question for 
Augustine. Whence came the evil motivation?  
When he was recording the inborn sinful inclination of the infant, Augustine 
asked God whether there was some period of his life, now dead and gone, which 
preceded his infancy. He queried whether his soul committed sin before his birth or 
whether his ancestors by sinning at the dawn of human history result in the loss of 
innocence of the whole of mankind. He had no answer yet, as no one was able to tell him 
except God. Nonetheless, he tentatively proposed the original innocence and the fall of 
man. In other words, man is not created evil even though he is born sinful. Tracing the 
source of evil is the way to find the remedy for evil and human salvation. On the whole, 
his Confessions is a story of his past, his wandering astray from God and his redemptive 
turn to God. God saved him from dispersion, dissipation and estrangement and brought 
him into unity. It is a story of the prodigal son, a journey from the fall to the salvation of 
the soul. He said to God, “You gathered me together from the state of disintegration in 
which I had been fruitlessly divided. I turned from unity in you to be lost in 
multiplicity.”3 He set the stage for the journey to salvation in Book One. In Book Two, 
Augustine interpreted the story of the theft of pears as the story of the Fall of man in 
order to find out the source of evil If man was born innocent as Adam before the Fall, 
what made him sin? For Augustine, a parallel examination of the motivation of his 
adolescent theft of pears and Adam’s ‘theft’ of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good 
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and evil would furnish a clue to the problem of evil. Moreover, it also continues his 
investigation into whether man is born good or wicked. 
Before going to the story of the theft of pears, I will review the story of the Fall in 
the Bible and bring out the points important for our study. God put Adam in the Garden 
of Eden after the creation of the universe and asked him to work and to cultivate the 
Garden. Then God commanded Adam, “You may freely eat of every tree of the garden; 
but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you 
eat of it you shall die.” (Gen 2: 16-17 emphasis added)4 God gave Adam freedom to eat 
any fruit of the trees but set a limit that he should not eat the fruit of the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil. Adam was not allowed to eat that fruit or he would receive 
the punishment of death. The freedom of behavior, its limit, and the consequence of the 
violation are clearly stated in the commandment. God claimed His right to the property 
by announcing the commandment. God is the owner of the Garden and Adam was His 
worker and the keeper of the Garden. It is understandable that Adam did not enjoy an 
unlimited freedom in the Garden of Eden.  
Then the tempter, the serpent arrived. It approached the woman and tested her to 
see if she knew the commandment. The serpent exaggerated the limit of human freedom 
in the commandment and depicted God as a tyrant. It said, “Did God say, “You shall not 
eat from any tree in the garden”?” (Gen 3: 1b emphasis added) The woman replied with a 
nearly perfect answer. “We may eat of the fruit of the trees in the garden; but God said, 
“You shall not eat of the fruit of the tree that is in the middle of the garden, nor shall you 
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touch it, or you shall die.” She understood her freedom, its limit, and the consequence of 
the violation well, but she did not really know the nature of the forbidden fruit. She knew 
only the location of the forbidden fruit that they should refrain from eating. That provided 
a loophole for the serpent to confuse her. First, the serpent denied the consequence of the 
violation: “You will not die,” if she ate the forbidden fruit. Refuting the punishment to 
relieve the woman of her fear. Furthermore, the serpent portrayed God as a ruler who is 
emulously jealous of man. “You will not die; for God knows that when you eat of it your 
eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.” (Gen 3: 4-5 
emphasis added)  Listening to what the serpent said, the woman was tempted to be like 
God. She might also dislike the idea of God arbitrarily setting limits upon her. “So when 
the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and 
that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate.” (Gen 3: 6 
emphasis added) By a threefold attraction, namely, the fruit was good for food, it was a 
delight to the eyes, and it would make one wise. Besides the attractiveness of food and of 
beauty, there was the attraction of becoming like God. The woman found these 
attractions irresistible, and so gave in to the temptation and took the fruit and ate it. Adam 
did not say a word to stop his partner, but instead accepted the woman’s offer of the 
forbidden fruit. “And she also gave some to her husband, who was with her, and he ate.” 
(Gen 3: 7) Adam was the one to whom God directly gave His commandment and he was 
supposed to have the strength to keep the commandment. Why did he accept the offer of 
the woman? Did his love of the woman make him violate the rule and eat the forbidden 
fruit? The author of Genesis simply stated what happened without giving an account of 
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what was on Adam’s mind. It is shown that there are four different possible motivations 
behind the first sin, namely, for the food, for the beauty, for God’s attribute, and for the 
love of friendship. How could all these positive motivations finally lead to sin? Augustine 
tried to analyze these four motivations in the theft of the pears to find out the real 
motivation of the first sin. 
According to Augustine’s account, there was a pear tree near his vineyard and the 
fruit was attractive neither in color nor in taste. He went with a gang of delinquent 
adolescents at night to shake off the fruits. They ate a few and threw the rest to the pigs. 
Many adolescents get into this kind of mischief. Nonetheless, Augustine used the 
occasion to examine the motivation of sin.   
It is worth emphasizing that Augustine took the theft as an analogy to the story of 
the Fall, where he interpreted the eating of forbidden fruit as a sin of theft. Theft is an act 
that violates the moral law of justice. The thief takes a property that does not belong to 
him without the owner’s consent. He replaces the owner with himself as the new owner 
of the stolen property. The thief violates the property right of the owner and he also 
disregards the law of justice. The theft of the pears not only violates the convention of the 
society but also God’s law. In Book Three, Augustine said, “True inward justice judges 
not by custom but by the most righteous law of almighty God. By this law the moral 
custom of different regions and periods were adapted to their places and times, while that 
law itself remains unaltered everywhere and always.”5 God’s universal law, which 
grounds the natural moral order, is the foundation of all moral customs. Therefore, all 
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shameful acts that are contrary to nature are to be detested, and anybody who performs 
such acts is subject to punishment even if all people break this rule.6 Theft is the kind of 
sin that is “not to be done under any pretext of a good reason, for any supposedly good 
end, with any seemingly good intention.”7 Theft is an intrinsically evil act that is contrary 
to both moral custom and God’s law.  
Augustine said that as an adolescent, he did not have any sense of justice in his 
heart. His soul was driven by the unbridled passions, e.g., sexual desire, vanity, and 
shame. He ignored both the laws of nature and the revealed commandments in the Bible. 
He acted with an unbounded freedom. Similarly, Adam and Eve replaced themselves 
with God as the new owner of the property, the Lord of the universe by their first sin. 
Furthermore, disregarding God’s commandment implies that they deny God’s authority 
over them. They wanted to act with an unbounded freedom. But why did they want to 
replace God? Augustine asked, “What is the motivation of my theft?” 
 Generally, man wants to obtain the object that he desires by means of an act. In 
other words, everyone acts for a reason. However, Augustine found no reason why he 
desired what he obtained in the theft. He desired the sheer excitement of thieving. He 
took pleasure not in getting something concrete but in doing what is wrong. He stole the 
pears for no reason. He felt that “wickedness filled” him. What does that mean? By his 
preliminary reflection of the experience of the theft, he concluded, “ I am seeking not to 
gain anything by shameful means but shame for its own sake.”8 Is it possible for one to 
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act for no reason? What was his heart seeking? How can his heart seek shame? Augustine 
investigated the possible motivations of human act to see if he really stole for no other 
reason than just doing what is wrong. 
First he examines aesthetic motivation. Beauty is the goal of human action. 
Physical objects, social status, temporal honor and power, friendship and the harmonious 
order are beautiful and attractive to human beings. Human beings love beautiful things 
and are attracted to possess them. The love of beauty motivates man to possess beautiful 
things and sometimes it even pushes man to violate the law to get them. Urged by the 
love of beauty, Augustine would have stolen the fruits if they were beautiful and 
attractive.  However, clearly this was not the case because the fruits were neither 
attractive in color nor taste. Beauty did not motivate his theft.  
It applies to the temptation of the woman in the Garden of Eden as well. It is true 
that the forbidden fruit was a delight to her eyes. However, the forbidden fruit was not 
more beautiful than the others. The delight of the forbidden fruit to her eyes was not 
strong enough to push the woman to violate the commandment even though the serpent 
had reduced her fear of punishment. The woman could eat other fruits of the trees in the 
Garden. Love of beauty is not the motivation of the woman’s sin. 
Second, Augustine examined the moral aspect of the motivation. Is stealing pears 
a moral good for him?  By nature, man desires to possess what is good, even though the 
good in his eyes may be bad objectively. Man acts to obtain the good he desires or needs. 
Man does not do harm to himself intentionally. If a man commits a crime, he must think 
that he got a good that outweighs his possible punishment for the crime. It is hard for 
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Augustine to believe that man sins for the sake of sin and gains nothing good out of it. He 
took murder as an example. Killing is a means for an end, either for obtaining a good or 
to prevent the loss of a good. A killer may murder for his love of a woman, for another’s 
property or money, or to avoid the loss of his own property or to eliminate a threat. Those 
might be goods he gains by his crime. One might kill for other goods, such as life in self-
defense. But is it possible to commit a crime because one loves the crime itself? 
Augustine argued that even Catiline, the infamous murderer who was known to kill for 
no reason, murdered the Roman Senators to obtain honor, power, and wealth. “No, not 
even Catiline himself loved his crimes, something else motivated him to commit them.”9 
To be sure, the good that attracts the sinner must be relatively better than other goods and 
it has to be much needed by the sinner in that circumstance. Did Augustine obtain some 
good out of his thieving of pears? He stole the fruits not because they were beautiful 
since they were neither attractive in color nor taste. Nor did he need the fruit for food 
since he threw them to the pigs. Thus, neither beauty nor goodness motivated him to 
steal. However, Augustine took pleasure in the wickedness in the theft. What is the nature 
of this pleasure in the theft? Is theft itself beautiful or lovable? Augustine found nothing 
lovable or beautiful in the theft. 
Likewise, in the Garden of Eden the forbidden fruit furnished neither a delight to 
her eyes nor a good for food to motivate Eve to pick and eat it. “Out of the ground the 
Lord God made to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food,” (Gen 
2: 9) so there were many more beautiful and better fruits for food in the Garden of Eden. 
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She had many choices there so it was not necessary for her to risk punishment to violate 
God’s rule. Neither beauty nor the good was the motivation of the first sin. 
Augustine’s investigation of the motivation for evil human acts concluded that a 
perverted imitation of God’s attributes was the motivation for sin. Man is created in 
God’s image and likeness. By nature, every human act imitates God’s likeness, except 
when man does not acknowledge God as the ultimate Good and the origin of all goods, 
and so attempts to replace God with himself. For instance, honor and glory are good 
insofar as they are attributes of God, and man shares God’s honor and glory by imitation. 
The ambitious man desires honor and glory because he will feel like God when he is 
admired or worshipped by others, whereas man as a creature is supposed to be grateful 
for sharing God’s honor and glory and to acknowledge that God alone is the most 
honorable and glorious forever. However, when man does not ascribe the glory and honor 
to God, he usurps God’s throne, thus perverting man’s imitation of God. A perverted 
imitation of God’s attribute becomes a motivation for sin by leading man away from God 
and making him the center of the world. Augustine regarded this perverted imitation of 
God as a fornication of the human soul, as human being unfaithful to God. Despite that, a 
perverted imitation of God is still an action for a good by which man still acknowledges 
that God’s attributes are good to possess. Although man is ambitious for honor, a 
particular good, even at the price of losing God, the ultimate good, he still reflects a 
positive share of God’s attribute in the imitation. This is to say that man’s fornication 
cannot totally relinquish his relationship with God. “But even by thus imitating you they 
acknowledge that you are the creator of all nature and so concede that there is no place 
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where one can entirely escape from you.”10 Augustine asked. “Therefore in that act of 
theft what was the object of my love, and in what way did I viciously and perversely 
imitate my Lord?”11 Augustine suspected that the pleasure in breaking the law gave him a 
deceptive sense of omnipotence, but he knew this is not plausible because he cannot act 
against the law without being punished, thus revealing his true lack of omnipotence. He 
queried, “Was it possible to take pleasure in what was illicit for no reason other than it 
was not allowed?”12 Is the perverted imitation of the omnipotence of God the motivation 
of the theft? 
In the Garden of Eden, the serpent tempted the woman by telling her that if she 
ate the forbidden fruit, she would be like God, knowing good and evil. She was tempted 
by the desire to be as wise as God. Did this desire motivate her sin? She was created in 
the image and the likeness of God. Her every act was an imitation of God’s attribute. As 
an image of God, she was like God. It is natural that she craved for the knowledge of 
good and evil. However, the woman’s imitation of God’s attribute became perverted 
when the goal of her desire for the knowledge of good and evil is for her to be an 
independent rival of God. She wanted to be as wise as God and become the judge of good 
and evil in her life. According to Augustine’s analysis, although the woman abandoned 
God, she was still following God’s knowledge of good and evil that she could not 
disregard. Therefore, she thought she could be as wise as God but she could not deny that 
God is the Lord of the knowledge of good and evil. Her perverted imitation of God’s 
                                                
10 Aug. Confs., II, vi, 14. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
 92 
attribute actually affirmed God’s status as the judge of good and evil and the executer of 
punishment. She knew that she could not escape the punishment of God who is truly 
omnipotent. Therefore, taking pleasure in imitating God’s omnipotence by breaking the 
law is unlikely to be the motivation of her sin. Nevertheless, we do not know to what 
extent the woman believed what the serpent said about the punishment, “You will not 
die.” If she did not believe what the serpent had told her, would she dare to act against 
God’s commandment? That is why Augustine was not certain whether it was possible to 
take pleasure in doing what is not allowed. It is worth noting that after considering these 
three motivations, the woman took the forbidden fruit and ate it. Then she gave it to her 
husband and he ate it. Did the woman break the law out of one of the three motivations?  
Furthermore, it is the woman who committed the first sin but the Judeo-Christian 
tradition regards Adam’s sin as the first sin in human history. Augustine, following the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, in fact investigated only the motivation of Adam’s sin but not 
the woman’s. Hence, Augustine questioned why Adam accepted his wife’s offer and ate 
the forbidden fruit. Thus, from what has already been said, it is not a delight to the eyes, 
or a good for food that motivated Adam to eat the fruit. Nor is the perverted imitation of 
God. Adam did not take the fruit until his wife gave it to him. Is his love for her the 
ultimate motivation of the first sin? This line of thought analyzed friendship as possibly 
the ultimate motivation of sin. 
 “Was it possible to take pleasure in what was illicit for no reason other than it 
was not allowed?” Augustine repeated the fundamental question. He found out that there 
was no thing in the thievery. There was no winner in the theft. The owner of the garden 
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lost his property, the pears. The common good and the justice of the society were 
damaged. God’s commandment and the natural moral law were violated. Most 
importantly, Augustine and his friends also gained nothing in the thievery. (I think the 
pigs to which Augustine threw the pears were the only winner in this case.) Yet 
Augustine took pleasure in the theft. Is there anything he found in thievery that he loved 
more than the act itself?  Maybe companionship?  Augustine took pleasure in the crime 
that was provoked by the companionship of sinners. He puzzled, “What is sin? Why do 
we sin? And who can understand sin?” How does “companionship” lend pleasure to the 
crime? Augustine noticed that he would not have done this crime alone, but why not? He 
did not take pleasure in the beauty of the fruit, or by the fruit as nutritious or tasty or in 
the perverted imitation of God’s attributes. None of those attractions motivated his act. If 
his motive was to insult the authority of God and the owner, he could have done it alone. 
So it seems that the pleasure he gained from committing the crime derived from his 
friends. How? As he recalled, “As soon as the words spoken ‘Let us go and do it’, one is 
ashamed not to be shameless.”13 Therefore, it is not friendship but the approval of his 
friends that motivated him to steal. Thus he took pleasure not in the friendship but being 
ashamed not to be shameless. This is the motivation of the crime. 
It is true that at the time in his life avoiding shame or getting approval from others 
is always the motivation of Augustine’s behavior. Since boyhood, Augustine sought 
vanity and avoided shame. He studied in order to be praised by people “whose approval 
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was at that time his criterion of a good life.”14 During his adolescence, he ran astray from 
God “by pleasing himself and by being ambitious to win human approval.”15 This 
yearning stems from his strong desire to love and to be loved. He was totally captured by 
this strong desire. In order to satisfy this desire for love, he would do anything his friends 
asked of him. “No restraint was imposed by the exchange of mind with mind, which 
marks the brightly lit pathway of friendship.”16 He loved himself and wanted to be loved 
by others as well. He acted in accordance with his friends’ opinions so he could get their 
love in return. 
What would have made Augustine feel ashamed in front of his friends? Shame is 
generally felt when one does something against the rule or expectation of others. It is 
different from guilt that is rooted in the wrongness of the act. Rather, shame points to the 
person who acted wrongly and cannot confront other people’s opinions or judgment. A 
person who has done shameful deeds is blamed and is looked down upon by others. 
Shame, in contrast to honor, hurts the self-esteem as determined by social norms. Thus, 
shame arises from the fear of being rejected and not being loved. Fear of shame leads one 
to hide one’s true self and try to please others by following other people’s opinion in 
order to gain their approval.  
In the case of the theft, Augustine was “ashamed not to be shameless.” His 
companions were proud of doing shameful deeds, so he would feel shameful if he did not 
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follow their standards. The two preceding shameful feelings were proportionate to the 
violation of two social norms: moral custom and the expectations of his companions.  
How does shame come about in the former situation? The social moral custom is 
established by the consent of the people for the common good of society. Any violation 
of the rule is unjust and injurious to the individual and the common good of society. In 
the case of theft, a thief stealing other people’s property harms the rights of others and 
breaks the customary agreement. Augustine said, “In saying that vicious acts contrary to 
human customs are to be avoided, we take account of variations in custom, so that the 
mutually agreed convention of a city or nation, confirmed by custom or law, is not to be 
violated by the lust of a citizen or foreigner. Any element that does not fit into the pattern 
of the whole is unacceptable to society.”17 Thus, a citizen should be ashamed of himself 
for violating the customs of society. 
 However, the habitual behavior of Augustine’s companions is to oppose the social 
moral custom. The group made it a point to honor shameful deeds. Violating the custom 
by stealing pears gave them pleasure. Augustine knew what he did was wrong but he was 
not free to refuse the urging of his companions. He would have felt ashamed if he had 
refused to perform the socially shameful act. “Be ashamed not to be shameless” is the 
culture of his friends. “Among my peer group I was ashamed not to be equally guilty of 
shameful behavior when I heard them boasting of their sexual exploits. Their pride was 
the more aggressive, the more debauched their acts were; they derived pleasure not 
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merely from the lust of the act but also from the admiration it evoked.”18 Augustine 
wanted to be praised by them and desperately wanted their approval. He continued to say, 
“Yet I went deeper into vice to avoid being despised, and when there was no act by 
admitting to which I could rival my depraved companions, I used to pretend I had done 
things I had not done at all, so that my innocence should not lead my companions to 
scorn my lack of courage, and lest my chastity be taken as a mark of inferiority.”19 His 
enjoyment did not so much come from doing the bad deed itself than from receiving the 
approval of his gang. At the time of stealing the pears, Augustine was greatly concerned 
about his value in the eyes of other people and “being ashamed not to be shameless” was 
the motto of his morality. Augustine’s motivation for the theft of the pears was fulfilling 
the expectation of the small community of friends in order to gain their acceptance and 
love. Nonetheless, it is ironic that Augustine tried to gain approval and love from his 
small gang of companions by doing harm to others and the larger society. Did he really 
gain their friendship by doing shameful deeds with them? As an adolescent, Augustine 
was seeking friendship to satisfy his desire to love and to be loved. Human friendship is 
good and “is also a nest of love and gentleness because of the unity it brings about 
between many souls.”20But Augustine conceded that the friendship he gained from the 
crime was harmful. “Friendship can be a dangerous enemy, a seduction of the mind lying 
beyond the reach of investigation.”21 What he gained was not the love of friendship but 
only the avoidance of being rejected. Their approval of his behavior is not a true love 
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because the fear of being rejected was uppermost in Augustine’s heart. “There is no fear 
in love, but perfect love casts out fear; for fear has to do with punishment, and whoever 
fears has not reached perfection in love.” (1 Jn 4: 18)  The  “not being rejected” gained in 
the thievery is not love. Augustine concluded that his heart truly desired God’s love in 
which there is no fear. He exclaimed, “The person who enters into you ‘enters into the 
joy of the Lord’, and will not be afraid; he will find himself in the supreme Good where it 
is supremely good to be.”22 However, at the time of his adolescence, he went astray from 
God and he exclaimed, “I became to myself a region of destitution.”23  
In sum, Augustine depicted the pre-conscious sinful state of an infant and the 
sinful social environment of his boyhood in Book One. Through his detailed analysis of 
the theft of pears in Book Two, Augustine demonstrated that his motivation to sin was to 
avoid shame and to violate the law for its own sake, which resulted in nothing gained. 
Nonetheless, Augustine had not yet solved the problem of the cause of evil. What made 
him wicked? He said that he would not have stolen the pear alone, he would not have 
done it if his friends did not tell him to. The desire to be shameless compelled him to do 
it. Should he blame his family and friends since they formed his ambition based on pride 
and his feeling of shame? But what shaped the mind and passions of his family and 
friends? Furthermore, why did he sin for no reason other than doing what was not 
allowed? After the examination of the motivation of the theft of the pears, Augustine 
excluded the possible motivations of human behavior as the cause of evil. In the end, 
there is no reason either for him to steal or for Adam to eat the forbidden fruit in the 
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Garden of Eden. Still is there an evil force that drives him to sin? If so, where does this 
evil force come from? 
 
2. Rousseau’s Account of the Motivation of the Theft 
 
i.  The Story of the Fall and the End of Childlike Serenity 
The serenity of Jean-Jacques’ childhood life was ended with an experience of 
injustice.24 When he was living with minister Lambercier, Rousseau was accused of 
breaking a comb to which he was the only person who had access at that moment. The 
objective external evidence showed that he was guilty. Lambercier made a judgment 
based on the evidences and punished Jean-Jacques. Jean-Jacques, however, never 
admitted his “crime”, because he knew that he was innocent. He insisted on demand 
justice. He thought that the judgment by which the stronger punished the weak for 
wrongs the weak had not done was unjust.  Rage and despair overwhelmed Jean-Jacques. 
He did not understand why the attitude of Lambercier, the one he loved and respected the 
most, changed towards him, especially if Lambercier knew that he was innocent. He 
exclaimed, “What a reversal of ideas! What disorder of feelings! What an upheaval in his 
heart, in his brain.”25 Jean-Jacques’ strict reaction to the unjust judgment reflected his 
change of heart and mind, in which his sense of injustice emerged so that he no longer 
saw things as positively as before. His emotional response was caused by the 
disproportion between his imaginative power and his ability to reason. He was able to 
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identify himself with Lambercier by his imaginative power but he failed to reason as 
Lambercier did; therefore, he could not see things the way Lambercier did. Jean-Jacques 
only saw his own position and affirmed his innocence. He explained, “I did not yet have 
enough reason to feel the reality that many appearances condemned me and to put myself 
in the place of the others. I kept to my own place.”26 At that moment, he was puzzled by 
Lambercier’s change of attitude. He interpreted Lambercier’s intention as offending him 
on purpose, since he was convinced that Lambercier knew he was innocent. This 
interpretation provoked the feeling of violence and injustice. However, the responses of 
both Lambercier and Jean-Jacques showed the limitation of their capability for rational 
judgment. Lambercier made his judgment based upon circumstantial evidence only. Jean-
Jacques, on the other hand, made his judgment of Lambercier’s assessment based upon 
his own rather limited knowledge of Lambercier’s perspective. The limitation of the 
human rational judgment on both sides led to this unjust scenario. This scenario 
stimulated in turn the capability to attribute bad intentions to others. The innate capability 
of attribution jumps at the opportunity to make it happen. Rousseau exploited the innate 
capability and the necessary conditions to arouse feelings of injustice in this event.  
Rousseau concluded from this experience, “There was the end of the serenity of 
my childlike life. From that moment I ceased to enjoy a pure happiness, and even today I 
feel that the remembrance of the charms of my childhood stops there.”27 His innocent 
childhood, or should we say his original innocence, ended. Rousseau exploited the 
typology of the fall of Adam to depict this experience. “We were there as the first man in 
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the terrestrial paradise, but we had ceased to enjoy it.”28 From then on, he lost his natural 
innocence and was able to attribute bad intentions to others. There was no more intimate 
loving relationship among Jean-Jacques and others. “Attachment, respect, intimacy, 
confidence no longer tied the students to their guides, we no longer regarded them as 
Gods who read in our hearts; we were less ashamed of doing wrong, and more fearful of 
being accused, we begin to hide ourselves, to mutiny, to lie.”29 Rousseau did not explain 
his loss of original innocence by means of a metaphysical principle nor a theological 
myth. His explanation is natural, which is to say, experiential, and social. Rousseau 
reckoned that this incident was a story of the Fall of both God and man. Lambercier was 
no longer the God who is omniscient. Lambercier was not able to read Jean-Jacques’ 
heart and so he could not make a just judgment. God became man. There is no more God 
or divine law in the world, and thus the rules set by men lost their legitimacy. Everyone 
with the limitation of reason is equal. Man is not obliged to observe any man-made rules. 
Moreover, it was also the Fall of Jean-Jacques. He was no longer the innocent who saw 
things as good. His eyes were opened and he saw only his own self-interests. Unlike 
Adam who was ashamed of his sin when his eyes were opened, Jean-Jacques was not 
ashamed of his wrongful acts afterwards. As the divine ruler, who is the judge of right 
and wrong, lose his legitimacy; man makes his own rules for himself. It follows that the 
loving relationships among men are gone, to be replaced by the relationships of interest 
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and power. Jean-Jacques did not dare to reveal his true self.  His appearance became 
inconsistent with his being.  
Rousseau showed us in this event that it is an incidental occasion that stimulates 
man to attribute offensive intentions to other people. Had this occasion not occurred, he 
would have remained good and innocent. “If he had fallen into the hands of a better 
master, his destiny would have been different.”30 Nonetheless, as I have demonstrated, 
the unjust scenario was caused by limitations of reasoning. Man is not God and man will 
make judgment only based upon the apparent evidence and his ability to reason at that 
moment. The limitations of reasoning are inevitable. Once having developed the ability to 
reason, the fallibility of human reason becomes a reality that can lead to possible 
injustices. Man’s original innocence is lost. Unlike Augustine, who is still uncertain 
about the motivation of the first sin after examining the motivation behind the theft, 
Rousseau here suggests to us a merely natural cause of the Fall. God became irrelevant 
for the explanation of the source of evil.  In other words, the problem of evil is not related 
to theodicy but ‘anthropodicy’. 
 
ii. The Theft for Natural Needs 
Augustine displayed the list of sins of his boyhood in order to show that the child 
was not innocent. Rousseau, instead, regarded those thefts and lying in his boyhood as 
childish misdeeds. He claimed he was not wicked since he did not take pleasure in doing 
harm to others. Furthermore, Augustine, in the story of his theft of pears, reflected the 
                                                
30 Confessions, p. 36. 
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nature and motivation of specifically sinful behavior. He understood that there was 
nothing gained in the thievery and he stole the pears because he was ashamed of not 
being shameless among his friends. Theft is a sin against God for which Augustine 
accepted responsibility. On the contrary, Rousseau viewed his events of theft in his 
adolescence as victimization. His events of theft took place during his apprenticeship 
under M. Ducommun. If Minister Lambercier for Jean-Jacques was a Godlike authority 
figure that was good but unjust, then M. Ducommun was another authority figure that 
was neither good nor just.  
 M. Ducommun, who was a loutish and violent young man, employed Jean-
Jacques as an apprentice. Jean-Jacques was living under M. Ducommun’s tyranny like a 
slave, deprived of freedom, food, material resources, and self-esteem. M. Ducommun 
kept him away from food he liked and good tools he needed. “Finally where everything I 
saw become an object of covetousness for my heart solely because I was deprived of 
everything.”31 Furthermore, Jean-Jacques became fearful staying at his master’s house 
and not daring to express his desires and the emotions of his heart. From then on he was a 
lost child who was disoriented and loved by nobody.32 Covetousness and powerlessness 
led him to masquerade, to lie, and finally to steal.  
 Unlike the case of the “fall” of the serenity of his childhood, Rousseau told the 
reader that it was the unjust living environment that made him vicious. At the beginning 
of the narrative of the apprenticeship, he said, “Despite the most decent education, I must 
                                                
31 Confessions, p. 27. 
32 Ibid., p. 26. Jean-Jacques was disoriented and did not feel he was loved. It is same as the young boy 
Augustine described in Aug. Confs., I, xix, 30. 
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have had a great penchant to degenerate.”33 The suggestion seems to be that the penchant 
in his heart caused his denaturing. However, after telling the readers about the unjust 
treatment at the hands of his master, he said, “Finally, where everything I saw became an 
object of covetousness for my heart solely because I was deprived of everything.”34 He 
was proposing a social cause of his wickedness and said, “It is almost always good 
feelings badly directed that make children take the first step toward evil.”35 In other 
words, it was the unjust environment that badly directed his good natural passions. There 
were three cases of theft during the period of his apprenticeship, namely, stealing 
asparagus, apples, and everything else that he wanted in the workshop of his master. The 
cause of the first theft was “friendship”, the second one was a physical need, and the third 
was a perverted imitation of the master. 
 Despite his deprived situation, Jean-Jacques’ first theft did not come from his own 
initiative, for his heart did not have this intention until the occasion arose. Like 
Augustine, Jean-Jacques would not have done it alone, if his friend had not asked him. 
The journeyman, M. Verrat, who did not have much money and wanted to have a good 
lunch, took the initiative. Because he was not nimble and did not want to take the risk, he 
asked Jean-Jacques to do the theft. He flattered Jean-Jacques and told Jean-Jacques that 
he really needed his help. Jean-Jacques then accepted the proposal and performed the 
robbery. He first robbed from the desire to be obliging.36 The theft of asparagus was not 
done out of his physical desire, even though he took pleasure in having a good lunch with 
                                                
33 Confessions, p. 26. 
34 Ibid., p. 27. 
35 Ibid. (Emphasis added) 
36 Ibid.  
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M. Verrat. If M. Verrat did not ask him, Jean-Jacques would not have done it by himself. 
He did not consent to Verrat’s proposal because of shame or pride. At first Jean-Jacques 
rejected Verrat’s proposal since he did not see its purpose. But Verrat insisted and 
persuaded Jean-Jacques to view it in another way. Jean-Jacques was unable to resist 
Verrat’s blandishment due to weakness of will. Apparently agreeing with Verrat’s 
arguments, he decided to help Verrat, even though he was not persuaded by Verrat’s 
argument, and only accepted it as an excuse. He really desired to be obliging. After a few 
thefts, his motivation changed. Rousseau said that the motivation of this theft was ‘to 
please the one who was making me to do it.”37 He felt obliged to do it under a situation of 
social inequality. M. Verrat was a journeyman and Jean-Jacques was only an apprentice. 
Had Jean-Jacques been caught, nobody would believe his word, were Verrat to deny 
being an accomplice. “This is how in every condition the guilty strong person saves 
himself at the expense of the innocent weak one.”38 M. Verrat, in the socially stronger 
position, took advantage of Jean-Jacques, who was the socially weaker one, felt obliged 
to obey Verrat’s will because he was relatively powerless. Thus, Jean-Jacques’ first theft 
in his apprenticeship was a fruit of social manipulation that did not involve any intention 
to harm others. He helped Verrat because he was not able to refuse and he shared his part 
at lunch without touching the wine. But the way it affected him was vicious. He learned 
from this experience that stealing was not as terrible as he had thought. It opened the door 
to future thefts. 
                                                
37 Confessions, p. 28. 
38 Ibid. 
 105 
 The second theft was of the apple, and it paralleled Augustine’s adolescent theft. 
Always having been asked to leave the table just as his favorite food was served, Jean-
Jacques’ desire to eat was enhanced and made him try to take the food knavishly. He was 
alone one day looking at the apples in the garden and he came up with the idea of using a 
spit to grasp an apple, which was, however, too big to get through the hole. As he tried to 
cut the apple by a knife, the split apple fell down into the pantry. He did not have time to 
try getting another apple on that day, so he returned to try again the next day. 
Unfortunately, just as he was about to succeed, his master appeared and caught him. 
Needless to say, he was harshly punished.39  
 In this case, he was motivated to steal the apple, the deprival of food having 
gradually made him covetous. Had he succeeded in getting the apple, he would have 
enjoyed eating it. Desiring to eat an apple arose from physical need, and an apple is good 
for human health. However, taking the apple without asking for permission from the 
owner was stealing--a violation of the rule of justice, and of the right of property. In this 
case Rousseau emphasized his physical need that went unsatisfied because of unjust 
treatment by his master. Jean-Jacques did not regard taking his master’s apple without 
asking for permission as a violation of his master’s property right. From his perspective, 
Rousseau was claiming the right to enjoy being a man in the intermediate state of 
nature.40 It is worth noting that Rousseau did not judge his theft morally and he recalled 
this event with no remorse. He said, “One remembrance that still makes me both shudder 
                                                
39 Confessions, pp. 28-29. 
40 In the intermediate state of nature narrated in the SD, the rich possessed too much property at the expense 
of the poor. Thus those who had grown poor had the right to seize their subsistence from the hands of the 
rich. SD, p. 181. 
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and laugh at the same time, is of a hunt for apples that cost me dearly.”41 He was 
horrified by the punishment but took pleasure in hunting the apples, which he did not 
regard as a crime or an immoral act. Rousseau treated stealing and being punished as two 
parts of the same act. According to the civil rule of justice, theft is a violation of the 
property right and an offense against the owner. Punishment is just rectification.42 
Whereas Jean-Jacques interpreted his beating as “a sort of payment for theft, which gave 
him the right to continue it.”43 Theft followed by punishment becomes an acceptable 
means of recompense for the goods unjustly obtained; making it not so much a crime as a 
cost to be paid. Henceforth, Jean-Jacques applied this payment principle to everything he 
wanted, rendering his thefts acts of mischief. 
 In the third case of theft, Jean-Jacques broke into the private workshop of his 
master and stole M. Ducommun’s good tools, drawings, and impressions and used them 
to serve his master. This event is redolent of both Augustine’s theft of pears and the story 
of the Fall in Genesis. The master set a rule keeping the apprentice away from the good 
tools, demonstrating the difference in status between the strong master and the weak 
apprentice. Once imagination is awakened, man is able to compare, so that envy and 
jealousy enter the human heart. Accordingly, in the story of the Fall, the serpent told the 
woman that after eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil she would be 
like God. This comparison with God provoked her envy so that she was tempted to 
imitate God’s wisdom by eating the forbidden fruit. Augustine stole the pear for doing 
                                                
41 Confessions, p. 28. 
42 SD, p. 176. 
43 Confessions, p. 29. 
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what was not allowed. His pride urged him to imitate God’s omnipotence, assuming the 
roles of legislator and judge. In Jean-Jacques’ situation, he broke in Ducommun’s 
workshop and took everything he coveted,44 yet neither for his personal use nor sell them 
for money, but instead, to use in his master’s service. In other words, Jean-Jacques stole 
his master’s means of production in order to work like him. It is a perverted imitation of 
his master. “I was carried away with joy at having these bagatelles in my power.”45 He 
regarded this theft not as a crime, but only as an act of mischief. Playfully lessening the 
seriousness of his violation of justice, Rousseau claimed his innocence, for although 
Jean-Jacques stole his master’s properties, he used them for his master’s service. He 
violated the right of property, but not in the way he put them to use. Moreover, if he had 
been allowed to use those tools and to share the food, he would not have stolen in either 
case. The injustice of the rule made him take the initiative to steal. In this regard, God 
unjustly kept the fruit of the tree of knowledge from our progenitors because the fruit 
could have been used for the service of God. Rousseau’s stories of theft suggest that our 
progenitors were innocent and should not have been found guilty of eating the forbidden 
fruit. Thus there was no original sin. 
In addition, it is remarkable that Jean-Jacques never became a regular thief. 
Rousseau claimed that what differentiates an act of mischief from a crime is what was 
desired. Jean-Jacques only desired what he needed directly or physically.  He was never 
tempted by money or objects that he did not directly need. It was more convenient for 
him to get the object he needed directly, since money is only the medium for obtaining 
                                                
44 Confessions, p. 30. 
45 Ibid. 
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the object or a symbol of glory in society. In Rousseau’s own story, while purchasing 
some pastries, he would imagine that people in the street would talk about how much 
money he spent on food, thus raising his public esteem. Insofar as he was only interested 
in the objects he needed directly, he was never tempted by money or the desire to pursue 
it for glory.  As long as he had enough money in his pocket to ensure his independence, 
he would not strive for more. “The money one possesses is the instrument of freedom, 
that which one pursues is one of servitude.”46 In this perspective, money is only good for 
exchanging other goods. Rousseau was unabashed in asserting, “To steal to pay was not 
even a temptation.”47 By distinguishing between the desire for money and for real goods, 
Rousseau is implying that his soul was still somehow living in the natural state.  
In sum, Rousseau’s account of the thefts brought out the social factor as the cause 
of evil: the unjust situation that deprived him of food, resources, freedom, and self-
esteem aroused his fear, envy, gluttony, and imagination. Those passions led his good 
feelings and innocent motivations astray and headed him toward vices. The motivations 
of his theft-- namely, helping out the journeyman, satisfying his desire to eat, and using 
the forbidden tools for his master’s service-- were innocent. However, the passions 
incited by the unjust situation turned these good intentions into temptations to steal. “It is 
almost good feelings badly directed that makes children take the first step toward evil.”48  
 
 
                                                
46 Confessions, p. 32. 
47 Ibid., p. 34 
48 Ibid., p. 27.  
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iii. The Image of Werewolf 
After working under M. Ducommun for a few years, Jean-Jacques lived like a 
werewolf. “As a result of quarrels, blows, furtive and poorly chosen readings, my 
disposition became taciturn, wild, my head began to be spoiled, and I lived like a true 
werewolf.”49 Why did Rousseau use ‘werewolf’ as a symbol of the remainder of his life 
at Ducommun’s place? Was Rousseau saying that Jean-Jacques’s soul strayed further 
away from nature during his period of apprenticeship? Or was Rousseau saying that 
although Jean-Jacques was living in an unjust social environment, he kept the 
characteristics of a natural man? Was a werewolf a good or a bad thing for Rousseau? 
How did Rousseau understand this metaphor?  
Before we turn to Rousseau’s understanding of werewolf, the werewolf tradition 
in France from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century has to be understood. In 1599, 
Beauvois de Chauvincourt in his Discours de la Lycanthropie said, 
But alas! When I myself came to ponder this said emergency, not a hair on 
my head stood upright, a fearful cold froze my heart, seized all of my 
limbs, not knowing if these are true and natural wolves or if, following 
common accounts, they are men so denatured, that they have made 
bastards of their first origin, leaving this divine form, and transforming 
themselves into such an impure, cruel, and savage beast!50 
 
Beauvois regarded the werewolf as a denatured man, transformed from the divine form of 
man into a savage beast, presupposing the traditional understanding of man as created in 
the image of God, and superior to beasts. Again, Montague Summer in his Werewolf 
                                                
49 Confessions, p. 34. 
50 De Chauvincourt, Beauvois, Discours de la Lycanthropie ou de la Transformation des hommes en loups, 
Paris, 1599, p. 2. Emphasis added. It is quoted in Jacques-Lefèvre, Nicole, “Such an Impure, Cruel, and 
Savage Beast…Images of the Werewolf in Demonological Works,” Werewolves, Witches, and Wandering 
Spirits: Traditional Belief and Folklore in Early Modern Europe, ed. by Kathryn A. Edwards Truman State 
University Press, Kirksville, MO, 2002, p. 182. 
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gives an account of the execution of three werewolves in December 1521 at Poligny.51 
Related to witchcraft, they were transformed into wolves by the magical power of the rite 
of anointing. Appearing in the form of wolves they ate people that they met in the field 
before being caught and executed for their crimes and sorceries. Summers says that 
werewolfery, which was regarded as a rebellion against God and His ordinances, 
flourished exceedingly in the sixteenth century France. 
Neither religion nor philosophy was able to destroy the werewolfery at the end of 
the sixteenth century.52 In the eighteenth century, according to the Histoire des 
superstitions, werewolfery was rather considered a kind of superstition, which should be 
healed by enlightenment. Ordinary people and peasants commonly believed in the 
existence of werewolves. They thought that werewolves, who committed crimes in the 
fields and the streets during the night, were very dangerous. Both the Church and the 
society pursued and killed werewolves for their safety. Using the symbolic meaning of 
werewolf common in his time, Rousseau used it for his own purposes. 
He used the symbol of werewolf three times in Confessions and twice in his 
Dialogues to comment on how his contemporaries viewed his solitary behavior. In their 
eyes, a werewolf is a solitary, denatured man who does harm to human beings. When he 
was exiled to Môtier Rousseau in Confessions said, “After that, being openly excited by 
the ministers, the people mocked the King’s Rescripts, the orders from the State Council, 
and no longer knew any brake. I was preached from the pulpits, named the antichrist, and 
                                                
51 Summers, Montague, Werewolf, Kessinger Publishing, 2003, pp. 223-225. 
52 Jaucourt, “Loup-garou”, Histoire des superstitions, p. 9:703, Artfl Encyclopedia, 
http://artfl.uchicago.edu.proxy.bc.edu/cgibin/philologic31/getobject.pl?c.69:198:8.encyclopedie1108.94129
3.941300 
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pursued in the countryside like a Werewolf.”53 He lived there like a werewolf. He was 
being accused of opposing Christianity and men pursued him in the countryside. This 
image was also used in the Dialogues where Jean-Jacques was regarded as solitary, 
unsocial and dangerous to human society. The Frenchman said, “Now that he is well 
known by all and would gain nothing more by keeping himself in check, he yields 
completely to his horrible misanthropy. He flees men because he detests them; he lives 
like a Werewolf because there is nothing human in his heart.”54 “This man [Jean-Jacques] 
who seems to you so gentle, so sociable flees everyone without exception, disdains every 
caress, rejects all overtures, and lives alone like a werewolf.”55 Thus, in the eyes of the 
modern man, Jean-Jacques was like a werewolf, denatured and uncivilized, with nothing 
human in his heart and totally bestial. The symbolic meaning of the werewolf in these 
few passages is consistent with the usage of this term at this time in France. Nonetheless, 
did Rousseau convey the same meaning when he said he lived like a true werewolf at 
Ducommun’s place? Not really. 
In Rousseau’s eyes, a werewolf was an animal mixed with natural and denatured 
characteristics. Werewolf shared with the natural man similar animal characteristics. 
Rousseau depicted man in the state of nature as living in an animal state, since his 
                                                
53 Confessions, pp. 525-526. 
54 Dialogues, p. 98. Emphasis added 
55 Ibid., p. 168. Emphasis added. 
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potential sociability and rationality were not yet developed in the Second Discourse.56 
Rousseau claimed that although he was living in an unjust social environment, which 
badly directed his feelings away, his soul was not divided and he did not live in the 
shadow of other people’s opinions. So he concluded his account of apprenticeship, “As a 
result of quarrels, blows, furtive and poorly chosen readings, my disposition became 
taciturn, wild, my head began to be spoiled, and I lived like a true werewolf.” Rousseau 
stated the cause and effect of the state of his soul in Ducommun’s place. He quarreled 
with his master and fought against him. He was hostile towards his master. Moreover, he 
read any books that he could get hold of in La Tribu. His reason was developed and his 
imagination was awakened, so that he was no longer a natural man and was departing 
from nature. Nevertheless, the poor social situation and the misguided development of 
reason and imagination led him to become a quiet, solitary, but wild person. His head 
began to be disoriented. His reasoning ability was gradually weakened. The social 
relationship and the reading of books were the characteristics of a civil man, yet they 
formed an unsocial and non-rational beast as he became uncivilized. In the eyes of the 
modern man, a werewolf is a denatured man and a dangerous beast. Since there are 
essential differences between man and beast, it is not surprising that the civilized 
Frenchmen in the Dialogues and the civilized man in Môtier regarded the naturally good 
Jean-Jacques as a werewolf. However, in Rousseau’s eyes, Jean-Jacques was not totally 
                                                
56 Robert Wokler states that in the Second Discourse, Rousseau wanted to illustrate the animal origin of 
man. “Some Philosophers have even suggested that there is a greater difference between one given man and 
another than there is a greater difference between a given man and a given beast.” SD, p. 148. Man in the 
state of nature lived like an orang-utan. “From the orang-utan to the vampire: towards an anthropology of 
Rousseau,” Rousseau, after two hundred years, ed by R. A. Leigh, Cambridge University Press, New York, 
1982, pp. 109-129. Rousseau’s idea that man was evolved from orang-utan is still debatable, but it is clear 
that in Rousseau’s mind the animal qualities of man are not negative and should be controlled. 
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denatured by social relation and misguided reading. Rather, he maintained his natural 
animal inclinations like a werewolf.  
Rousseau further said he was happy living in his imaginary world and isolating 
himself from reality. “This love of imaginary objects and this facility at occupying myself 
with them disgusted me completely with everything that surround me, and determined 
that taste for solitude, which has always remained with me since then.”57 His inclination 
toward isolation gave others the impression that he detested others and feared having 
social relations. “More than once in what follows one will see the bizarre effects of this 
inclination, in appearance so misanthropic and so somber, but which in fact comes from a 
too affectionate, too loving, too tender heart which—for lack of finding existing ones that 
resemble it—is forced to feed itself with fictions.”58 The paradox is quite obvious here. In 
Rousseau’s eyes, Jean-Jacques was living in accordance with his heart even though he 
appeared misanthropic. His loving and tender heart and his solitary inclination resembled 
the man in a pure state of nature. But unlike the natural man, Jean-Jacques was able to 
read and imagine. Reading and imagination, which are the characteristics of denatured 
civilized man, however, reinforced his taste for solitude. In sum, Rousseau symbolized 
his life of apprenticeship with the image of the werewolf to underline that he was in an 
unjust social environment and his reason was developed, his heart was as natural as the 
natural man. His life consisted of a mixture of natural and denatured characteristics of 
man. 
                                                
57 Confessions, p. 34. 
58 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
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If Jean-Jacques’ heart was not wicked, then his theft was not an evil. Sin, 
according to Augustine, is an offense against God; but evil, according to Rousseau, is an 
act that leads man away from nature.  In his account of evil, Rousseau takes his concept 
of nature rather than God as the center and reference point. He was naturally good 
because he acted according to his natural inclination to satisfy his physical needs. His 
needs set the purpose of his action. He intended to gain friendship, an apple for his 
physical need, and his peace of mind by reading. He had no intention to harm others nor 
did he take pleasure in doing harm to others. However, living in a corrupt social 
environment, he would unintentionally do harms to others for self-preservation. He said 
that he lived like a true werewolf, who was a man most of the time and would become a 
beast only at the time of full moon. In other words, his character was mixed with both 
animal and human inclinations, and also, both natural and artificial passions. He behaved 
like a beast only on certain occasions when he would harm others but his naturally good 
heart remained intact. While he was living under the brutal treatment of his master, he did 
not start stealing until provoked to do so by the journeyman Verrat. Thus, environment 
was the necessary but not sufficient condition of his wickedness. Despite that, the 
environment shaped the social relations, which not only aroused artificial passions, but 
also placed interests among men in conflict. We shall go into the significance of social 
relationships later. Be that as it may, if, as Rousseau claimed, he did not have any 
intention to do harm to others, was he, as a victim of the unjust situation, blameworthy? 
On his interpretation, the events of the theft were only childish misdeeds or acts of 
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mischief. By no means did he feel remorse in his heart. He excused himself as not 
deserving of punishment. 
In summary, Augustine examined the motivations of theft and concluded that 
neither beauty nor good, neither imitation of God nor friendship motivated his evil 
actions. Being ashamed of not being shameless was the motivation of his robbery. 
Augustine and his friends stole for no reason other than to do what was wrong. They 
were delighted in violating order and creating disorder. They did not intend to gain 
something good, like beauty and food, but to destroy the natural and social order. If man 
by nature yearned for obtaining good, it is unnatural to yearn for destroying the good for 
no reason. Augustine is suggesting a new perspective for seeing evil as a privation of 
good. However, he was not certain about its cause. There can be three possible causes, 
namely, the man himself, the ancestor’s sin, or an evil force. It seems that at that stage, 
Augustine eliminated the first possibility because sin is contrary to natural human desire. 
For Rousseau, Jean-Jacques misbehaved out of his self-interest, e.g., friendship, 
fruit, and the imitation of his master. He gained something good from the wrong doings. 
Not desiring any supernatural goal as Augustine did, natural need alone motivated him to 
steal. Evil was viewed instead in terms of denaturation, inequalities and injustice. 
Consequently, Jean-Jacques lost his respect for authority and his trust in others. The 
worst result of his fall is the division of the soul between reality and appearance.  
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CHAPTER FOUR APPROACHES TO THE TRUTH 
  
In Book Seven of both Confessions, both Augustine and Rousseau were in an 
objectively evil situation, verging on chaos. Augustine, on the one hand, wanted to seek 
the cause of evil and wisdom, but, on the other hand, he continued chasing after earthly 
success and following his corporeal desires. The situation of his mind and will 
demonstrated the defects due to the punishment of original sin, which were ignorance and 
frailty of the will. He sought wisdom and the cause of evil by studying different 
philosophies. However, he faced many difficulties in his journey of intellectual enquiry. 
After following Manicheism for nine years, Augustine found the errors of the doctrines of 
Manicheism and their leader, Faustus, who disappointed him by not being able to answer 
his questions. Despite his disappointment, his inertia caused him to be intellectually still 
associated with Manicheans in Rome, since he could not find another alternative. 
Influenced by the Academics’ skepticism, he suspended his judgment of truth. 
Eventually, when he came across the books of the Platonists, he found his way to the 
truth. In Book Seven he told how he discovered that evil is not a substance but a privation 
of good. Granted that the Platonist books helped him on an inward way to truth that is 
immaterial, he could only enjoy it sporadically because the weight of his sexual habit 
dragged him down. Reason alone discovered the truth, but did not make him live in 
accord with it. Augustine had to encounter the Mediator and have God’s grace to convert 
his bad will, habituated in sin. This was Augustine’s path of intellectual enquiry and his 
journey to faith. 
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In Book Seven of Rousseau’s Confession, as Jean-Jacques left Mme de Warens 
and went to Paris, his soul was denatured by imagination and amour-propre. Reading 
novels awakened his imagination, which satisfied his needs in the imaginary world but 
alienated him from the real world. Amour-propre engendered by social relationships 
drove him to chase after vanity and public regard. Jean-Jacques wandered in Paris 
looking for opportunities. He got a job as an assistant to the Ambassador to Venice. The 
Ambassador treated him unjustly and withheld his salary. He appealed to Paris for 
justice. While he was waiting for the reply from Paris, he went to a dinner and met 
Zulietta, a courtesan. In the encounter in her chamber the next day, Jean-Jacques saw 
himself in and through Zulietta. In this encounter his heart and mind opened his eyes and 
made him aware of evil and its impact on man and society. He, however, could not 
reconcile the rupture between the natural beauty of the human person and the misery of 
the human condition. Augustine’s encounter with the books of the Platonists can be 
compared with Rousseau’s encounter with Zulietta. Both typify their different approaches 
to the truth and the understanding of the nature of evil. And both Augustine and Rousseau 
only had a glimpse of the truth without being able to act coherently with it. In this 
chapter, I will compare Augustine’s philosophical approach to the truth with Rousseau’s 
existential approach as well as their approaches to the source of evil; and show how by 
taking different paths they turned to the putatively right direction in conversion and in 
discovering their answers to the problem of evil. 
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1. Platonism: A Glimpse of the Truth with the Eyes of the Mind 
 
i. Augustine’s Journey of Philosophical Inquiry 
 In examining the motive for the theft of pears, Augustine was not able to find out 
a valid reason for the theft at first. Why did he steal the pear just for the sake of doing 
what was not allowed when his friends asked him to do it? Augustine said he did it for 
nothing. The theft itself was nothing and the unfriendly friendship, which urged him to 
steal, was nothing as well. It is unnatural for man to act for nothing. This led Augustine to 
suspect that there might be something other than the self that was responsible for the sin. 
“Who can untie this extremely twisted and tangled knot?”1 As a result, he set off on his 
journey to seek the truth and discover the source of evil. His search was philosophical. 
He obtained insights by studying different philosophies during the journey until he 
grasped the reality of eternal truth by reading of the Platonist books. However, Augustine 
was able to clarify both the contribution of philosophy and its limitations as well. 
In the Confessions, Augustine depicted his life as an adventure towards knowing 
and loving God, urged by his restless heart, though he also suffered from the punishments 
of original sin, namely, ignorance (ignorantia) and difficulty (difficultas). He was 
constantly exposed to temptations to love the wrong objects during the journey.2 Then 
what is a sure guide to knowing and loving God? In his adolescence, disoriented by his 
sexual desire and his love of being loved, he chased after the acceptance of others and 
physical pleasures. 
                                                
1 Aug. Confs., II, x, 18. 
2 Free Will, III, 18, 52. Augustine used the term “difficultas” to denote the frailty of will due to original sin.  
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As yet I had never been in love and I longed to love…I sought an object 
for my love…My hunger was internal, deprived of inward food, that is 
you yourself, my God. But that was not the kind of hunger I felt…To me it 
was sweet to love and to be loved, the more so if I could also enjoy the 
body of the beloved. I therefore polluted the spring water of friendship 
with the filth of concupiscence.3  
 
Since it is difficult to discern internal hunger for God through physical desires, one may 
easily confuse right and wrong objects of love. Besides the discernment of passions, 
education might have taught him the right way to God, but Augustine’s parents and the 
education he received taught him to pursue wealth and success, thus leading him astray 
from God. Clearly, passions and social norms are not indubitable guides to human 
happiness.  
When Augustine read Cicero’s Hortensius, he was excited that philosophy could 
be his guide to happiness. “The book changed my feelings. It altered my prayers, Lord, to 
be towards you yourself. It gave me different values and priorities…I longed for the 
immortality of wisdom with an incredible ardor in my heart, I began to rise up to return to 
you.”4 Cicero’s book did not attract him by its rhetorical skill but by its content. It turned 
Augustine’s mind towards wisdom. “Nevertheless, the one thing that delighted me in 
Cicero’s exhortation was the advice ‘not to study one particular sect but to love and seek 
and pursue and hold fast and strongly embrace wisdom itself, wherever found’.”5 This 
was a turning point of Augustine’s journey of seeking God. Henceforth, he took God as 
the immortality of wisdom, the goal of his mind. For Augustine, the love of God is 
tantamount to the love of wisdom. Note that when Augustine recounted this impressive 
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experience of reading Cicero’s Hortensius, he said, “There are some people who use 
philosophy to lead people astray.”6 With a quotation of St Paul, he reminded the readers 
that philosophy is not an indubitable guide to the truth. “See that none deceives you by 
philosophy and vain seduction following human tradition; following the elements of this 
world and not following Christ; in him dwells all the fullness of divinity in bodily form” 
(Col 2: 8-9). As demonstrated by his exposure to Manicheism, Astrology, and Academic 
skepticism, this quotation foretells the inability of philosophy alone to lead man to God. 
Augustine then turned to Manicheism to seek an answer to the problem of evil. 
He wanted to find a way to excuse God and himself from the blame for evil. Augustine’s 
Manichean phase can be compared with when Rousseau wanted to find whether the flaw 
of nature is the source of evil. In this part I will show how reason and faith, will and 
passions interact in contrast to Rousseau’s encounter with Zulietta studied in the next 
section.  
Augustine had been a Manichean for nine years. Manicheism, which was a 
dualistic form of Gnosticism, claimed that there are two coeval conflicting cosmic forces 
of good and evil in the universe. God, the good but not the omnipotent force, is not able 
to defeat the evil force. The evil force devours some good particles from God and mixes 
it with evil matter from which man is formed. Thus, man consists of the good soul and 
the evil matter, and becomes the battleground of these two forces. Ultimately, man is 
compelled by the evil force within his nature to sin, so the evil force should be blamed for 
sin. Accordingly, Manicheism exempts man and God from the blame for evil. Augustine 
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was attracted by this dualistic explanation, as he did not want to take responsibility for his 
sin. “I still thought that it is not we who sin, but some alien nature which sins in us. It 
flattered my pride to be free from blame and, when I had done something wrong, not to 
make myself confess to you [God] that you might heal my soul; for it was sinning against 
you. I liked to excuse myself and to accuse some unidentifiable power which was within 
me and yet not I.”7 Thus he did not consider himself a sinner. Moreover, following the 
Manichean theory that man is made of good particles from God, Augustine, also out of 
pride, thought that man should share the divine nature. “I asserted myself to be by nature 
what you are…Yet I preferred to think you mutable rather than hold that I was not what 
you are.”8 To be consistent with this train of thought, Augustine would have had to 
conclude that God was the cause of his perverse will, which was the agent of moral evil. 
Before coming across the Platonist’s books, Augustine’s thinking was 
characteristically bound to the corporeal or the material order. He could think of 
substances or matters only bodily. His knowledge was confined by what his senses could 
perceive. He said, “In seeking for you I followed not the intelligence of the mind 
(intellectum mentis) by which you willed that I should surpass the beast, but the mind of 
the flesh (sensum carnis).”9 He could not think of the Creator and creatures in terms other 
than bodily images that exist in space and time. “But the principle things which held me 
captive and somehow suffocated me, as long as I thought only in physical terms, were 
those vast masses.”10 Besides the Manichean influence, his corporeal penchant was 
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supported by Aristotle’s Ten Categories, in which substances are qualified by ten 
descriptive categories. Augustine even thought that God, like other creatures, is one of 
the substances thus qualified. “Thinking that absolutely everything that exists is 
comprehended under the ten categories, I tried to conceive you also, My God…as if you 
too were a subject of which magnitude and beauty are attributes.”11 Augustine regarded 
this materialistic way of thinking as the main cause of the error that kept him from 
knowing either God or the nature of evil. “When I wanted to think of God, I knew of no 
way of doing so except as a physical mass. Nor did I think anything existed which is not 
material. That was the principal and almost sole cause of my inevitable error.”12 Neither 
could his understanding of evil surmount this way of thinking. Going by what the 
Manicheans said, Augustine accepted that evil is a substance that is contrary to God, the 
good substance. Moreover, according to corporeal thinking, evil is a material substance, 
expressible in different modes, either as a solid or as a gas. “I also believed that evil is a 
kind of material substance with its own foul and misshapen mass, either solid which they 
used to call earth, or thin and subtle, as is the body of air.”13 Accordingly, he wondered 
about the efficient cause of evil, what made evil? 
Throughout his journey of intellectual enquiry, Augustine sought the truth by 
exerting his mind. Although he suffered the punishment of original sin, that is, the 
darkening of the intelligence, he trusted the capability of reason. Before his reading of the 
Platonist books, while under the influence of corporeal thinking, the dualism of good and 
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evil, and addiction to lust, he still tried to unravel the knot of erroneous thinking by 
reading other philosophers. He found “the philosophers’ teachings seemed to be more 
probable than what the Manichees said.”14 His reason with the help of different 
philosophies discovered the inadequacy of Manicheism on the problem of truth and evil. 
This echoes Rousseau’s awareness of the inadequacy of the naturalistic answer to the 
rupture between the natural beauty of man and the miserable social condition of man. 
Influenced by the Academic’s skepticism, while he doubted everything, he did not totally 
suspend judgments of the truth. Eventually he left the Manicheans and went on to 
become a catechumen of the Catholic Church.  
It is worth noting that after being a catechumen for some time, faith in God had 
been fostered in Augustine’s heart. He said, “But you [God] did not allow fluctuations in 
my thinking to carry me away from the faith which I held, that you exist and are 
immutable substance and care for humanity and judge us; moreover, that in Christ your 
Son our Lord, and by your scriptures commended by the authority of your Catholic 
Church, you have provided a way of salvation whereby humanity can come to the future 
life after death.”15 Augustine did not approach the light of the truth by reading the 
Platonist books alone. His faith in God played a major part in the inner journey of seeing 
the truth as well. By his Catholic faith, he later saw the limitations of Platonism. 
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ii. The Ascent of Mind 
The reading of Platonist books was crucial to Augustine’s search for wisdom. 
They opened Augustine’s mind’s eyes and helped him to glimpse the truth. This was the 
climax of his philosophical enquiry, before he became clear about the limitations of 
reason and the need for faith in order to live in accordance with the truth that he affirmed 
by loving God. As mentioned above, Augustine’s materialism had hitherto confined his 
knowledge of God and evil. “For me to see meant a physical act of looking with the eyes 
and of forming an image in the mind.”16 The Platonist’s books taught Augustine to go 
beyond the eyes of the flesh and to use the eyes of the mind. They helped him to 
transcend his materialistic way of thinking. “By the Platonic books I was admonished to 
return into myself. With you as my guide I entered into my innermost citadel, and was 
given power to do so because you had become my helper. I entered and with my soul’s 
eyes, such as it was, saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher than 
my mind.”17 Augustine no longer restricted his knowledge of God by knowing external 
things, and turning to his own interiority in the sense of his internal experience of 
knowing the truth as external things; instead, by entering into his mind and wondering 
what enabled him to know the truth, he was led upwards to contemplate God as the truth. 
There he saw God as the immutable light, which is different from all other kinds of light, 
and this also transcended his mind.  
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When he ascended to see God as the true light of Being, he was astonished to 
realize that he had already loved Him for a long time.18 Nevertheless, even as he was 
being caught up by God’s beauty, the force of his sexual habits was also dragging him 
down. “I was in no kind of doubt to whom I should attach myself, but was not yet in a 
state to be able to do that. The body, which is corruptible, weighs down the soul, and our 
earthly habitation drags down the mind to think many things.”19 Augustine, as a rational 
being, was created for the contemplation of God with his highest faculty, reason. Instead, 
when he had conceived and affirmed his nature correctly, he turned away from Him to 
the lower parts of being, the body, but why? Hitherto, it is clear that Augustine’s inquiry 
to the problem of evil oscillated between a metaphysical and a moral mode. By reading 
the Platonist books, he understood that evil is not a substance but a privation of good. He 
then grasped the meaning of physical evil. Although individual beings are good, they 
inevitably have conflict among themselves and cause harm to each other, and yet they 
contribute to the goodness of the whole. But, why does man, a rational being, who sees 
the proper goal of his mind, turn to the delight of bodily passion? The problem of evil is 
no longer only about the knowledge of the extra-human destiny of the soul, but also about 
the will of the rational being. “At the moment I saw your invisible nature understood 
through the things which are made. But I did not possess the strength to keep my vision 
fixed. My weakness reasserted itself, and I returned to my customary condition.”20 The 
focus is on the human will.  
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With the aid of Platonism, Augustine’s quest for the truth came to a climax. The 
interruption of the desire to be with God by his penchant for bodily pleasure also brought 
him to face the problem of nature and grace, and the relation of philosophy and faith. Is 
wisdom a natural goal that man can attain by his own effort? Since his reading of 
Cicero’s Hortensius when he was eighteen years old, Augustine had started his journey of 
searching for wisdom. “The book changed my feelings. It altered my prayers, Lord, to be 
towards you yourself. It gave me different values and priorities…and I longed for the 
immortality of wisdom with an incredible ardor in my heart. I began to rise up to return to 
you.”21  He was changed in many aspects of his life by Cicero’s book. He began to burn 
with desire to leave the earthly things and to embrace wisdom.22 From then on, he was 
exposed to the Scripture, Manicheism, the skeptic Academics, Aristotle’s Categories, 
Ambrose’s sermons, and lastly, the Platonist books. By the reading of the Platonist 
books, he transcended his path of knowing and entered into his mind and was ascended to 
wisdom. Augustine saw the pattern of his inquiry into wisdom. Over the years, Augustine 
was caught up with a longing to embrace both wisdom and the delight of earthly things. 
At the moment of his inner insight into the eternal truth, the weight of his disordered 
sexual habits dragged him down from the height of the vision. His problem was not about 
knowing the goal or end, but finding a way to abide with the eternal wisdom. It seems 
that this suggests that philosophy alone enables man to see the destiny, but only faith 
empowers him to enjoy it. Is this what Augustine intended to convey? 
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iii. The Limitations of Reason and the Need of Faith 
Philip Cary interprets the ascent of the soul to wisdom in Book Seven as 
epistemological instead of mystical. He critiqued that for Augustine “the human intellect 
is an eye created to see eternal Truth, and this natural capacity for intellectual vision is 
precisely what opens up the soul’s inner space, the new holy space in which to find 
God…seeing God is a natural capacity limited only by sin, which will be restored to us 
once our mind’s eye is restored to its natural health and strength.” 23 Man is able to know 
God as eternal truth and wisdom by his natural capacity, and he needs grace only to 
restore the natural health of the eyes of his mind so as to attain the eternal wisdom. 
According to Cary, it seems that Augustine separated grace from nature and agreed with 
the Platonists that man is able to understand and affirm God’s existence and nature by 
unaided reason. In addition, he criticizes that Augustine identified the God of philosophy 
with the God of faith and worshiped the Platonist’s God of philosophy. Since Augustine 
took the inner path of the mind to seeing God, Cary thinks that Augustine abandoned the 
path to the humanity of Christ. I, however, think otherwise. Seeing the eternal truth is the 
fruit of the cooperation of grace and reason. Augustine clearly separated the God of 
philosophy and the God of faith. He did not worship the God of philosophy. Only faith 
can help man to see the true face of the incarnate Christ and enables one to surrender to 
God. 
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Although Augustine saw the eternal light of wisdom by means of reading the 
Platonist books, it is worth noting that Augustine clearly showed that he was moved by 
God and guided by His secret goad over the course of his ascent. “By inward goads you 
stirred me to make me find it unendurable until, through my inward perception you were 
a certainty to me.”24 “By the Platonic books I was admonished to return into myself. With 
you as my guide I entered into my innermost citadel, and was given power to do so 
because you had become my helper.”25 He did not attempt to approach eternal wisdom by 
his own effort alone. Augustine always emphasized the guidance of God throughout the 
journey of his conversion. At eighteen, his desire for wisdom was apparently ignited by 
Cicero’s book, but Augustine said, “My God, how I burned, how I burned with longing to 
leave earthly things and fly back to you. I did not know what you were doing with me.”26 
He regarded the longing for wisdom as providential. Furthermore, Augustine did not 
worship the God of philosophy. He without doubt saw it as eternal wisdom by the light of 
his intelligence, but it did not arouse his spirit of devotion. It is also true that he loved the 
God of his inner vision. When Augustine faced the eternal Truth, he said, “I was 
astonished to find that already I loved you.”27 But it is the love of wisdom, which stirred 
since reading Cicero’s Hortensius.  
Moreover, he said none of the Platonic books mentioned the incarnation of Christ, 
which fueled his confessional love as a sinner. He said,  
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Those pages do not contain the face of this devotion, tears of confession, 
your sacrifice, a troubled spirit, a contrite and humble spirit, the salvation 
of your people, the espoused city, the guarantee of your Holy Spirit, the 
sup of our redemption. In the Platonic books no one sings: Surely my soul 
will be submissive to God? From Him is my salvation; he is also my God 
and my savior who upholds me; I shall not be moved any more.28  
 
Augustine made plain the difference between his reason’s love of wisdom and what 
springs from the love of faith. It is the divine love of God revealed in the life, death, and 
resurrection of Christ that moved Augustine to confess and worship God.  
From the experience of the division between his desire to be with God and his 
penchant for bodily delight, Augustine distinguished the Platonist books from the 
Scripture. The former only led him to see the way but did not enable him to attain it. 
Rather, the latter showed him the way and how to get there as well. “I would learn to 
discern and distinguish the difference between presumption and confession, between 
those who see what the goal is but not how to get there and those who see the way which 
leads to the home of bliss, not merely as an end to be perceived but as a realm to live 
in.”29 Remarkably, Augustine’s inner vision does not confirm Cary’s argument that 
philosophy shows us the goal and that faith restores our strength, but only Christ provides 
the way to the goal. If that were so, reason could work independently from grace. Christ, 
thus, would become only a moral example for man who approaches God by the imitation 
of Christ. Augustine, on the other hand, told us that the only goal for both unaided reason 
and faith is God Himself. Reason alone only enables us to know God truly but only in 
part because to comprehend God truly is beyond the natural capacity of our reason. 
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Reason cooperates with God’s grace, which moved and guided Augustine to seek the 
truth. To heal the wound of sin and to elevate human nature, a Mediator who is the truth, 
the way, and the life is needed.30 Scripture and the gift of faith enable us to believe in 
Christ, the incarnate Son of God in whom we see the self-giving love of God the Father, 
to whom Augustine confessed. Thus, Christ is the Truth. “The food which I was too weak 
to accept he mingled with flesh, in that ‘The Word was made flesh’.”31 In addition, faith 
is a grace that enables us to surrender to God and follow the humility of Christ so as to 
return to God, the home of bliss. And Christ is the Way. When a believer sees God the 
Truth in Christ and follows the humble Christ, who is the way, to observe the 
commandments in accord with the order of the universe, he will be in union with God 
and share His life. And Christ is the Life, which is a realm to live in.  
Following the inner path of the mind, Augustine was able to know the God of 
philosophy but not to live in accord with this truth, showing that the pursuit of wisdom 
involves not only intellectual activities but also volitional acts. The incorruptible and 
immutable being is the truth and goodness. By his eyes of the mind man knows the truth 
and by his act of will embraces the good. Augustine could know only the God of 
philosophy because of the natural limitation of human intelligence. He knew what truly 
is, and is always the same, namely, the immutable Being to which all beings owe their 
existence. Augustine was certain of this knowledge of Being. “I turned my attention to 
your ‘invisible nature understood through the things which are made’. But from the 
disappointment I suffered I perceived (sensi) that the darkness of my soul (tenebras 
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animae meae) would not allow me to contemplate these sublimities…. Of these 
conceptions I was certain; but to enjoy you I was too weak.”32 Unlike the limitation of the 
intellect, the weakness of the will is not due to the natural limitation of the faculty but the 
result of his sinful state’s darkness of the soul. He wished to stay with the eternal light but 
was dragged down by the habitual force of bodily and lustful desire. This turning away 
from the highest good to the lower good was caused by the perversity of his will. In other 
words, the moral impotence of the perverse will brings about the darkness of the soul. 
The question is: what made the will perverted? 
Because of the inner vision of the mind Augustine retained a loving memory of 
the experience of knowing eternal truth, and went back and forth between complacency 
about his limited knowledge of the eternal truth, and the felt need for a Mediator, who 
could help him to enjoy the eternal truth. After knowing the true light but being unable to 
adhere to it, Augustine carried with him “a loving memory and a desire for that of which 
I [he] had the aroma but which I [he] had not yet the capacity to eat.”33 Although he was 
not able to continue contemplating the eternal truth, he did not regret it. Hesitant to heal 
the defect of his soul that kept him from enjoying the true light of wisdom, he was self-
satisfied and took pride in knowing the immutable Being even if only partially and 
temporarily. He said, “I prattled on as if I were expert…I gave myself airs as a wise 
person. I was full of my punishment but I shed no tears of penitence. Worse still, I was 
puffed up with knowledge.”34 Philosophic knowledge brought pride to Augustine.  
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Yet he also felt the need for a Mediator, because he realized that embracing the 
eternal wisdom was beyond his natural capacity, which was corrupted by sin. “I sought a 
way to obtain strength enough to enjoy you; but I did not find it until I embraced ‘the 
mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus.”35 Even though his pride kept him 
from looking for the Mediator in the Scripture, Augustine understood that due to the 
essential difference between immutable Being and mutable beings, only a Mediator who 
shares both divinity and humanity could be a bridge between them. Only the incarnate 
Logos can be the Mediator. “Your Word, eternal truth, higher than the superior parts of 
your creation, raises those submissive to him to himself. In the inferior parts he built for 
himself a humble house of our clay. By this he detaches from themselves those who are 
willing to be made his subjects and carries them across to himself.”36 Augustine still 
could not accept Jesus Christ as the Mediator. None of the Platonist books mentioned the 
incarnation and the salvation of the Word;37 and his understanding of human nature at 
that time blinded him from seeing God in and through the humanity of Jesus. The 
Gospels’ description of Jesus (e.g. eating, sleeping, weeping) appeared to him 
incompatible with the co-existence of the soul and the eternal Word in a human body. 
Since there could only be one commander inside the body, he thought Jesus was not the 
Son of God but only a great man of excellent wisdom. “So because the scriptures are true, 
I acknowledged the whole man to be in Christ, not only the body of a man or soul and 
body without a mind, but a fully human person. I thought that he excelled others not as 
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the personal embodiment of the Truth, but because of the great excellence of his human 
character and more perfect participation in wisdom.”38  
In sum, the Platonist books helped Augustine to overcome the confines of his 
corporeal view of things and enter into his mind to ascend to the immaterial truth. He saw 
not with the eyes of the flesh but with those of the mind. This vision of the immutable 
being who cried out, “I am who I am” enabled him to understand the relationship 
between Creator and creatures, with the incorruptible being as the origin to which all 
beings owe their existence. This enabled him to clarify the nature of evil, which is not a 
substance but a privation of good. After he realized that evil involved objective falsity, 
Augustine felt more sharply his bondage to disordered sexual habits, which drew him 
away from living in the light of the highest truth to corporeal things. He then shifted his 
attention. The perverse will became the focus of his search for the source of moral evil.  
The reading of Platonist’s books brought Augustine to the limits of his 
philosophical inquiry. Knowing the eternal wisdom with the eyes of the mind, he realized 
that he had already loved God for a long time. Augustine did not insist on attaining 
eternal wisdom by the natural capacity of his intellect; rather, he was grateful for the 
divine guidance and impetus. Because eternal wisdom is Augustine’s supernatural goal, it 
cannot be attained by natural capacity alone, and especially not as it is corrupted by sin. 
Augustine exclaimed, “Without you, what am I to myself but a guide to my own self-
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destruction? …What is a human being (name anyone you may please) when he is merely 
a man?”39  
Furthermore, although he was blinded by his pride in having attained knowledge 
of the truth, his need for a Mediator shows the need of grace to abide in the truth and to 
live in accord with it. While he was hindered by those natural limitations and moral 
impotence, reading St Paul’s letters helped him come to grips with the conflict in his 
soul; God’s compassion expressed there touched his heart. “In surprising ways these 
thoughts had a visceral effect on me as I read ‘the least’ of your apostles. I meditated 
upon your works and trembled.”40 Reading Platonist books was the watershed of 
intellectual or philosophic conversion in discovering the reality that is not necessarily 
bodily; and reading the Scripture paved the way to his moral and religious conversion. In 
sum, this was Augustine’s approach to the truth: first by means of philosophy and 
eventually by the gift of faith. He had to integrate faith and reason in his life.  
 
2. Encounter with Zulietta: A Glimpse of the Natural Face of Man 
 Both Book Seven of the two Confessions are about seeking the truth. For 
Augustine, knowing the truth is analogous to understanding the incorruptibility and 
immutability of eternal wisdom, the ultimate goal of man, atonement with which requires 
both reason and the grace of faith. Reading philosophic books of the Platonists played a 
significant role in Augustine’s intellectual journey to the truth. They helped Augustine to 
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investigate the foundation of both his knowledge of the external world, and of the internal 
process of knowing the truth. This turning inwards enabled him to turn upwards to gain 
insight into the light of eternal truth with the eyes of the mind. Platonist philosophy led 
Augustine to understand eternal truth but his weak will and moral corruption made him 
unable to live habitually in accord with it. By the same token, Book Seven of Rousseau’s 
Confessions is also the critical episode for knowing the natural face of man.41 Unlike 
Augustine’s ascension of the mind to the truth, Rousseau took the path of experience of 
interpersonal relationship. He had a glimpse of the truth with the eyes of the heart in an 
encounter with Zulietta, a courtesan.  
For Rousseau, the purpose of the Confessions was to present to the readers a 
portrait of man according to nature. The natural face of man is the truth that is to be 
demonstrated in the book. This involves the epistemological problem of the natural face 
of man. Self-knowledge was Rousseau’s life long concern. He had brought out the 
problem of self-knowledge in the beginning of the Second Discourse.  
And how will man ever succeed in seeing himself as Nature formed him, 
through all the changes which the succession of times and of things must 
have wrought in his original constitution, and to disentangle what he owes 
to his own stock from what circumstances and his progress have added to 
or changed in his primitive state?42 
 
Rousseau saw that the natural face of man is changed by historical elements over 
time and there is no criterion to grasp the original nature underlying the changes them. 
Besides, the more the reason is developed, the more the man will be led astray from 
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nature. Thus, man, hindered by his reason, is not able to know the original state of man. 
“So that it is, in a sense, by dint of studying man that we have made ourselves incapable 
of knowing him.”43 Man’s self-knowledge is situated in a dilemma. On the one hand, 
reason is the only faculty for knowing nature. On the other hand, this faculty inevitably 
denatures man as it develops. In order to know the natural self, the development of reason 
inevitably veils the natural face of the knowing subject and the known object at the same 
time. Regardless, is reason really the proper faculty to know human nature? Even if the 
knowing subject were able to prevent its denaturation by reason, one would still not be 
able to know nature by reason. Even if one were able to find the proper knowing faculty, 
would the knowing subject be able to prevent the denaturation of reason? Then how can 
one without knowing the criterion of human nature disentangle the natural from the 
artificial elements in the process? Or how can he make the natural face manifest? It 
seems that there is no escape from this dilemma of self-knowledge. Criticism of 
Rousseau’s theory of the natural goodness of man in the Second Discourse points out that 
if he were a modern man, he would suffer the same disabilities of knowing nature as 
others, how could he justify his knowledge of the natural man? Rousseau was aware of 
this difficulty in the study of man. He conceded the ‘double illusion’ of amour-propre in 
knowing man in the Neuchâtel Preface to the Confessions. “Either by falsely attributing 
to those we are judging the motives that would have made us act as they do in their place; 
or – in that same assumption – by deceiving ourselves about our own motives for lack of 
knowing enough how to transport ourselves into a different situation from the one in 
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which we are.”44 Man judges the behavior of others by means of his own but he does not 
know whether he knows his true self. Here is Rousseau’s solution: “In order for one to 
learn to evaluate oneself, I want to attempt to provide at least one item for comparison, so 
that each can know himself and one other, and this other will be myself.”45 He proposed 
his autobiographical self-portrait in the Confessions as the criterion for knowing human 
nature. But could he be immune from the epistemological defect of modern man? How 
could Rousseau as a denatured person know his true natural self? First of all, we need to 
grasp Rousseau’s understanding of the ability and limitations of reason.  What is the role 
of reason in self-knowledge? Did he suggest another faculty for knowing nature? As the 
known object, what was Jean-Jacques’ state of mind regarding the development of 
reason? To what extent was he denatured? 
 
i. The Inadequacy of Reason 
 Unlike Augustine, who was optimistic that reason can lead man to the truth, 
Rousseau was well aware of the limitations of reason and its negative impact on man. 
Our knowledge of the world comes through our senses. That does not mean that all 
knowledge is sensual knowledge. Knowledge has sensible and intellectual components. 
“Sensual knowledge consists in forming simple ideas by the combination of several 
sensations. And intellectual or human knowledge consists in forming complex ideas by 
the combination of several ideas.”46 However since knowledge begins with the senses, 
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the sense organs are not only the channels, but also limits of human knowledge. “Why 
can we not know what mind and matter are? Because we do not know anything except by 
our senses, and they are insufficient to teach it to us. As soon as we want to make use of 
our faculties we feel them all constrained by our organs.”47 Thus reason is not able to 
know things that are beyond what the senses can perceive. Accordingly, knowledge of 
the soul and God is beyond the ability of reason because both the soul and God are 
immaterial. “With so few means for observing matter and sensitive beings how do we 
hope to be able to make judgments about the soul and spiritual beings? ... who among us 
ever perceived a soul without body and can have the slightest idea of a purely spiritual 
substance?”48 “We believe we possess intelligence for piercing these mysteries [beyond 
senses], but all we have is imagination.”49 Furthermore, Rousseau’s nominalist theory of 
knowledge suggested that man could not know the real object, but only the ideas that are 
produced by reason through the senses. In the knowing process, man perceives the 
external object through his senses. His sense knowledge attains the existing external 
object. He then compares and judges the relation of the ideas that are produced by 
imagination and finally judgment yields intellectual knowledge. Thus understanding and 
judgment do not come from the external objects but arise within the knowing subject. 
The mind produces intellectual knowledge, and so intellectual knowledge does not 
necessarily correspond to the truth of things. Judgment can be wrong because man brings 
prejudices to bear on his judgments. Thus “Truth is in things and not in the mind which 
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judges them, and that the less of myself I put in the judgments I make, the more sure I am 
of approaching the truth.”50 Man cannot guarantee the truthfulness of his intellectual 
judgments.  
Furthermore, Rousseau claimed that human reasoning is vulnerable to errors. 
When a philosopher forms a system by generalizing evidences into a proposition, the 
same proposition changes slightly in every repetition. This almost insensible difference 
will escape the philosopher’s notice. Accordingly, he will not demonstrate what he 
believes he has proven, but something else.51 This defect in the chain of reasoning makes 
reason vulnerable to errors. In addition, by analytical reasoning the philosopher finds that 
his proposition is hardly a universal truth and he cannot avoid making more exceptions in 
order to justify the systematic proposition. The systematic proposition finally has no 
support other than the philosopher’s own evidence and argument. According to 
Rousseau, the subjectivity of the intellectual knowledge and the vulnerability of the 
systematic propositions cause the disagreements among philosophers.  
 Pride is another reason for disagreements among philosophers. The Vicar of 
Savoyard said when he was in doubt about anything, “I consulted the philosophers, I 
leafed through their books. I examined their various opinions. I found them all to be 
proud, assertive, dogmatic (even in their pretended skepticism), ignorant of nothing, 
proving nothing, mocking one another; and this last point, which was common to all, 
appeared to me the only one about which they are all right.”52 He concluded that pride as 
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a second cause of the diversity among philosophies meant that philosophers do not search 
for the truth but only want to distinguish themselves from others, thus only creating 
disagreement and confusion. The difficulty of finding an indubitable foundation of truth 
to judge the diverse philosophies, made the Vicar skeptical about philosophical truth. 
How can man reconcile the disagreement among philosophers? Besides, if the truth of the 
foundation of morality were only knowable by philosophers, “we cannot be a man 
without being a scholar.”53 If man could not replace confusion with truth, should one 
become skeptical and suspend all one’s judgments? Is there another faculty other than 
reason for ascertaining knowledge? 
In sum, for Rousseau, reason is not the proper faculty for knowing immaterial 
objects, whether God or human nature. It is clear that Rousseau was aware of the 
insufficiency of reason and the vanity of the philosophers. Unlike Augustine, who was 
unceasingly searching for the truth, and became a catechumen of the Catholic Church 
even though the Academics and Manicheans led him to doubt everything, it is not 
surprising that Rousseau abandoned the intellectual approach and took a different 
approach to the knowledge of the truth. We will investigate this approach later. First, we 
will examine the state of his mind as influenced by reading books and his amour-propre 
engendered by social relations. If Rousseau claimed that he was able to know the natural 
face of man, how does he disentangle the natural from artificial in him? 
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ii. Denaturation by Reading of Books  
Did the development of reason and amour-propre denature Jean-Jacques 
completely? What was the impact of reading on Jean-Jacques’s journey to “know” his 
nature? Rousseau began reading when he was young. He read novels with his father and 
Plutarch’s Illustrious Men was his favorite book. “By this dangerous method I acquired in 
a short time not only an extraordinary facility in reading and understanding, but also in 
intelligence about the passions that was unique for my age.”54 Reading inspired a bizarre 
and romantic concept of human life and engendered a love of Roman virtue and glory in 
him. It also awakened his imagination, enabling him to identify himself with the 
characters in the novels. Later on, his apprentice master’s unjust treatment made him 
forget everything he had learned and stifled his imagination. Nevertheless, the boredom 
of his apprentice’s life revived his taste for reading.  Regardless of the consequences, 
Jean-Jacques read all sorts of books he could buy from the bookstore La Tribu. His power 
of imagination was awakened again and further developed. He could create scenarios and 
stories in his imaginary world and become one of the characters he imagined. This 
calmed his sensuality and let him escape from the injustices of reality. Consequently, 
“this love of imagination and this facility at occupying myself…disgusted me completely 
with everything that surrounded me, and determined that taste for solitude, which has 
always remained with me since then.”55  
 If reading novels awakened Jean-Jacques’ imagination and led him astray from 
reality, would the reading of philosophic books lead him to the truth? Desire and the 
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ability to search for wisdom, like perfectibility, are only potencies of the human mind. 
Chance provides the appropriate environment that man needs to develop his reason. The 
naturally given faculty must await opportunities for development as the environment 
keeps on providing them; otherwise, developments cease. M. de Conzié provided Jean-
Jacques such an opportunity. Rousseau said, “The seed of literature and philosophy, that 
began to ferment in my head and which awaited only a little cultivation and emulation to 
be completely developed, found them in him.”56 Discussion of the Crown Prince of 
Prussia’s argument with Voltaire drove him to Voltaire’s books that inspired him and 
encouraged him to write elegantly. In addition, “[Voltaire’s Philosophic Letters] was the 
one that attracted me most toward study, and this nascent taste has not died out since that 
time.”57 Reading philosophic books planted the seeds of literature and philosophy in 
Jean-Jacques’s head.  
Augustine’s desire to know the truth was aroused by Cicero’s Hortensius. His 
inner self began to strive for wisdom. Jean-Jacques, however, did not continue his search 
for the truth after reading Voltaire’s Philosophic Letters. The sprout of philosophic study 
was not watered as often as Jean-Jacques’s capricious moods, and the noisy environment 
in Mme de Warens’ house distracted him from solitary study.58 Concentration and 
solitude are necessary conditions for study; without them the desire for study would fade 
away.  
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When Jean-Jacques fell seriously ill in Chambéry, he lived in seclusion, and this 
situation afforded him an appropriate environment for study. He obtained different types 
of books at that time -- e.g., philosophy, theology, astronomy, algebra, and Latin. He was 
most interested in philosophy and theology. Nonetheless, he found that the philosophers 
disagreed with and contradicted each other. Having failed in the attempt to reconcile 
them, he gave up and developed his own way of reading, considering them one by one 
without mixing his and others’ opinions. Suspension of judgment turned his mind into a 
big storehouse of knowledge.59 He did not criticize their thoughts until he could fully 
understand them, but it took him years to do so. Jean-Jacques had not developed his own 
ideas at that time. The suspension of judgment created a skeptical attitude in him; 
troubled as he was by their disputes. He tells us about his inner self when he was forty: 
“Instead of removing my doubts and ending my irresolution, they [philosophers] had 
shaken all the certainty I thought I had concerning the things that were most important for 
me to know.”60 He was in a state of doubt and skepticism.  
Note that reading philosophy did not engender the philosopher’s pride in him. 
Since he was facing an imminent death with no hope for a future during his stay in 
Chambéry, he read for the sake of studying without thinking about its utility, so that, “the 
pleasure of learning contributed a great deal to my happiness.”61 According to 
Rousseau’s criticism of the sciences in the First Discourse and Émile, the citizen, 
motivated by his amour-propre to study, chased after vainglory instead of virtue. 
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However, Jean-Jacques did not suffer this defect because he studied for the sake of 
acquiring knowledge, when he was living in seclusion and awaiting death. In addition, 
Jean-Jacques was virtuous at times, which he ascribed to his study. When his rivals at 
Mme de Warens’ place upset him, he still tried to do well by them. “Thus began to 
germinate, along with my misfortunes, the virtues whose seeds were at the bottom of my 
soul, which study had cultivated, and which awaited only the ferment of adversity in 
order to bloom.”62  
 However, if his expectation of death kept Jean-Jacques from pride and vanity in 
this world, then reading theological books made him anxious about his fate after death. 
During his sickness, Jean-Jacques read the books of the Oratory and of Port-Royal in 
particular. He gradually accepted their doctrine and became a quasi-Jansenist. 
Jansenism’s negative views on human nature and the doctrine of Hell frightened him. 
According to Jansenism, which radicalized some teachings of Augustine, since men were 
born sinful, if one were not predestined to be saved, he would be immersed in eternal 
damnation. Fear of eternal damnation often troubled Jean-Jacques, “I asked myself, ‘In 
what state am I? If I die at this very instant would I be damned?’”63 Although his mind 
assented to rigorous Jansenism, his conscience did not. There was a conflict between his 
mind and his heart. Unable to solve the conflict by praying to God for mercy or seeking 
help from philosophy, he decided to throw a rock against a tree, in his desire to be the 
judge of his own fate. He threw a rock against a big tree nearby that he could not miss, 
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thus assuring his salvation. “After that time I never doubted my salvation again.”64 His 
mind was thus set free from the threat of eternal damnation. Faced with the disagreement 
and contradiction among different philosophies, Jean-Jacques gave up his effort to 
reconcile them. He chose to solve the disagreement between reason and conscience in 
religious doctrine by a simple trick of his own. In either case Jean-Jacques was unable to 
solve either the philosophical or theological disputes by his reason. Well aware of 
reason’s incapacity to know the truth, he sought not intellectual answers but only peace 
of mind.  
Thus far, reading novels and history books nurtured Jean-Jacques’ imagination, 
which enabled him to identify with others but steered him away from reality. And reading 
philosophical books in Chambéry was a pleasant and enjoyable experience for him. 
Moreover, giving up the attempt to reconcile the different works of philosophers made 
his mind a storehouse of thought but he became a skeptic.65 Reading theological books 
brought him a negative impression of Jansenism. In short, for Jean-Jacques, unlike 
Augustine, reading revealed the inadequacy of reason for knowing the truth. 
  
iii. Denaturation by Amour-propre 
What about the influence of amour-propre on Jean-Jacques? How far did his 
amour-propre take him from nature? First, the pursuit of vainglory was the motivation of 
his trip to Paris.  Before setting off to Paris to seek success, Jean-Jacques was upset and 
frustrated with his relationship with Mme de Warens.  He foresaw her misfortune but 
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could do nothing to prevent it.66 His love of Mme de Warens drove him to seek recourse 
in his previous study. One day he had an inspiration to make use of his knowledge of 
music to invent a new musical note system. Reflecting on his difficulty in reading music, 
he tried to substitute musical notes with numbers and he succeeded in developing a new 
musical note system. He was ambitious to make a fortune with his invention. There was 
no other place better than Paris for pursuing wealth and fame. “From that moment I 
believed my fortune made, and in the ardor to share it with her to whom I owed 
everything, I thought only of leaving for Paris, not doubting that I would cause a 
revolution by presenting my project to the Academy.”67 He expected his invention to start 
a revolution in Paris. His imagination was at work and at the moment of his departure his 
amour-propre was highly active. He left Chambéry with a strong desire for vainglory.  
Second, his title and service as secretary to the Ambassador to Venice was the 
source of both his pride and disappointment. Jean-Jacques was told that there were 
certain rights attached to the title of Secretary. It aroused his sense of pride and his 
expectation of regard from others. He was satisfied with his performance in deciphering 
the documents by which he gained self-confidence. Since the Ambassador was inattentive 
in writing the Dispatches, Jean-Jacques was given room to encipher more than just what 
the Ambassador had said. Jean-Jacques did not regard such action as unfaithful, but 
thought that he did it for the glory of the Ambassador. He said, “For once it was time for 
me to be what Heaven (which had endowed me with a happy natural disposition), what 
the education I had received from the best of women, what the one I had given myself 
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had made me be, and I was.”68  As an Ambassador’s secretary, he thought he could 
become his true self. He was proud of himself as a civil servant and believed he served 
France well. “Irreproachable in a post that was sufficiently in view I deserved, I obtained 
the esteem of the Republic, that of all the Ambassadors with whom we were in 
correspondence and the affection of all the French established in Venice.”69 However, he 
had an argument with the Ambassador, because the Ambassador deprived him of some 
privileges of the secretary, for instance, denying him his right to use the Gondola, and not 
allowing him to dine with the honorable guests of the Ambassador. Jean-Jacques 
regarded those as insults and asked to be dismissed. Although the Ambassador mistreated 
him, Jean-Jacques did not lose his sense of pride. “My conduct had been seen and 
approved; I was universally esteemed.”70 During his service in Venice, he considered his 
social identity as his true identity and grounded the value of his self upon the esteem of 
others. His amour-propre kept him from seeing his true self. In sum, if the philosophy 
was incapable of knowing the truth, and Jean-Jacques was denatured by reading and 
amour-propre, how did Jean-Jacques know his true self? 
 
iv. History of the Soul Manifested by the Chain of Feelings 
Rousseau in the Letter to Beaumont revealed how he understood the true nature of 
man and the cause of evil by telling the Archbishop the history of his ideas.  
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As soon as I was capable of observing men, I watched them act and 
listened to them speak. Then, seeing that their actions bore little 
resemblance to their speeches, I sought the reason for this dissimilarity, 
and found that since being and appearing were two things as different for 
them as acting and speaking, this second difference was the cause of the 
first, and itself had a cause that remained for me to seek.71 
 
By observing, Rousseau noticed a discrepancy between what people said and 
what they did. He found out that the difference between beings and their appearances 
suggested the clue to the rupture of their acting and speaking. He later concluded that 
man was naturally good and the social order was the source of all the vices of men and all 
the ills of society. He revealed the history of his ideas to the Archbishop. Nonetheless, the 
epistemological criticism of his study of human nature remains. Is Rousseau’s discovery 
of human nature and the source of evil a product of philosophy? Although Rousseau 
revealed the history of his ideas to the Archbishop, reason was not necessarily the only 
source of those ideas. Rousseau wrote the Letter to Beaumont at the end of 1762 as he 
was preparing to write his autobiography. At the same time he examined his inner self in 
order to discover the fundamental principle of moral guidance for the rest of his life.72 
Reflecting on the philosophies that he studied, he was troubled by the disagreement 
among philosophers. Although he was unable to reply to their arguments, he felt that 
there must be one fundamental principle. With the understanding that human reason is 
insufficient to know the universal truth or to penetrate the mysteries, he said, “I adopted 
for each question the sentiment which seemed to me the best established by direct means 
and the most believable in itself without paying attention to objections I could not solve, 
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but which were refuted by other no less strong objections in the opposite system.”73 The 
inner sentiment, after the deliberation of reason, judges reason’s conclusion. The inner 
sentiment senses the truth affirmed by reason.74 It does not mean that the inner sentiment 
is infallible. “It [inner light] will lead me astray less than they [philosophies] lead me 
astray; or at least my error will be my own, and I will deprave myself less in following 
my own illusions than in yielding to their lies.”75 Rousseau remarked that the inner 
sentiment is different from the sensible feelings caused by external objects. It is the 
revelation of the heart. Remarkably, the noise of philosophical disputes and amour-
propre can disturb the inner sentiment, but they cannot destroy it completely.76  
When he was preparing to write his autobiography, it is not surprising that 
Rousseau, who found inner sentiment to be the criterion of truth, proposed a newly 
invented language to convey the knowledge of the natural self. “For what I have to say it 
would be necessary to invent a language as new as my project.”77 He promised to tell the 
readers the true knowledge of human nature, and how he had discovered and understood 
it. The new language is the narrative of the events of his life in which his feelings, 
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perceptions, and ideas were formed. His feeling is a sure guide to the experiences by 
which he acquired knowledge of the natural self and the source of evil. In the 
Confessions, he wrote his life history by telling the readers the history of his soul, which 
consists of his feelings and ideas. Jean-Jacques came across with other people in his daily 
experience in which his feelings were stimulated and his perception and ideas were 
formed as well. He might forget the details of the event but he did not forget the feelings 
and the ideas he discerned by them. “That is the chain of feelings which have marked the 
succession of my being, and, by means of them, the succession of events which have 
been their cause or effect.”78 Rousseau made his interior known to the readers by 
revealing the history of his feelings, which was “the history of his soul.”79 In other words, 
the history of feelings and ideas is the manifestation of his interiority. Rousseau wanted 
to illustrate that the knowledge of human nature is a product of experience, consisting of 
feelings and ideas. In this way, he sensed and knew the knowledge of man according to 
nature. Thus, if the Second Discourse was the philosophical presentation of the natural 
goodness of man and the source of evil, then the Confessions is the experiential 
demonstration of them.80 
 In fact, as in Augustine’s journey of philosophical inquiry, Jean-Jacques narrated 
the history of his experiences of the split between beings and their appearances both in 
his and other people’s lives in the first seven books of Confessions. When Jean-Jacques 
was a lackey in Mme de Vercellis’s house, she was curious about him and asked him for 
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his letters to Mme de Warens in which Jean-Jacques showed his affections. However, 
Mme de Vercellis never expressed her own emotions or thoughts. Jean-Jacques, who 
expected a mutual sharing, was discouraged by her attitude. He then hid his own feelings 
and thoughts and said nothing to her that could do him harm.81 According to Rousseau, 
Mme de Vercellis “judged me less upon what I was than upon what she had made me, 
and as a result of seeing nothing but a lackey in me, she prevented me from appearing as 
anything else to her.”82 The social convention at that time determined the behavioral 
pattern of the social classes and everyone appeared not as they were but as the convention 
required.83  
 Later, when Mme de Vercellis died, Jean-Jacques stole a ribbon at the house and 
it was found in his room. Then accused of theft, he lied and falsely accused Marion, a 
maid in the house. He insisted on his innocence and ignored Marion’s sad and 
disappointed look on her face. Meanwhile, even though he wanted to reveal the truth to 
his master, he was forced to feign innocence because of shame. Rousseau sighed, “If they 
had allowed me to return to myself, I would have infallibly declared everything…but 
they only intimidated me when it was necessary to give me courage.”84 It was a 
significant event in which Jean-Jacques felt the split between his being and appearance in 
his life.  
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 Moreover, lying is a typical symptom of the split between being and appearance. 
Jean-Jacques felt the charm of imposture in Venture de Villeneuve pretending to be a 
Parisian music master and being well accepted by the people despite his limited 
knowledge of music.85 He followed Villeneuve’s example and lied that he was a musician 
from Paris when he was suffering in poverty in Lyon.86  Similarly, newly converted to 
Catholicism, he feared persecution by the Protestants, and so on a journey to Montpellier 
with a group of people including Mme de Larnage, he lied that he was an Englishman 
named Dudding, even though he did not speak any English. It is clear how familiar Jean-
Jacques was with the split between being and appearance in his early life.  
 
v. The Encounter with Zulietta 
The encounter with Zulietta was the crucial episode in the process of knowing 
human nature.  In this episode, Jean-Jacques revealed his perception of the natural face of 
mankind, and he attempted to reconcile the natural beauty of man with his miserable 
social condition. We will see the interplay of natural passions, imagination, reasoning, 
and sexual desire in this event. The encounter in Zulietta’s chamber opened Jean-
Jacques’ eyes of the mind and heart to the truth. Rousseau expected the narrative of this 
event to open the reader’s eyes as well. He said, “If there is one circumstance in my life 
that depicts my natural disposition well, it is the one I am about to recount… Whoever 
you may be who wishes to know a man, dare to read the two or three pages that follow 
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you are about to know J.-J. Rousseau to the full.”87 Rousseau promised in the prefatory 
note of the Confessions that readers would see the self-portrait of man according to nature 
in this encounter. 
In his denatured condition, imagination and amour-propre hindered Jean-Jacques 
from seeing the real face of Zulietta and himself in the encounter, because in the first 
place Jean-Jacques’ relationship with Zulietta was both imaginary and erotic. Zulietta 
was a courtesan paid by Captain Olivet to entertain Jean-Jacques. Their basic relationship 
was sexual and commercial. When they met on the boat, Zulietta kissed him and said 
Jean-Jacques resembled her ex-lover. Jean-Jacques played the role of her ex-lover with 
pleasure in a relationship that turned out in great part to be imaginary. Both commercially 
and in imagination their relationship satisfied the yearning of Jean-Jacques’ amour-
propre. Before meeting with Zulietta, he was frustrated by the Ambassador’s unjust 
treatment, when the latter did not give him due respect. Furthermore, he was upset at the 
dinner at the beginning of the episode when Captain Olivet did not give him a salute from 
the cannon as he had expected. But now, his amour-propre’s thirst for public regard was 
satisfied in his imaginary relationship with Zulietta, who loved him in his imaginary 
world. 
The next day after the dinner they met at her place. Jean-Jacques was attracted by 
Zulietta’s physical beauty. She was dressed in vestito di confidenza, which aroused Jean-
Jacques’ sensual pleasure and sexual desire. Besides, Jean-Jacques’ first impression of 
his sexual object perceived more. “I entered a Courtesan’s room as the sanctuary of love 
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and beauty; in it I believed I saw the divinity in her person. I would never have believed 
that without respect and esteem one could feel anything similar to what she made me 
experience.”88 His imagination of entering into a sacred environment and seeing the 
divinity evoked his respect and esteem. In his imagination Zulietta was religiously 
adorable like a goddess. But while he adored his goddess, Jean-Jacques was compelled 
by sexual desire and he wanted to have sex with her. “When from fear of losing their fruit 
too early, I wanted to hasten to pluck it.”89 Suddenly, Jean-Jacques felt a mortal coldness 
running through his body and he wept like a child. What had transpired in the mind and 
heart of Jean-Jacques, when at that critical moment he felt coldness and wept? Rousseau 
said that he saw something with the eyes of the mind. It is the mind that stopped him 
from attempting to satisfy his sexual desire. “It [nature] put into my unruly head the 
poison for that ineffable happiness, the appetite for which it put into my heart.”90 Jean-
Jacques, also wanting to know the cause of his feelings at that moment, reflected on the 
experience: “This object of which I dispose is the masterpiece of nature and love; the 
mind, the body, everything about it is perfect; she is good and generous as she is lovable 
and beautiful…Nevertheless, here she is a wretched trollop abandoned to the public.”91 
He was aware of the division between the beauty of Zulietta and her miserable social 
status. This perception was adumbrated in the recounting of his entrance to Zulietta’s 
room. “I entered a Courtesan’s room as the sanctuary of love and beauty.”  A courtesan is 
the antithesis of a goddess, so which one was her true identity? Jean-Jacques thought that 
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as the Ambassador’s secretary, he was nothing in Zulietta’s eyes and she would not know 
his merit by his appearance. Yet his social status or talent had nothing to do with his 
relationship with Zulietta, theirs was only a commercial relationship. Accordingly, he 
concluded that Zulietta was a whore at the disposal of anyone who paid her. She was only 
a commodity or a plaything. Nevertheless, if Zulietta were no more than a wretched 
trollop in reality, then why was she a perfect creature in his eyes? Was he fooled by his 
senses? Was her beauty only a product of his imagination? However, her charm was so 
real that it could not be denied. Could there be a hidden flaw that destroyed her charms 
and made her “odious to those who ought to contend over her”?92 Jean-Jacques was 
trying to give a rational explanation of the division.  
 
vi. The Natural Cause of the Vices 
This suspicion of a hidden flaw of nature was probably derived from his 
experience in the Scuole that was a house of charity for girls without property. The girls 
there were trained to sing beautifully like angels. Jean-Jacques attended Vespers there 
every Sunday: “I have no idea of anything as voluptuous, as touching as this music; the 
richness of the art, the exquisite taste of the songs, the beauty of the voices, the exactness 
of the performance, everything in these delightful concerts combines to produce an 
impression which is assuredly not suitable to the dignity of the place, but from which I 
doubt that any man’s heart is safe.”93 He noticed that the voices of the girls did not match 
the social status of the place. What made the girls with such beautiful voices live in a 
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place for social outcasts? Later, when he had an opportunity to meet them, he was 
surprised by their appearances. “Virtually not a single one without some notable flaw.”94 
All of the girls suffered different flaws of nature. Because of their ugly appearances they 
were sent to the Scuole as social outcasts. Were they animals that sang in angelic voices? 
But ugliness does not exclude graces. He said to himself, “One does not sing in this way 
without a soul; they have them.”95 These ugly girls deserved respect because they were 
people with souls just like him. Even though they were endowed with a soul to sing 
beautifully with an angelic voice, their natural flaw deprived them of social status. In this 
event, Jean-Jacques found a rational explanation for the discrepancy between the natural 
beauty of voice and social inequality. Following the same line of thought, Jean-Jacques 
tried to find out the hidden flaw of nature in Zulietta.  
Moreover, Rousseau’s search for the rational explanation for the division reminds 
us of Augustine’s Manichean phase of searching for truth. Manichean dualism explained 
the source of evil as an evil force invading human nature. It is the evil force that drives 
human nature to sin, thus freeing God, man, and society from blame for the evil deeds. 
Augustine said: “I still thought that it is not we who sin, but some alien nature which sins 
in us. It flattered my pride to be free from blame and, when I had done something wrong, 
not to make myself confess to you [God] that you might heal my soul; for it was sinning 
against you. I liked to excuse myself and to accuse some unidentifiable power which was 
with me and yet not I.”96 Similarly, Jean-Jacques at that moment tried to discover the 
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reason for the division, which could free God, man, and society from responsibility for 
human miseries.  
But then, why did he weep like a child? How did these reflections in his head 
agitate him to the point of weeping? Jean-Jacques was not convinced that he was fooled 
by his senses, because Zulietta’s perfection was so real that it could not be denied. It had 
to be a hidden flaw that degraded her. While he was pondering the natural explanation for 
the division, the contrast saddened him; indeed, the contrast between the divine beauty of 
her person and the ugliness of her social status shocked him to the point of weeping. 
Jean-Jacques wept like an innocent child for the misery and the suffering of his beautiful 
Zulietta. Seeing Zulietta, who was a person like him in suffering, repulsed him.97 
Compassion moved him to weep, as he identified Zulietta with himself. The miserable 
social status of Zulietta reminded him of his own social status as the secretary of the 
Ambassador. Like a whore, he sold his service to anyone who paid him. The 
Ambassador, who had the social power and right to dispose of him, treated him unjustly. 
Nature brought his sexual desire for Zulietta to a halt by the reflection of his mind and the 
compassion that moved him to tears for their miseries. 
Yet his sexual desire was still not totally calmed. While he was reflecting and 
looking for a rational answer, he was distracted by Zulietta’s seduction. He then turned 
his attention to her body. He was torn between mind and body, but his mind won at that 
moment. Looking at her body he found a malformed nipple, which he interpreted as a 
notable natural vice. This discovery illuminated the eyes of his mind and he said, “I saw 
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as clear as day that, in the most charming person I could imagine, I was holding in my 
arms only a sort of monster, the outcast of nature, man, and love.”98 He grasped the 
rational answer to the question about the contrast between Zulietta’s real charms and 
beauty and her miserable social status. A natural vice destroyed her charm and made 
Zulietta a whore, who was abandoned by nature and man. He told Zulietta about his 
discovery. His act upset and irritated her and she asked Jean-Jacques to leave. But did the 
natural cause of vices settle Jean-Jacques’ puzzle? Was he convinced? Not at all! The 
puzzle remained in his heart. Augustine denounced the Manichean explanation of the 
source of evil because there were no grounds for a universal war between good and evil, 
the existence of evil matter being contradictory to the omnipotence of God. Similarly, 
Rousseau would ask himself: Whence came the notable natural vice? Why did nature 
abandon Zulietta? Although Rousseau did not state the reason why he did not accept the 
natural explanation for the contrast, his anxiety about the problem showed the 
restlessness of his mind and heart.  
He left Zulietta’s room with mixed feelings and made another appointment with 
her on the third day. Jean-Jacques longed for the coming meeting. His heart was captured 
by the charms and graces of Zulietta and he regretted what he had done in her room. In 
addition, in spite of everything, he was “still anxious to reconcile the perfection of that 
adorable girl with the unworthiness of her condition.”99 His heart was restless even 
though he had found the rational answer to the division between her being and her social 
condition. His inner sentiment did not endorse his rational explanation. 
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vii.  The Portrait of Man According to Nature 
What portrait of man was Rousseau depicting in his encounter with Zulietta? We 
saw the interplay of imagination, reason, feelings, sexual desire and amour-propre in 
Jean-Jacques’ encounter with Zulietta. Without doubt, his denatured faculty of reason and 
imagination led him away from reality. He played with Zulietta in an imaginary world of 
lovers. Reason could not guide him to the natural face of mankind and to the source of 
the evil with the eyes of the mind, because the contrast between the natural beauty of man 
and the miserable social condition still puzzled him. In addition, his amour-propre made 
him actively yearn for the esteem and regard of the others. If he could only console 
himself for losing Zulietta, he said, “I admit that I could not console myself for the fact 
that she carried off only a contemptuous memory of me.”100 Moreover, his sexual desire 
captivated him, distracting him from his concern about the issue of the contrast. 
Nevertheless, his natural passion, his compassion, had not been stifled by artificial 
passions and imagination. He wept for Zulietta’s suffering and his own in this unjust 
society. Rousseau said that the readers would get to know Jean-Jacques in full in the 
narrative of the encounter. The focus of the narrative was not on Jean-Jacques alone but 
also on Zulietta, as there is identification of Jean-Jacques with Zulietta. As Madeleine B. 
Ellis points out in Rousseau’s Venetian Story, “He [Rousseau] manifests himself in and 
through her, and in this way the writer uses her, as he does everyone else, to tell about 
himself in the past…Her sentiments are his. Her indifference to money is his 
own…Zulietta’s demand for respect corresponds…to the demands of his own pride for 
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deference to his person and his place.”101 Both Jean-Jacques and Zulietta reflect the 
portrait of the natural man. 
 
viii. The identification of Jean-Jacques with Zulietta 
What did Jean-Jacques see in and through the person of Zulietta? At the first 
moment of encounter, Jean-Jacques was attracted by Zulietta’s appearance. As a 
dazzling, nimble, charming, and lively young person, she was physically and sexually 
attractive to him. Since Jean-Jacques resembled her former lover, they started an 
imaginary relationship. Besides her physical and sexual appearance, he saw her character. 
She showed herself indifferent to money, and gave away in gratuities much more than 
they had spent on her. “From the indifference with which she threw her money around 
and let us throw ours, we saw that it was not of any value for her.”102 However, she 
demanded payment in order to show her status and value in other people’s eyes. Money 
was nothing to her but at the same time it was the measure of her social value. “She is 
flattered by the value that was put on her favors.”103 Later, when Jean-Jacques took her 
home, he saw two pistols on her dressing table. She said, “I will not fail to shoot the first 
one who fails to respect me.”104 So Zulietta was caught up in the tension between the 
esteem for her person and the insult and shame of being a courtesan. In short, before the 
intimate encounter in her chamber, besides her physical beauty, Jean-Jacques saw 
Zulietta like his inverted image in a mirror. Indifferent to money, she had a strong 
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demand for respect. Zulietta enjoyed the imaginary love relationship with Jean-Jacques 
and had no concern for the artificial need of money. But, driven by amour-propre, she 
demanded public esteem. She was a person mixed with both natural and denatured 
characteristics. 
On the next day in her chamber, Zulietta appeared before him like a divine being. 
Jean-Jacques saw the divinity of her existence in his imagination. At that moment, he 
suddenly became aware of their relationship in reality. Zulietta was in fact a courtesan 
who amused people who paid her. She threw herself to the arms of her customers, 
including Jean-Jacques, without knowing who they were and their merits. People only 
cared about her body and appearance and they did not mind who she was naturally. 
Zulietta only showed them the appearance they liked and valued instead of her inner self. 
The relationship between Zulietta and the people who bought her services was based 
upon appearance and commercial contract. The value of her as a person depended on her 
market price. She was the victim of social inequality. He saw her social identity and 
charming appearance only in his imagination.  
In addition, Jean-Jacques further saw himself in Zulietta. This awareness caused 
him more pain. He could live happily in an unjust situation as long as he was not aware 
of this problem. However, in and through Zulietta, Jean-Jacques could not escape from 
seeing his misery as a victim of social inequality as well. Before encountering Zulietta, 
Jean-Jacques was arguing with his superior, the French Ambassador in Venice, in his 
work. There he shared the same fate as Zulietta. He sold his service to the Ambassador 
but he did not receive the respect and reward deserved or expected. Moreover, Jean-
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Jacques thought that his superior was mediocre, and the latter had the power to command 
Jean-Jacques only because of his position of power. Jean-Jacques was frustrated by the 
unjust working condition. He thought he could at least earn certain respect and some 
sense of superiority in his relationship with a courtesan. He was hoping to compensate for 
his misery in an artificial and imaginary relation. He, however, saw in Zulietta not only 
himself as a victim of unjust social conditions, but also saw himself as complicit in this 
unjust situation. He degraded this woman as a plaything. Jean-Jacques saw himself in and 
through Zulietta. 
In sum, Rousseau showed the readers the portrait of Jean-Jacques, who was 
endowed with natural beauty but suffering from the split between his being and his 
appearance in the narrative of the encounter. He also illustrated how by his heart Jean-
Jacques perceived the natural beauty of mankind and the alienation of the self. Moreover, 
Rousseau brought out the nature of evil in the encounter, which is the split between the 
being and appearance. 
 
ix. Evil as A Privation of Good 
In Book Seven of the Confessions, Augustine understood evil ontologically as a 
privation of good. Since finite beings were created out of nothing, and are situated in 
between being incorruptible and non-being, which is to say, nothing, they are susceptible 
to corruption. In other words, finite beings are corruptible but they are not yet corrupted 
when they were created. What does corruption mean? Corruption is the harm done to the 
goodness of being and thereby diminishing it. Since all finite beings are corruptible, they 
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are good, for otherwise there is nothing corruptible in them. Corruption does not have an 
independent existence; what exists is the corrupted being. Thus, “all things that are 
corrupted suffer privation of some good.”105 A finite being is neither the Supreme Being, 
which is totally good, nor the non-being, which has no goodness at all. As long as a being 
exists, it is good but corruptible. Augustine then concluded that evil is not a substance but 
a privation or corruption of good. “Accordingly, whatever things exist are good, and the 
evil into whose origins I was inquiring is not a substance, for it were a substance, it 
would be good. Either it would be an incorruptible substance, a great good indeed, or a 
corruptible substance, which could be corrupted only if it were good.”106 By the reading 
of the Platonist books, Augustine brought to light the nature of metaphysical evil. God 
did not create evil, which is nothingness. All existences, which owe their existence to 
God, are good. Evil is the privation of the good, which a finite being ought to possess. 
Augustine affirmed that every individual being is good, but corruptible. 
Evil is a reality caused by man’s immoral act and sin. With the eyes of the mind 
Augustine saw the order of universe, by which he understood the nature of moral evil. All 
things owe their existence to God who created them out of nothing. As mentioned above, 
a creature is not absolutely being or absolutely non-being. A creature is a finite being, a 
becoming. Augustine identified being with good and truth. Every being is good and true 
insofar as it exists. In other words, it will be bad or false if a being were supposed to exist 
but does not. Moreover, every being participates in being with a different degree of 
likeness according to how it is situated in the hierarchy of beings. The more it becomes 
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and is like God, the higher it is in the hierarchy. Augustine saw that “each thing is 
harmonious not only with its place but with its time.”107 Therefore, each thing acts at the 
right place and at the right time according to the order of the universe. For instance, bread 
is good for the healthy palate but is bad for the unhealthy one. Light is desirable to the 
healthy eyes but is hateful to the sick eyes.108 The beings in the lower part of the 
hierarchy are good as long as they act according to their order, even though they are far 
away from the likeness to God. Accordingly, a wicked person is one who acts against the 
order. He thinks he is acting according to his higher faculty, the intellect; but he is acting 
instead in accord with his lower part, the passions. Wicked man himself, as long as he 
exists, is good but he diminishes his own goodness by his disorderly acts. “I inquired 
what wickedness is; and I did not find a substance but a perversity of will twisted away 
from the highest substance, you, O God, towards inferior things, rejecting its own inner 
life and swelling with external matter.”109 Platonism helped Augustine understand the 
nature of evil, but he did not grasp the source of evil at once. Why does man turn from 
God to the beings in the lower hierarchy? Augustine dealt with the problem of evil 
ontologically. 
Rousseau did not deal with it in the same way. Rather, he shifted the problem of 
evil from the ontological to the socio-political realm. He saw evil in and through Zulietta. 
Social inequalities deprived her of the divinity of her natural beauty. She was not free to 
live up to her natural self. Her inner self that nobody cared for and respected in society 
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was separated from her appearance and outward behavior. In society, anyone who could 
afford to pay her could dispose of her and she was only a social outcast. Jean-Jacques 
saw the evil in the denatured Zulietta and in their unequal social relationship. He became 
an accomplice of evil, exploiting Zulietta in this relationship. Evil manifested itself in the 
denatured reality of social inequality.  
 
x. The Social Cause of Evil As Felt 
Unlike Augustine’s inner insight into the eternal wisdom with the eyes of the 
mind, Jean-Jacques vaguely understood the natural face of man with the eyes of the heart 
and mind. Similar to Augustine, who was complacent with his limited knowledge of the 
truth because of his pride, Jean-Jacques was distracted by his sexual desire, amour-
propre and the social environment from knowing nature and continued his previous 
lifestyle. Jean-Jacques agreed with his friend, Carrio, to buy a little girl, Anzoletta, to be 
their mistress. His only intention was to have a sexual relationship with her when she 
grew up. They paid some money to Anzoletta’s mother and provided for her upkeep. 
Later, he went back to Paris to appeal his quarrel with the Ambassador. He was 
concerned with his public self-esteem.  Reading the Scripture led Augustine to see the 
true source of evil.  For Jean-Jacques, in spite of distractions, the encounter with Zulietta 
let him gradually sense the social cause of the split between the being and appearance as 
the source of evil.  
In fact, he had already sensed the social cause of the alienation of the soul in his 
early life. When he was a lackey in Mme de Vercellis’ house, Mme de Vercellis did not 
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encourage him to reveal his feelings and thoughts so he acted and spoke according to his 
social role of lackey. “I believed that from that time I experienced that malicious play of 
hidden interests that has crossed me all my life, and that has given me a very natural 
aversion for the apparent order that produces them.”110 Another time, on his way to 
Lyon from Paris, he was hungry and tired after walking for a whole day and he asked a 
peasant for food. The peasant offered him some skimmed milk and coarse bread. After 
hearing Jean-Jacques’ story and seeing that he was very hungry, this peasant believed that 
Jean-Jacques was not a spy. He then offered Jean-Jacques better food. To avoid paying 
more taxes to his landlord, this peasant hid his food to pretend that he could not afford it.  
The peasant was forced to split his being from his appearance. When Jean-Jacques heard 
the story, he was indignant at the social institution that produced the split between being 
and appearance. “That was the seed of that inextinguishable hatred that has developed in 
my heart since then against the vexations suffered by the unfortunate people and against 
its oppressors.”111 The hatred towards social injustice gradually directed his attention to 
the social cause of the split.   
Furthermore, besides his early experience of the source of evil, his own 
unfortunate experience in Paris also turned his heart to its social cause. He went to Paris 
to ask for a just judgment on his quarrel with the Ambassador. He was not able to obtain 
any justice there because he was only a secretary and M. Montaigu was an Ambassador. 
He sighed, “Good order, or what was called that, wished me to obtain no justice 
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whatsoever, and I obtained none.”112 He found out that people in Paris faithfully followed 
“one of the great maxims of the society, which is always to sacrifice the weaker to the 
more powerful.”113 Although he finally received some money as compensation, he 
learned from this experience that social institutions played a large role in doing injustice 
to the weak. “The justice and uselessness of my complaints left a seed of indignation in 
my soul against our foolish civil institutions in which the true public good and genuine 
justice are always sacrificed to some apparent order or other, in fact destructive of all 
order, and which does nothing but add the sanction of public authority to the oppression 
of the weak and the iniquity of the strong.”114  The social injustice caused by the social 
institutions aroused Jean-Jacques’ indignation, and induced him to see the natural face of 
man and the true source of evil later in a sudden inspiration on the road to Vincennes. 
 
xi. Wept as Jesus Did for Human Suffering 
It is clear that Rousseau did not consider either reason or faith alone as the proper 
means of knowing the natural face of man and the source of evil. It is the heart that 
knows the truth. In the encounter with Zulietta, Jean-Jacques saw the natural beauty of 
man with the eyes of the heart, but his sexual desire and amour-propre distracted him 
from pondering the problem. Unlike Augustine, Jean-Jacques did not consider the need 
for a Mediator to bridge the split of the alienated self. Rousseau implicitly guided the 
readers to compare himself with Jesus by his weeping for the miserable social condition 
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of man. If Rousseau intended to identify himself with Jesus, Jean-Jacques’ weeping in 
Zulietta’s room was redolent of Jesus’ weeping in the Gospel. In two passages in the 
Gospels Jesus wept. In Luke 19:41-44, “As he [Jesus] drew near and came in sight of the 
city he shed tears over it and said, ‘if you too had only recognized on this day the way to 
peace! But in fact it is hidden from your eyes! They [your enemy] will leave not one 
stone standing on another within you, because you did not recognize the moment of your 
visitation.” Jesus mourned for the future destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans in 70 
AD. He wept not only for the suffering of the people but also for their neglecting the 
moment of repentance he offered them. And in John 11:33-35, his friend Lazarus died 
and people were distressed by the deep sorrow of the departure of their beloved. “At the 
sight of her [Mary] tears, and those of the Jews who had come with her, Jesus was greatly 
distressed, and with a profound sigh he said, ‘Where have you put him?’ They said, 
‘Lord, come and see.’ Jesus wept.” Jesus was deeply moved by the suffering of mankind 
and he wept for the human suffering brought on by death when they did not have faith in 
Him who is life and resurrection. Similarly, seeing the miserable fate of human being in 
both Zulietta and himself, Jean-Jacques felt sad and wept out of compassion as Jesus did. 
This instance and the image of a weeping natural man offered the readers a hint of 
Rousseau’s attempt to replace Jesus Christ with himself as the mediator, although Jean-
Jacques also wept for himself.  
In short, Rousseau in Book Seven dealt with the question of knowing human 
nature. Giving up the path of reason, he delineated the path of experiences towards 
knowledge of human nature. Although he was denatured by the development of reason 
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and amour-propre, his natural passion was not stifled, and on the occasion of the 
encounter with Zulietta, his heart cooperated with reason to perceive the natural beauty of 
man and the miserable social condition of man. But he did not see the natural face of man 
and the true source of evil until the revelation to him occurred on the road to Vincennes 
in Book Eight. 
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CHAPTER FIVE CONVERSION AND THE SOURCE OF EVIL 
 
The conversion in Book Eight is the crowning event of Augustine’s Confessions. 
He saw clearly that he was enslaved by sin and recognized the source of his miseries in 
the war between the two forces in his soul. In Book Seven, as a prelude to the conversion, 
Augustine understood eternal wisdom in his mind but he was dissipated by the lures of 
his sexual habit. The perverse will directed one to deviate from one’s goal by objects 
lower in the hierarchy of being. Augustine yet did not know the cause nor did he attempt 
to find out, because he was satisfied with his limited knowledge of eternal truth. In the 
narrative of his conversion, Augustine learned from stories of the conversion of others 
about his sinful state, and that God is merciful. He struggled against the bondage of sin 
by his own effort but failed to deliver himself from it. At the turning point of his religious 
conversion, Augustine humbled himself and turned to God. He was liberated from the 
bondage of sin by God’s grace. His conversion was at once a self-discovery in which 
Augustine realized that true fulfillment depends upon God, and the discovery that the 
source of evil lies in both original sin and personal sin, reinforcing the necessity of grace 
for living in accord with the true self. 
 In Book Seven, Rousseau understood the contrast between the divine beauty of 
the human person and the miserable human condition in Zulietta. He was unable to 
reconcile these two extremes. Despite that, he did not ponder the problem further, but 
continued to associate with the Parisians. By adopting their customs, he abandoned his 
children into the Foundling Hospital. He showed the split between the divine beauty of 
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his person and the miserable social condition of his life in the lowliest of society. On the 
road to Vincennes, while he was reading the question of the Dijon competition, he saw 
the true self and the source of evil in a sudden inspiration. Here the main focus is the 
religious self versus the natural or secular self. I will show how Rousseau recognized the 
natural self of man and how he shifted the issue of the problem of evil from the 
metaphysical and moral aspects of the will to the socio-political dimension of the soul.  
Augustine narrated his conversion in detail in Book Eight, from his visit to the old 
Bishop Simplicianus to his transformation after the reading of St Paul. Rousseau, 
however, did not recount the details of his conversion in his Confessions. He just said, 
“At the moment of that reading [the question proposed by the Academy of Dijon: Has the 
progress of the sciences and arts tended to corrupt or purify morals?] I saw another 
universe and I became another man.”1 What was the cause of this epoch-making 
moment? What insight did he have in the inspiration? What kind of man did he become? 
In his second Letter to M. de Malesherbes, he told M. de Malesherbes about that 
experience, “Oh Sir, if I had ever been able to write a quarter of what I saw and felt under 
that tree, how clearly I would have made all the contradictions of the social system seen, 
with what strength I would have exposed all the abuses of our institutions, with what 
simplicity I would have demonstrated that man is naturally good and that it is from these 
institutions alone that men become wicked.”2 A new horizon of truth and of the ultimate 
source of evil opened up to him, from which he could reconcile the contradiction of the 
goodness and the deplorable social condition of the human person. It seems that 
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Rousseau’s “conversion” was not as complex as Augustine’s. Although the recount of 
Rousseau’s sudden inspiration on the Road to Vincennes in Book Eight is not as detailed 
as Augustine’s conversion account, their similarities are striking.3 Jean Perkin has 
compared the two conversion accounts.4 
Augustine Rousseau 
Left Alypius behind in the garden Diderot was put in prison 
Saw his miseries Read the question of the Academy of Dijon 
Threw himself under a fig tree Fell under one of the trees of the avenue 
A massive downpour of tears Shed tears without having felt that 
Heard a voice: “Pick up and read”, Read St 
Paul’s epistle in the Bible 
 
Saw another universe in the revelation of 
the truth 
He decided to put on Jesus Christ He saw that man is naturally good and that 
it is from these institutions alone that men 
become wicked 
 
Felt relieved from all anxiety, and all the 
shadows of doubt were dispelled, he was at 
peace 
 
He was in an agitation that bordered on 
delirium after the incident 
Decided not to have a wife and longed for 
eternal life 
Became another man, he was enthusiastic 
about truth, freedom, and virtue and he 
committed to be an author 
 
Shared his conversion experience with 
Alypius and Monica 
 
Shared his experience with Diderot 
Resigned from his teaching post and made 
a retreat to prepare for baptism 
Determined to earn his living by copying 
music, declined the king’s offer of pension, 
and moved to the Hermitage 
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Their similarities draw the reader’s attention to the relationship between the two 
Confessions. However, although there are similar elements in the two events, the order of 
elements differs as does their significance. In his conversion account, Rousseau 
purposefully employed the fundamental principle of his thought, the natural goodness of 
man and the social cause of evil, as a reply to Augustine’s doctrine of Original Sin. 
Despite their apparent similarities, Rousseau gave a definitively different answer from 
Augustine, as to the split between the natural face of man and the source of evil. 
Therefore, Perkin’s comparison does not help the readers grasp the significance beyond 
just their structural similarities. I suggest the following comparison, with respect to the 
themes, which indicates the significance of the different nature of their conversion. 
Augustine Rousseau 
Testimonies of converts Unprecedented event 
Under a fig tree: a symbol of sin Under an oak tree: a symbol of naturalness 
Weeping: for his sin and repentance Weeping: for joy 
The need of grace 
 
Accident 
Divided will: will to God and will to 
earthly things 
 
Divided soul: being and appearance 
Reading of St Paul Reading of the question set by Dijon 
competition 
 
Converted to become a Christian Committed to be a virtuous man and an 
author 
 
I will divide them into three sections: i) before the conversion; ii) the conversion 
event; and iii) after the conversion. Since the life after conversion, which brings out the 
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model of good life and of good man, deserves a longer discussion, the third section will 
be studied in the next chapter. 
 
1. Before Conversion 
 
i. The Testimonies of the Converts 
 Right before the conversion narrative, Augustine was told about nine Christian 
figures and seven conversions.5 The conversion of Augustine, which was about to 
happen, was one of the most famous conversion stories in Christian tradition. The 
testimonies of the converts illustrate the pattern of conversion, which attunes the meaning 
of human existence to God. Any conversion story of an individual, in which confessio 
peccati and confessio laudi take place at the same time, expresses in a concise form the 
salvation history of mankind. At the beginning of Book Eight, Augustine said, “My God, 
in my thanksgiving I want to recall and confess your mercies over me…You have broken 
my chains, I will sacrifice to you the sacrifice of praise.”6 According to the Scripture, 
man was made originally good from the hand of his Creator. He was in communion with 
God in the Garden of Eden and obeyed to God’s commandment. However, because of 
pride man was not willing to submit to God. He wanted to be the master of his own life, 
determining what is good or bad. Man turned away from God to himself and other earthly 
things. That for Augustine is the fundamental meaning of the Fall into sin. Salvation is 
                                                
5 Patrick Riley mentions this in the note 21 of “The Inversion of Conversion: Rousseau’s Rewriting of 
Augustinian Autobiography,” Studies of Eighteenth Century Culture, 28(1999) p. 250. 
6 Aug. Confs., VIII, i, 1. Emphasis added. 
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the event by which man returns to God and reenters into a relationship with God through 
Christ, the Mediator. The testimonies of the converts related to Augustine illustrated the 
salvation history of mankind and also brought out the main characteristics of conversion.7 
Although he had attained some knowledge of the eternal truth, Augustine had 
been unable to attain full happiness, not only because of the inertial force of his sexual 
habits but also because of his pride. He was complacent about his ascent to eternal truth 
even though it was only limited. Pride shifted his focus from the eternal truth to himself 
but did not extinguish his yearning for the truth. Under the tension between the pull of his 
pride and sexual habits and that of his yearning for the truth, he sought help from 
different sources. At this point, Augustine was no longer struggling between philosophy 
and Christianity. He had understood the contribution and the limitation of the Platonists. 
He had attained certainty about the highest truth, which he had sought ever since reading 
Cicero’s Hortensius. “Of your eternal life I was certain, though I saw it ‘in an enigma and 
as if in a mirror’. All doubt had been taken from me that there is indestructible substance 
from which comes all substances.”8 Although he had only caught sight of a vague image 
of the eternal truth, he did not doubt the truth. “My desire was not to be more certain of 
you (certior de te) but to be more stable in you (stabilior in te).”9 He wanted to be in 
communion in God. The desired relationship with God was not that of a knower and 
known object but an interpersonal relationship with God. He even knew that the way to 
                                                
7 Elizabeth de Mijolla says “Autobiography begins in community, emphasizing less what is singular in a 
life than what a life holds in common with other lives…What is singular, what is Augustine’s in the 
Confessions is his erring life into which he reads Christian meanings.” Augustine wanted to depict the 
communal Christian self in the Confessions. Autobiographical Quests, Augustine, Montaigne, Rousseau, 
and Wordsworth, Univesity Press of Virginia, 1994, p. 1. 
8 Aug. Confs., VIII, i, 1. 
9 Ibid. 
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that relationship was through Jesus Christ. But his pride and attachment to earthly things 
prevented him from following Christ. “I was attracted to the way, the Savior himself, but 
was still reluctant to go along its narrow paths.”10  
As stated in the last chapter, Augustine knew he needed a Mediator, in whom a 
divine and a human nature coexist to bring sinful man to God. But here Augustine knew 
that what was at stake was not merely an intellectual conversion to the knowledge of the 
Mediator or a moral conversion to the Christian way of life. At stake was a total 
reorientation of self to Christ in which he would be obliged to give up all temporal things. 
It was really a narrow path. To be sure, he had already changed a lot during his 
philosophical enquiry. Secular activities were less desirable to him than before. “And 
now that I was not burning with my old ambitions in hope of honor and money it was 
burdensome to me to tolerate so heavy a servitude…But I was still firmly tied by 
woman.”11 He was in the grips not so much of the desire for honor and wealth as by 
carnal lust. If what he needed were only the overcoming of sexual lust, married life might 
have been an option, in which the chain of sexual desires is tolerated for the procreation 
of offspring. However, the issue concerned not only sexual desire but also the attachment 
to temporal things. The option of married life did not serve dedication totally to God. 
“Moreover, there were other matters which were a tiresome distraction to me, but which I 
was compelled to put up with because they go with married life; once tied by that, I was 
restricted.”12  
                                                
10 Aug. Confs., VIII, i, 1. 
11 Ibid., VIII, i, 2. Emphasis added. 
12 Ibid. 
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Here Augustine brought out the essential element of conversion, which is a 
radical return or surrender to God. Conversion calls for a renunciation of worldly goals 
by which one acquires a new identity. The meaning of human existence is a dependence 
upon God. Augustine had to submit to God as defining the ultimate meaning of his life. 
“And now I had discovered the good pearl. To buy it I had to sell all that I had; and I 
hesitated.”13 He was not able to accomplish his goal by his own effort. He read the 
Scripture, consulted Bishop Simplicianus, and prayed. Augustine regarded this yearning 
as resulting from God’s grace. “Your words stuck fast in my heart and on all sides I was 
defended by you…I was attracted to the way, the Savior himself…And you put into my 
heart, and it seemed good in my sight, that I should visit Simplicianus.”14  
After listening to Augustine’s story of wandering and his reading of Platonist’s 
books, Simplicianus knew that Augustine needed to follow the humility of Christ. He 
then told Augustine the story of the conversion of Victorinus whose life and struggle 
before conversion were similar to Augustine’s. Both were rhetoricians and sought 
wisdom by reading philosophical books. The most significant element that they shared 
was their pride. After reading the Holy Scripture and numerous Christian books, 
Victorinus accepted the Christian faith both intellectually and privately. He thought he 
was a Christian already, but Simplicianus replied that he needed to be a member of the 
Church of Christ. Victorinus refused to do so because, fearing the opinion of others, he 
wanted to remain a hidden Christian. Victorinus did not wish to be scorned and mocked 
by influential Romans. The underlying motive was his pride, as he refused to give up his 
                                                
13 Aug. Confs., VIII, i, 2. 
14 Ibid., VIII, i, 1. 
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earthly success. His attachment to temporal things kept him from imitating the humble 
Christ.  
Nevertheless, when he viewed himself not from the perspective of this world but 
in God’s light, he saw another universe and another self. “But after his reading, he began 
to feel a longing and drank in courage. He was afraid he would be ‘denied’ by Christ 
‘before the holy angels’. He would have felt guilty of a grave crime if he were ashamed 
of the mysteries of the humility of your Word and were not ashamed of the sacrilegious 
rites of proud demons, whose pride he imitated when he accepted their ceremonies.”15 He 
became concerned about how Christ would see him instead of the people of this world. 
He was a successful rhetor and teacher in the eyes of the Romans, but a sinner in the eyes 
of Christ. Now he preferred to be a humble servant of God rather than being a well-
thought of master, as “the Lord God was the hope of his servant; ‘he paid no regards to 
vanities and lying follies.’”16 His changed view of himself encouraged him to profess his 
faith publicly, as a gesture of total renunciation of this world. It was a road of no return. 
Renouncing oneself and earthly attachments are signs of humility. God exalts the humble 
and the lowly but puts down the proud. “You [God] have chosen in preference the weak 
things of the world to confound the powerful.”17 That is the principle of salvation.  
At the end of Victorinus’ conversion narrative, Augustine brought Paul up as an 
example of this principle and regarded his struggle as an example of a war of the will 
between two laws, in which Paul bemoaned his miseries. Paul’s was a famous story of 
                                                
15 Aug. Confs., VIII, ii, 4. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., VIII, iv, 9. Cf. 1 Cor. 1: 27-28. 
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conversion. Paul’s conversion meant a dramatic and radical change from being a 
persecutor of the Christian Church to becoming a great apostle to the gentiles. It is not 
surprising that Augustine recognized Paul as the exemplar of conversion. In response to 
these examples, Augustine said,  “Lord, my helper and redeemer, I will now tell the story, 
and confess to your name, of the way in which you delivered me from the chain of sexual 
desire, by which I was tightly bound, and from the slavery of worldly affairs.”18 
Augustine then mentioned another story of conversions in reaction to hearing the 
conversion story of St Antony, another great example of conversion in the Christian 
tradition. St Antony renounced all his possession after listening to the following Word of 
God: “If you want to be perfect, go, sell what you have and give to the poor, and you will 
have treasures in heaven; and come, follow Me.” (Mt 19:21) St Antony radically 
renounced the world for the Kingdom of God, once he was ignited by the power of the 
Word of God. However, the responses of Ponticianus and his colleagues to St Antony’s 
conversion showed that it was not easy to follow Christ if their hearts still clung to 
earthly success. Thus, those different conversion stories shared some common elements, 
namely, humility, radical renunciation of the world, and a turning to God. The story of 
Augustine’s conversion was to become one of the prominent conversion stories in 
Christian tradition. The mercy of God transformed the meaning of his life. Augustine’s 
conversion story portrays the communal religious self, who can find his fulfillment only 
in God. 
                                                
18 Aug. Confs., VIII, v, 12. Emphasis added. 
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In Rousseau’s conversion story, no such tradition or testimonies of different 
converts occurs. The people he associated with in Paris before his moment of inspiration 
were either the lowly or the literary people and nobles. Regardless of their class, they 
lived according to the social customs of their age. Rousseau mentioned a group of people 
he met in Mme la Selle’s restaurant, who had their own norms of behavior. It was a close 
community accepting only a limited membership, and people who were Abbés and 
lawyers were not welcomed. They did not accept strangers and one had to be 
recommended to be a member. In other words, one had to be recognized by the others as 
one who agreed with their maxims. They were driven by their amour-propre and their 
self-interest. Rousseau said, “Decent persons harmed, husbands deceived, women 
seduced, clandestine births were the most common texts there, and the one who best 
peopled the foundling hospital was always the most applauded.”19 The moral associations 
among the nobles were no better than that group of people, either. For instance, M. de 
Francueil had a secret relationship with Mme d’Epinay, about which his wife did not 
know. Moreover, Rousseau’s literary friends, like Diderot, Abbé de Condillac, and 
d’Alembert, were busy with their publications, for the sake of reputation and wealth. In 
sum, Rousseau had no exemplar of any natural goodness of man at that time. The 
inspiration by which he realized the natural goodness of man was an unprecedented 
event, which did not follow any model or exemplar. And so Rousseau claimed at the 
beginning of the Confessions, “I am forming an undertaking which has no precedent.”20 
His existence and history were unique. “I dare to believe that I am not made like any that 
                                                
19 Confessions, p. 289. 
20 Ibid., p. 5. 
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exist. If I am worth no more, at least I am different.”21 There was no imitation connected 
with his particular history except for his own blazing the inner path to the self for his 
readers.  
 
ii. Trees and Weeping 
The trees under which Augustine and Rousseau threw themselves down are full of 
symbolic meanings. The fig tree in Augustine’s conversion scene is a symbol of sin and 
darkness.22 After having examined his heart and seeing all his miseries, Augustine could 
not keep his tears from pouring out. He wanted to face his affliction alone and so he stood 
up and moved a little farther away from Alypius. “I threw myself down somehow under a 
certain fig tree, and let my tears flow freely.”23 Why did he allude to a fig tree? What did 
it mean for him? In his commentary on Nathanael’s encounter with Jesus in the Gospel 
according to St John, Augustine explained the symbolic meaning of the fig tree in detail. 
He recalled the passages where a fig tree was mentioned in the Scripture. “We find the 
fig-tree cursed because it had leaves only, and not fruit. (Matthew 20:19) In the beginning 
of the human race, when Adam and Eve had sinned, they made themselves girdles of fig 
leaves. (Genesis 3:7) Fig leaves then are emblematic of sin. Nathanael then was under the 
fig-tree, as it were, under the shadow of death.”24 In the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus 
condemned the fig tree because it did not bear fruit, and so was a sign of infertility and 
death. The girdles of fig leaves share the same symbolic meaning. For Augustine the fig 
                                                
21 Confessions, p. 5. 
22 The argument in this part is indebted to Andrew McGowan, “Ecstasy and Charity: Augustine with 
Nathanael under the Fig Tree,” Augustinian Studies 27-1 (1996) 27-38.  
23 Aug. Confs., VIII, xii, 28. 
24 Augustine, Tractate on the Gospel of John, 7. 21. 
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tree symbolized the sinful condition of human beings. When Jesus saw Nathanael coming 
toward him, he said to him, “Here is truly an Israelite in whom there is no deceit!” 
Nathanael asked him, “Where did you get to know me?” Jesus answered, “I saw you 
under the fig tree before Philip called you.” (John 1: 47-48)  Jesus saw Nathanael under 
the fig tree before he found Jesus. When Nathanael heard Jesus’ reply, he was compelled 
to confront his miserable condition of living under the shadow of darkness. Thus, fig tree 
in the garden symbolized the miserable condition in which Augustine was living. The 
testimonies of converts heightened his awareness of his miserable condition, but this was 
not the only meaning that Augustine wanted to convey in the conversion scene. 
He wept for his sin and for his helplessness. He was not able to deliver himself 
from the deep abyss of darkness. He prayed, “How long, O Lord? How long, Lord, will 
you be angry to the uttermost? Do not be mindful of our old iniquities.”25 Augustine was 
aware of the bondage of his sin and his need of God’s mercy. Jesus replied to Nathanael 
that he saw him under the fig tree. What does it mean by Him seeing Nathanael? 
Augustine elucidated this event in the Discourse on Psalm 31.  
He was under a fig tree, which symbolized being subject to the condition 
of our flesh. If he was subject to the fleshly condition, being held prisoner 
by the impiety we all inherit by human descent, then he was under that fig 
tree another psalm groans about: Lo, I was conceived in iniquity (Ps 
50:7(51:5)). But he who saw Nathanael there was he who had come to 
bring grace. What does ‘saw him’ mean? He had mercy on him.26  
 
                                                
25 Aug. Confs., VIII, xii, 28. 
26 Augustine, Discourse on the Psalm, 31.2.9. 
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With compassion, God saw him under the fig tree. God had pity on him. Jesus found 
Nathanael before he was looking for Jesus. God has already forgiven sinners before they 
cry for mercy. “God sees you in mercy as he calls you while you are still unworthy.”27  
Under the fig tree, Augustine saw his sins with regret and God saw his sins with 
mercy. This merciful regard touched Augustine’s heart and made him weep with bitter 
agony in his heart. But this weeping is not just a tear for his sin but also a tear of 
repentance. Augustine did not claim credit for his repentance. It is God’s mercy that 
moved him to repent. Augustine commented on the scene in which Jesus looked at Peter 
when he denied Jesus for the third time. “Though each person does penance by the will, 
the will is prepared by the Lord, and this change comes from the right hand of the Most 
High (Ps 77:11), as the sacred psalm sings forth, and because the Lord looked at Peter in 
order that Peter might weep.”28 Augustine’s prayer for God’s forgiveness was enabled by 
God’s grace. He did not repent by his own effort but by God’s mercy. In sum, a fig tree, 
on the one hand, was the sign of sin, but on the other hand, symbolized God’s mercy and 
salvation. Augustine wept for his miserable sinful condition and also on account of God’s 
mercy. In addition, the fig tree became the sign of the threshold between the sinful 
condition of human beings and God’s salvation.  
Rousseau’s inspiration happened under an oak tree along the road to Vincennes. 
As the fig tree in Augustine’s conversion, the oak tree in Rousseau’s inspiration also 
possessed a symbolic meaning. It could connote the oak tree under which the natural man 
in the state of nature satisfied his needs. By the inspiration under the oak tree Rousseau 
                                                
27 Augustine, Sermon, 69. 
28 Augustine, Unfinished Work Against Juliana, Book Four, 4, 126. 
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saw that man is naturally good. Thus the oak tree on the road to Vincennes might be the 
symbol of the natural man. However, the natural man in the state of nature is related to 
the natural man Rousseau saw on the road to visit Diderot, namely, Rousseau himself. 
There are similarities and differences between the natural man in the state of nature and 
the natural man in society. In the Second Discourse, Rousseau saw the natural man in the 
state of nature “sating his hunger beneath an oak, slaking his thirst at the first Stream, 
finding his bed at the foot of the same tree that supplied his meal, and with that his needs 
are satisfied.”29 The natural man is an animal only concerned about physical needs. His 
life is driven by two passions, self-preservation and pity. His reason has yet to be 
developed, because the environment has not yet demanded its development. The natural 
man under the oak tree symbolizes human self-sufficiency. “His desires do not exceed his 
physical needs; the only goods he knows in the Universe are food, a female, and rest, the 
only evils he fears are pain, and hunger.”30 But at the same time, his state of self-
sufficiency also prevents him from developing his reason and acquiring knowledge. Had 
the environment not changed, it would have been hard for the natural man to evolve from 
savageness. Rousseau’s description of the difficulty of acquiring knowledge in the state 
of nature is worth quoting: 
                                                
29 SD, pp. 141-142. 
30 Ibid., p. 150. 
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His imagination depicts nothing to him; his heart asks nothing of him. His 
modest needs are so ready to hand, and he is so far from the degree of 
knowledge necessary to desire to acquire greater knowledge, that he can 
have neither foresight nor curiosity. The spectacle of Nature becomes so 
familiar that he grows indifferent to it. Forever the same order, forever the 
same revolutions; he lacks the wit to wonder at the greatest marvels; and it 
is not to him that one would turn for the Philosophy man needs in order to 
be able for once to observe what he has seen every day. His soul, which 
nothing stirs, yields itself wholly to the sentiment of its present existence, 
with no idea of the future.31 
 
This long quotation shows that the natural man lacks the ability or the conditions 
for acquiring knowledge. The ability of imagination and self-reflection has not yet been 
developed. There is not any sense of the future or foresight, the criterion for evaluating 
daily life is lacking. Remaining in a state of sense knowledge as the idea of things, there 
is no capacity to see oneself from the perspective of self-reflection; in other words, no 
ability to know oneself as an object. Despite the potential of perfectibility, self-
sufficiency and indifference to the environment eliminates every temptation to leave the 
savage stage. Lacking the sufficient conditions, Rousseau cannot conceive how man 
could cross the great gulf from savagery to rationality. The acquisition of metaphysical 
knowledge by a genius in philosophy would be doomed by having nothing to do with the 
daily life of his fellows.32 But the symbolic meaning of the oak tree allows us to 
comprehend what Rousseau learned from the inspiration on the road to Vincennes in light 
of the natural man in the Second Discourse.  
Rousseau introduced readers to a natural man in society under an oak tree. In this 
epoch-making event, unlike the oak tree for the natural man in the state of nature, the oak 
                                                
31 SD, pp. 150-151. 
32 Ibid., p. 152. 
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tree along the road to Vincennes could not satisfy Jean-Jacques’ needs. “The trees on the 
road, always pruned in the fashion of the country, gave almost no shade, and often 
exhausted from the heat and fatigue.”33 The oak trees in society pruned by man were not 
able to satisfy Jean-Jacques’ physical needs; therefore he had to have recourse to other 
resources. He found books. Feeling unpleasant on the road due to the heat, to moderate 
his pace he brought along some books to read. Moreover, besides his physical needs, 
Jean-Jacques, unlike the natural man in the state of nature, had developed his ability to 
reason. His imagination was working so actively that he was capable of reflecting on 
himself and the environment. In other words, Jean-Jacques was denatured. Despite these 
apparent differences, like the natural man in the state of nature, Jean-Jacques was still 
indifferent to the environment at the moment. Before the inspiration on the road to 
Vincennes, Jean-Jacques was following the maxims of the group in Mme la Selle’s 
restaurant. He did not reflect on his life and the environment because he lacked the 
impetus as well as any criterion of judgment. He remained happy to mingle with them 
and to be recognized by them. Having no felt need to reflect on his life and the state of 
his soul, and even though he had became aware of the split between being and 
appearance in his encounter with Zulietta, he neglected to analyze the contradiction. 
Before his inspiration, it was inconceivable that Jean-Jacques might acquire the 
knowledge of the natural goodness of man. But Jean-Jacques, the natural man in society, 
truly attained a revolutionary insight when he read the question proposed by the 
Academy of Dijon.  
                                                
33 Confessions, p. 294. 
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2. Conversion Event 
 
i. Reading of St Paul and Reading of Philosophical Question 
When Augustine saw his miserable condition and threw himself under a fig tree in 
grief, he gave up his own effort to deliver himself from the bondage of sin. He turned to 
God and started a conversation with Him. He first asked God for forgiveness. Augustine 
then heard a voice chanting, “Tolle et lege”. He thought it might have been a song 
chanted by children in a nearby garden. He recalled the conversion story of St Antony, 
who converted to Christ after reading a passage of the Gospel hit upon by chance or 
divine providence. This made him think God was commanding him to read the Scripture 
as St Antony did. So we see how testimonies of converts provided a model for people 
like Augustine to emulate. Augustine went back to the place where he had left the book 
of St Paul’s Letters. He read the first passage which caught his eyes, where St Paul’s 
Letter to Romans,34 having spoken of the struggle between dark and light, exhorted the 
Romans to renounce sensual pleasure and selfishness by putting on Jesus Christ’s armor. 
Augustine, who was not able to renounce his attachment to sexual pleasure and secular 
activities by his own effort, had to humble himself to God and acknowledge Jesus as 
Savior. The Scripture as God’s Word calls man not only to a new way of moral life but 
                                                
34 In Images of Conversion in St. Augustine’s Confessions, Robert O’Connell suggests that Augustine, 
besides verses 13-14 he quoted in the conversion, would have also read verses 11-12: “Besides this, you 
know what time it is, how it is now the moment for you to wake from sleep. For salvation is nearer to us 
now than when we became believers; the night is far gone, the day is near. Let us then lay aside the works 
of darkness and put on the armor of light.” O’Connell comments, “But he [Augustine] tells us quite 
expressly that he read, in silence, not only those two verses but also the capitulum on which his eyes first 
fell, the ‘chapterlet,’ or chapter-subdivision, the sense-unit containing those two verses. Verse 11 mentions 
the urgency of making decision, as salvation is approaching closer to us. Verse 12 exhorts people to 
renounce the works of darkness and put on the armor of light, that is Jesus Christ. It makes the meaning of 
verse14 clearer.   
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also, more importantly, to accept Jesus as the Lord and Savior. This reading goes beyond 
philosophy to a conversation with God. God speaks to man and invites man to respond to 
God’s Word, so that reading Scripture consists of God’s self-revelation and man’s 
response in faith.  
After reading that passage, Augustine accepted God’s command and surrendered 
to Jesus Christ. God became the center of his life and the relation between God and man 
was restored. The meaning of his life now relied totally upon God’s love and forgiveness. 
Augustine no longer lived in the dark because he had chosen the light. “At once, with the 
last words of this sentence, it was as if a light of relief from all anxiety flooded into my 
heart. All the shadows of doubt were dispelled.”35 
Rousseau commented upon his reading of the question set by the Dijon Academy 
for a prize essay as the occasion for his inspiration. “One day I took the Mercury of 
France and while walking and glancing over it I fell upon this question proposed by the 
Academy of Dijon for the prize for the following year: Has the progress of the sciences 
and arts tended to corrupt or purify morals?”36 It is a philosophical question, which 
examines the progress of the sciences and arts in relation to its effect on morals. This 
question recalled the unfinished resolution of Jean-Jacques’ encounter with Zulietta. 
After meeting with Zulietta in her chamber and becoming aware of the contradiction 
between the beauty of man and his miserable condition, Jean-Jacques did not occupy 
himself with this problem, because his attention was still engaged by social activities with 
the noble, literary, and lower class people. It seems that he was unconcerned with the 
                                                
35 Aug. Confs., VIII, xii, 29. Emphasis added. 
36 Confessions, p. 294. 
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contradictions between being and appearance. Even so, Jean-Jacques did acquire some 
knowledge of the split between being and appearance in the past and was generally aware 
of the social cause of evil, but he did not know specifically the reason underlying the 
contradictions yet. Furthermore, he did not associate this issue with daily affairs. Thus he 
lacked the motivation to keep pondering on this problem, until that moment when he 
accidentally took up that magazine and read the question to help him feel better under the 
sun. Had this chance not come, it was not clear how Jean-Jacques would have acquired 
the knowledge of what is natural.  
“At the moment of that reading, I saw another universe and I became another 
man.”37 He added in his Letter to Malesherbes, “If anything has ever resembled a sudden 
inspiration, it is the motion that was caused in me by that reading.”38 Unlike Augustine’s 
reading of the Scripture, it was not a religious inspiration; God played no part in it. With 
feelings stirred up in him, the inspiration opened up another universe to him and he 
became another man. He had an insight into what is natural and he committed himself to 
be a virtuous man and an author. This inspiration yielded something like an intellectual 
conversion and -- in his peculiar terms -- a moral conversion, but not a religious 
conversion. Philosophically, he discerned the natural face of man and the source of evil. 
Morally, he re-orientated his life. The meaning of his life was not defined by God and His 
created order, but by his conception of naturally good self.  
Moreover, how did Jean-Jacques acquire the knowledge of the natural goodness 
of man and the social cause of evil? As mentioned before, Jean-Jacques was already 
                                                
37 Confessions, p. 294. 
38 Mals, 3, p. 575. 
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aware of the split between being and appearance from his experience but he did not know 
the cause yet. When Jean-Jacques got the insight, it was not a necessary logical inference 
from his past experience. It was more like the Eureka experience of Archimedes. Man 
cannot explain how an insight occurs to one, except to say that it comes as the answer to 
a question, accidentally and naturally.39  
The significance of Jean-Jacques’ weeping evoked by the inspiration clearly 
differs from Augustine’s weeping under the fig tree. Augustine wept for his sins and on 
account of God’s mercy. Jean-Jacques wept because he saw the natural goodness of man 
and the social cause of evil, which became for him the key to the reconciliation of all the 
contradictions between man and society. His were the tears of joy.40 When he wept in 
Zulietta’s chamber, he was weeping for all miserable human beings including him, 
because he was not able to reconcile the contradiction between man and society. But the 
inspiration’s insight into the natural face of man and the true source of evil granted a way 
out of the darkness for him to choose a way of light. This sudden illumination stirred his 
emotions and he wept spontaneously without self-consciousness.  
In short, Rousseau’s conversion was a secular conversion that had nothing to do 
with God. It was a sort of intellectual and moral conversion rather than a religious 
conversion. Furthermore, like Augustine’s conversion, it happened accidentally, as Jean-
Jacques did not prepare for it. Despite his past experience of the split between being and 
                                                
39 Jean Guéhenno compared Jean-Jacques’s experience with a religious experience. “However, in every 
life, however humble, there occur moments of inexplicable harmony during which, by some mysterious act 
of grace, we are suddenly aware, if only for one brief instant, of what we are, in relation to the world, in 
relation to heaven, and in relation to God.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. One, 1712-1758, p. 212. 
40 Ibid., p. 215. 
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appearance, Rousseau suggested he would not have gotten this insight, had this chance 
not come. 
 
ii. The Religious Self and The Natural Self 
Augustine’s conversion concluded with a journey towards its telos, God. 
Augustine’s search for wisdom began a new phase after his reading of Cicero’s 
Hortensius and attained certainty about the truth by his reading of the Platonist’s books. 
Transforming him from his materialist notion of truth, to a rational conviction that what 
is real is not the same as bodily existence. However, he was unable to live in accord with 
the truth because his will was chained by his sexual desire and his taste for secular 
success. In his conversion, he responded to God’s Word and put on the armor of the true 
light, Jesus Christ. Renouncing the pleasures of this world for eternal happiness in 
heaven, he became redefined by his faith in God. He was converted from his old self, 
who, bothered by the effects of original and personal sin, was attached to the pursuit of 
secular success and sensual pleasure, to the new self, whose self-understanding depended 
upon God’s mercy and obedience to God’s command. Augustine’s conversion consisted 
of a radical and substantial change of the foundation and orientation towards the goal of 
life. Most importantly, it changed his identity from a corrupt sinner to a beloved child of 
God. The recovery from corruption could only occur because of God’s grace, because 
God forgave him and freed and strengthened his will.  
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In contrast, Rousseau’s conversion was not an irrevocable move from an old self 
to a new self, but the disentanglement and revelation of the natural self. Rousseau said in 
the Second Discourse about the relationship between natural and denatured parts,  
The human soul, altered in the lap of society by a thousand forever 
recurring causes, by the acquisition of a mass of knowledge and errors, by 
the changes that have taken place in the constitution of Bodies, and by the 
continual impact of the passions, has, so to speak, changed in appearance 
to the point of being almost unrecognizable…all one still finds is the 
disfiguring contrast of passion that believes it reasons and the 
understanding that hallucinates.41  
 
This was exactly the situation that Jean-Jacques and his contemporaries were in. The 
historical corruption did not destroy but only disfigured the natural face of man.  
Although Jean-Jacques had been denatured since his childhood, his natural self 
was never destroyed by society. In his childhood, reading novels with his father 
engendered his republican spirit and his romantic notions about human life. The 
awakening of imagination blurred the boundary between reality and the imaginary world. 
Furthermore, being accused in the incident of the broken comb was his first experience of 
injustice. Jean-Jacques felt deliberately accused by M. Lambercier even though the 
minister knew he was innocent. M. Lambercier judged Jean-Jacques only according to 
appearance, and not by the truth--the first account of the split between being and 
appearance. The emergence of the ability to attribute intentions to people in this event 
marked a crucial stage of his denaturation; and this effect of the split between being and 
appearance made an indelible mark on Jean-Jacques when the authoritative, God-like 
figures of adults lost their credibility because they failed to know his heart. The relevant 
                                                
41 SD, p. 129. Emphasis added. 
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symbol Rousseau used to describe his state of soul at that time was the werewolf, a being 
always with mixed natural and denatured characteristics. Nonetheless, the natural self 
would at times be revealed as in his compassion, his ecstatic experience under the starry 
night in Lyon, and the memorable period in the idyllic Les Charmettes with Mme de 
Warens. But his natural self was entangled with the part that was denatured by society. 
The denatured passions and intelligence would prevent him from seeing the reality. In his 
encounter with Zulietta, Jean-Jacques’ images of either the divine beautiful goddess or 
the monster of the outcast of nature and society were not the reality but figments of his 
imagination. At the moment of the inspiration, Jean-Jacques did not undergo a radical 
moral or spiritual change like Augustine,42 but he did become aware of his natural self, 
which was always there within him, and he understood the source of its corruption. This 
new awareness enabled him to see the reality and re-orientate his life to amour de soi 
away from following artificial passions. But he was still mixed with natural and 
denatured parts. Natural passions and love of virtue already existed within his heart 
before his conversion. In his “conversion,” it was not the telos but the origin that became 
the touchstone for the meaning of his self. 
In the above comparison, I have demonstrated the different notions of the self 
expressed in the two conversion accounts. Augustine delineated the model of the 
Christian self, whose existence and meaning depends totally upon God. In contrast, 
                                                
42 Norman Wilde says that Rousseau did not undergo any great moral change in the conversion. His moral 
point of view was already formed since young. “In character, too, there was change. Not, it is true, a putting 
off of the old man and his deeds, but a growth in seriousness and steadiness of purpose.” “On the 
Conversion of Rousseau,” International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 26, no. 1, (Oct., 1915), p. 70. Wilde did not 
mention the relationship between natural and denatured and he also overemphasizes the sentimental side of 
Rousseau. 
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Rousseau portrayed the natural man in society, who acquired insight into his self 
accidentally and naturally. For him the meaning of his self depends solely upon its 
relationship with himself. Furthermore, Augustine also presented his path to salvation for 
the readers that he learned from the testimonies of other converts, whereas Rousseau 
presented his conversion as unprecedented and unique. Now we turn to another central 
theme of conversion. 
 
3. The Source of Evil 
 
i. Divided Will: The Legacy of Original Sin 
The battle in his mind between two forces is the crucial episode in which 
Augustine discussed the nature and the source of evil. What was going on in his mind? 
Augustine used to struggle with external influences--parents, teachers and friends-
-that led him to sin, so they should be responsible for his sins. Later on in Milan, the 
inner conflict shifted from those external factors to his mind as the battlefield where his 
will to serve God wrestled with the habit of passion. How are sinful habits formed?  On 
the etiology of vice and sin Augustine wrote, “The consequence of a distorted will is 
passion. By servitude to passion, the habit is formed, and the habit to which there is no 
resistance, becomes necessity.”43 The disoriented desires led Augustine towards sexual 
objects that aroused his passion. Pursuing his disordered sexual passion for many times 
thus formed a habit. Therefore, neither the family nor the society but the distorted will is 
                                                
43 Aug. Confs., VIII, v, 10. 
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the source of the passion and the sexual habit. However, what distorts the will? If 
external factors cannot be blamed, what is accountable for the evil act?  
Augustine said that he was responsible for the evil act because he had consented 
to the will’s disoriented desire. “But I was responsible for the fact that habit had become 
so embattled against me; for it was me with my consent that I came to the place in which 
I did not wish to be. Who has the right to object if a sinner incurs a just penalty?”44 
Augustine clearly stated that he had decided to pursue created things instead of God; 
therefore, he had to undergo a just punishment. Why then did Augustine will what he 
knew to be bad? If one should only will what he thinks is good, why did he consent to do 
what he knew was bad? 
Augustine, the first one to formally articulate the freedom of the will, asserts that 
for an action to be voluntary, three conditions must be present: namely, knowledge of 
good, objectively possible alternatives among which to choose, and free consent.45 First, 
man has to be capable of knowing what is good either for him or for others. Otherwise he 
will not be able to deliberate about what it means to choose to attain the good. Second, 
there must be alternatives so that one can choose either this or that object; or either to 
perform this act or not. Third, one has the freedom to consent either to this object (or 
course of action) or another specified by one’s deliberation. Finally, one freely wills to 
act out one’s choice with consent. The first engages the intellect; the second considers the 
circumstances; and the third involves the will. 
                                                
44 Aug. Confs., VIII, v, 10. 
45 William Babcock, according to Augustine’s thought, makes a good analysis of an act of a moral agent 
and traces back to the cause of sin and evil. He, however, thinks Augustine has not yet solved the issue of 
the cause of evil. Babcock, William S., “Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency,” The Journal of Religious 
Ethics, vol. 16, no. 1, Spring 1988. 
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Furthermore, there are two subtle aspects of freedom in the third condition of 
human act: (1) the freedom of the human will to choose either good or bad; and (2) the 
power to maintain the will of the good. The selection of alternatives suggests the free will 
of choice (liberum uoluntatis arbitrium). After deliberation, the intellect suggests the 
option for good to the will. However, the free will does not necessarily opt for the 
suggested good, but may turn to other choices. Augustine said the will requires the power 
to continue the will to good, and this power he called liberty (libertas). Man is at liberty 
to will what he thinks is good, and is able to exercise a certain control over what he does.  
God, then, in the beginning had given man a good will; he had made him 
in it, for He had made him right. He had given him an aid, without which 
he could not continue in it, if he willed; but the will itself to continue was 
left to man’s free choice. He could therefore continue, if he willed, 
because the aid was not lacking by which he could, and without which he 
could not, perseveringly hold on to the good that he willed.46  
 
The freedom of choice and liberty are the underlying principles of the act of a 
moral agent.47 In the human act, the moral agent deliberates about the objects of love, and 
one is free to opt for what one thinks is good among the alternatives; and with liberty one 
is also able to maintain the option for the outcome of one’s deliberation and selection. 
Otherwise the act is not considered as voluntary and does not deserve a punishment if it is 
bad.  
Augustine’s analysis of human act is different from the view of human act often 
ascribed to Socrates, who is supposed to have asserted that man only wills what reason 
                                                
46 Augustine, Admonition and Grace, 11, 32. 
47 Gilson, Etienne, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans L. E. M. Lynch, Random House, 
1960, p. 157. Gilson makes a clear exposition of the distinction between freedom of choice (liberum 
uoluntatis arbitrium) and the ability to persevere the good will (libertas). Augustine illustrated the concept 
of libertas in Free Will, Book II, Chapter 13-14. 
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judges good. Socrates responded to the question why man is overcome by the desire of 
food or drink or sex and though man recognizes them as evil in Protagoras.48 Socrates 
said if pleasure and pain is the criterion of good and evil act, then the act that results in 
greater pleasure is good. It is not if otherwise. Thus it is nonsense that “for a man to do 
evil, knowing it is evil [that results in less pleasure or greater pain] that he ought not to do 
it, because he is overcome by good [pleasure of eating or having sex].”49 Accordingly, 
man measures the extent of the pleasures and pains of the act and the consequence before 
making the decision. No one wills what deliberation judges evil. Knowledge of the 
measurement is the decisive element of human moral act. “When people make a wrong 
choice of pleasures and pains, --that is good and evil--the cause of their mistake is lack of 
knowledge.”50 Knowledge with certitude plays an important role in human act; therefore 
a man is inculpable of his wrongdoings if he lacks the knowledge of good. Accordingly, 
Socrates denied the possibility of the weakness of will.  
In contrast, despite the influence of the Platonists, Augustine emphasized free will 
and the power of the habits that weakens the will. The focus is no longer on knowledge of 
good or alternative choices but the ability to will what one knows is good. In his treatise 
On Two Souls Against the Manichees, Augustine said that the will is “an uncompelled 
movement of mind either to acquire or to avoid losing some object,”51 so that while the 
will is characterized by the freedom to choose, it does not necessarily choose the right 
thing. For the will to make the right choice that reason presents, it will also need the 
                                                
48 Plato, Protagoras, 353c-357e 
49 Ibid., 355d. 
50 Ibid., 357d. 
51 Augustine, On Two Souls Against the Manichees, 10, 14. (Emphasis added) It is quoted and translated by 
William Babcock in his article, “Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency,” p. 37. 
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ability to will efficaciously.52 Otherwise, he sins when he does not will the good specified 
by reason. From this perspective, sin is the “will either to keep or to obtain something 
that justice forbids when there is freedom to abstain.”53 The freedom to abstain means the 
ability to refrain from following evil. “However, what will be more free (in the sense of 
libertas) than the free will (liberum arbitrium), when it shall have no power to serve 
sin?”54 Man is free to choose (liberum arbitrium) the good presented by reason and he is 
also free (libertas) to consent to abstain from the evil. Thus if man acquired the 
knowledge of good, but is weighed down by the bad habit and opts for what he knows is 
bad, he is responsible for his sin. Although Augustine felt that his will was forced by 
sexual habit to choose what he knows is bad, he consented to it due to moral impotence. 
He lacked effective liberty. Therefore, his free consent to the object of the bad habit made 
the act voluntary, and so he was accountable for the act. 
In his personal experience, Augustine regarded his habitual lustfulness as another 
will in his mind. Thus, there were two wills within his mind that led him to different 
objects of love: one that followed the mind’s command and the other of his passions. 
Augustine did not excuse himself from blame and punishment because he consented to 
the necessity connected with habitual desires that compelled him to love the earthly 
goods instead of God. The sexual habit became greater over time, but before the 
formation of the habit, Augustine was more effectively freer to decide in accord with the 
good.  Once the bad habit was formed, he lost this effective freedom to resist so that the 
                                                
52 Augustine, On Grace and Free Will, 15, 31. 
53 Augustine, On Two Souls Against the Manichees, 11,15. Cited by Babcock, p. 37. (Emphasis added) 
54 Augustine, Admonition and Grace, 11, 32. 
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bad habit became dominant. In his fallen state he could not deliver himself from the 
slavery of sin. But what makes the will distorted?  
Ambrose’s sermon and the story of the conversion of Victorinus, already 
convinced Augustine to abandon earthly pleasure to serve God. Rather than willing to 
serve God, he was morally impotent, due to the effect of bad habit upon his antecedent 
willingness. He had no doubt that the bad habits were a product of his free consent, so 
that he himself was responsible. St Paul’s writings shed light on his personal experience. 
“In vain I ‘delighted in your law in respect of the inward man; but another law in my 
members fought against the law of my mind and led me captive in the law of sin which 
was in my members (Rom 7:22).’ The law of sin is the violence of habit by which even 
the unwilling mind is dragged down and held, as it deserves to be, since by its own choice 
it slipped into the habit.”55 Thus, the division of the will.  
At times, the power to act is identical with the will, as Augustine realized in the 
situation when the mind is commanding the limbs or members of the body. It is not 
always the case that the mind commands itself efficaciously. The mind may command 
itself to will the good; the will may not follow through. What has happened then? 
Augustine asserted that the mind has become determined by disordered desires chosen in 
the past. If the will is conditioned in this way, then its command is not wholehearted, and 
it loses the power to execute the command. When such an interior division exists, the 
good will is morally impotent. Wishing to serve God, he was drawn by force of bad habit 
towards earthly pleasure, and so torn between two wills. “So there are two wills. Neither 
                                                
55 Aug. Confs., VIII, v, 12. Emphasis added. 
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of them is complete, and what is present in the one is lacking to the other.”56 Augustine 
then exclaimed, “It was I. I was neither wholly willing nor wholly unwilling. So I was in 
conflict with myself and was dissociated from myself.”57 There were not two faculties of 
the will, his will was torn between two objects of love, either to serve God or to enjoy the 
sexual pleasure. He willed the good and but also he willed the bad. His heart became the 
battlefield of two forces, both belonging to him. Therefore he sinned when his good will, 
perverted by sexual habit, consented to the earthly pleasure.  
In light of St Paul’s letters, Augustine discovered that he was not struggling 
against external forces, such as the pressure of unfriendly friendship or the sweetness of 
honor and praises. The power of the external forces was the result of inner corruption. 
The evil already existed in his heart. The law of sin was in his body, and the weight of 
habit carried in the members of his body resulted from the perverse will. This conflict 
between good and evil forces in his heart might easily have led Augustine to Manichean 
dualism, but he had already rejected the Manichean view concerning the war between 
good and evil in the human soul. There is no war between good and evil substances 
invading him. The internal conflict arises when one has to choose among mutually 
incompatible wills, which can be either good or evil,58 because conflict between two 
forces in the heart is not necessarily a war between good and evil. Then what is the nature 
of the conflict in Augustine’s mind leading up to his conversion?  
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If one returns to Augustine’s analysis of the hierarchy of being, one recalls that 
every being should act according to the measure and the species of its being; and so, for 
instance, as a rational being, man should contemplate God, the eternal truth rather than 
indulge in disordered sexual pleasure. In fact, Augustine insisted that both contemplation 
of God and enjoying sexual pleasure are good, but to prefer sexual pleasure at the 
expense of contemplation of God is evil. Not the object of love itself that is bad or sinful 
but willing in a disordered way by not choosing according to the order of being makes the 
act sinful. It is clear that Augustine said that he willed both the good and the bad. What 
made him choose the lower order of being? Was he the source of the evil will? 
Following St Paul, Augustine wrote, “yet this was not a manifestation of the 
nature of an alien mind but the punishment suffered in my own mind, And so it was ‘not 
I’ that brought this about ‘but sin which dwelt in me’ (Rom 7:17, 20), sin resulting from 
the punishment of a more freely chosen sin, because I was a son of Adam.”59 Augustine’s 
notion of original sin was in response to the problem of the cause of evil. He now realized 
that the weight of the sexual habit was in part the punishment of original sin in the 
concupiscence or the darkening of the intellect and the weakening of the will; this 
impeded him from willing the good. The sin, which dwelt in him, originated not only 
from his personal sin but also from the sin inherited from Adam. This inherited 
disposition had disoriented his will since his birth, the results of which he observed in his 
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will to evil by appealing to the mystery of freedom. 
 202 
behavior as an infant. Inasmuch as he was already born with a distorted will in the sinful 
world, the probability was high that he would follow passions like pride and shame, 
which habitually disposed him to sin. Due to the will’s being “cursed in on himself” 
Augustine was not free to will the good virtually since birth and he could not persevere in 
willing to carry out what he knew as good.  
Augustine explained the consequence of Adam’s sin in his later work, “At 
present, however, it is a punishment of sin on those to whom this aid [perseverance of the 
good will] is lacking.”60 Only Adam could make the free choice of passions. Adam was 
free to choose good or evil but he lacked the ability of persevering the good will.  
But for perseverance in it he [Adam] did need the aid of a grace, without 
which he was powerless to persevere. He had received the power to 
persevere, if he willed, but he had not the will to use his power of 
perseverance…and the fact that he did not will goes back to his free 
choice, which at the time was free in the sense that he could will either 
good or evil.61  
 
Although Adam could get the grace of perseverance of the good will if he willed to ask 
for it, Adam did not do so and thus he fell into the temptation. “The fact that he did not 
will to continue was certainly his own fault; as it would have been his own merit, if he 
had willed to continue.”62 The consequence of Adam’s sin was the disobedience to the 
good will due to concupiscence. Every descendent of Adam inherits a will distorted by 
disordered desires (concupiscence) at birth. Man is born in a fallen state in which he is 
not liable to will to do good and also lacks the capacity consistently to carry out what he 
thinks is good. The distorted will is punishment for Adam’s sin from which no human 
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61 Ibid., Emphasis added. 
62 Ibid. 
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beings can escape. Augustine wrote that “Actually, the effect of this grace of God in us is 
that, in recovering and holding on to good, we not only are able to do what we will, but 
we also will to do what we are able to do.”63 Augustine in Confessions finally discovered 
the true source of his moral impotence, in light of the saving grace that makes one once 
again able not to sin or also to sin again. 
Thus, Augustine traced the source of the evil will back to original sin. Because of 
original sin, Augustine inherited a sinful disposition to evil and was ignorant of God’s 
goodness. The inherited antecedent bondage of sin was manifested in the pre-conscious 
sinful disposition of an infant and the distorted will in the adult Augustine’s mind. Thus 
he replaced God with other creatures and himself as objects of his love. The source of sin 
is not only pride and shame and sexual habit, but at their root the distorted will. Although 
Augustine was created good like every other human being, so, too, was he sinful and his 
heart corrupted since the first moment of his existence in the world. As nature was 
created good and ordered well by God, Augustine was not naturally evil, but 
ontologically and naturally good. However, as a historical man his existence was sinful 
and corrupt. In other words, there is no one who was not born in a fallen state. That is 
why man is so familiar with evil and not accustomed to good.64  
 
ii. The Need of Grace and Its Means 
According to Augustine’s interpretation of the Word of God in the Scripture, 
based on his own experience, every man born suffers from the effects of the first sin of 
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Adam. Throughout Augustine’s life journey to God, human intelligence as shaped, for 
example, by Cicero’s Hortensius, Aristotle’s Categories, and Platonist’s books, could 
help him see the goal, but it did not enable him to reach it. The law of sin, which 
paralyzed his good will, imprisoned him. Man is bound by the anterior bondage of sin 
from which he cannot save himself. “We have been justly handed over to the ancient 
sinner, the president of death, who has persuaded us to conform our will to his will which 
‘did not remain in your truth’ (John 8:44).”65 Only God’s grace mediated through the 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ can deliver man from this valley of tears. Man’s 
humble confessions of praise, of faith, and of sin “leads him to the home of bliss, not 
merely as an end to be perceived but as a realm to live in.”66 God calls man to be good 
but alone one is not able to attain the goodness. He has to pray to God for the ability to 
accomplish the willingness. Augustine prayed, “You command continence; grant what 
you command, and command what you will.”67  
Although operative grace was the agent of his conversion, his free will had to 
cooperate with God’s grace. In Augustine’s conversion, God manifested his saving grace 
through different concrete means such as the vision of Lady Chastity and the Holy 
Scripture, inviting Augustine to choose the good. And later he confirmed his conversion 
through the sacrament of baptism by the Church minister. In the garden in Milan, the 
vision of Lady Chastity enhanced the delight of the good to him; the Holy Scripture 
mediated the revelation of the Word of God; Bishop Ambrose of Milan baptized him in 
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the cathedral in Milan. Inasmuch as one is ignorant of the truth, one needs the teaching of 
the Church. In Augustine’s case, Ambrose’s sermons were essential for him to 
understand the Word of God. Until Ambrose’s teaching, Augustine had not received the 
light of the Truth. If the sacrament of baptism is an indispensable threshold of the life of 
grace, the institutional Church is also the ordinary means of human salvation, where 
scripture is preached and sacraments administered. Augustine solved the problem of 
theodicy by proposing that evil is a privation of good and the source of evil is the mystery 
of free will which influenced by the first sin of Adam.  
 
iii. Divided soul: The Social Cause of Evil 
Rousseau shifted the discussion of the nature of evil from onto-theological 
speculation to a philosophical, socio-political issue. In other words, he abandoned 
theodicy for anthropodicy. In the experience of inspiration, he grasped that “man is 
naturally good and that it is from these institutions alone that men become wicked.” 
Rousseau did not explain the social cause of evil after the inspiration. However, his 
calumniation of Marion is a good example to compare with Augustine’s divided will in 
the struggle against the bondage of sin.  
In the sudden inspiration, another universe dawned upon Jean-Jacques in which 
man is naturally good, and that man became wicked was from society’s institutions alone. 
In terms of this new universe Jean-Jacques could reconcile the division between the 
natural beauty of Zulietta and her miserable social condition. Zulietta was neither a 
goddess nor a monster but a naturally good person. Social institutions debased her to 
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become a prostitute. Rousseau asked as a young boy in Book One, “How could I have 
become wicked, since under my eyes I had only examples of gentleness, and around me 
only the best people in the world?” The social cause of evil explained why a good person 
became wicked in the society. Rousseau thought that the insight occasioned by 
inspiration explained the source of evil better than the doctrine of original sin. 
Archbishop Beaumont followed the Augustinian teaching when he stated in his 
pastoral letter that the Holy Scripture and Church doctrine disclosed the mystery of man’s 
heart, where the desire to live in accord with truth struggles against the penchant to vice 
by the doctrine of original sin. Because of the deplorable fall of our first father, man is 
subject to disordered inclination. Man needs God’s grace and the Church teaching of 
Scripture and celebration of the sacraments, in order to be a good man and a good 
citizen.68 The conversion experience of Augustine recounted in his Confessions confirms 
this doctrine. 
However, Rousseau countered that the doctrine of original sin is not a sufficient 
answer to the problem of theodicy. If God were good and the body was created good, 
then why does He allow man to be dragged by his sexual desire? Why does He put man 
into this situation? According to Augustine’s interpretation of the Genesis, one of the 
consequences of the first sin of Adam is the disobedience of God’s commandment for the 
sake of concupiscence. Via the mouth of the Vicar of Savoyard Rousseau said that 
although it is true that the bodily passions lead man to act against the general order of 
nature, for as long as man makes good use of his freedom, the temptations to disorder 
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actually witness virtue.69 However, Augustine’s personal experience in Confessions 
seems to demonstrate that man was born with sinful inclinations, which compromised his 
effective freedom. The consequence of the original sin is the distorted will rendering man 
unable to choose the good freely. Like the Pelagian heretics, Rousseau claimed that any 
unavoidable act is not sinful. Therefore it is unfair of God to impute moral responsibility 
to a person who is compelled to sin due to original sin. The Savoyard Vicar objected to 
the doctrine of Original Sin that “it is doubtless no longer in their [men’s] power not to be 
wicked and weak; but not becoming so was in their power.”70 Furthermore, the doctrine 
of original sin fails to explain the source of evil. Why did Adam sin? Rousseau criticized 
the doctrine of original sin because it explains everything except its own principle, which 
itself has to be explained. Rousseau claimed that his explanation in terms of natural 
goodness and the social cause of evil is a better account of how man falls into the hands 
of devil. We are going to examine the incident of calumniation of Marion to concretize 
Rousseau’s new insight on the occasion of his inspiration. 
 
iv. Weakness and Wickedness 
The incident took place in Mme de Vercellis’ house. Jean-Jacques’ relationships 
with the other people there set the social and psychological conditions for his false 
accusation of Marion. First, his relationship with Mme de Vercellis caused a separation 
of his inner being from his appearance. The social convention at that time demanded 
people to observe the custom in which there was no room for personal feelings and for 
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ideas to play a role. Duties and virtues took priority over personal interests. Mme de 
Vercellis was an extraordinarily strong and virtuous woman but she related to others with 
a cold manner. “That strength of character sometimes went to the point of coldness. She 
[Mme de Vercellis] always appeared to me as little sensitive to others as to herself, and 
when she did good for the unfortunate, it was to do what was good in itself rather than 
out of a genuine commiseration.”71  
Jean-Jacques was hired as a lackey in Mme de Vercellis’ house and he expected 
to earn a decent fortune there.72 He was assigned to take down what Mme de Vercellis 
dictated to him. Since Mme de Vercellis was a noble and virtuous woman who was 
philanthropic, Rousseau expected that she would naturally show affection to him. 
However, it did not turn out as he expected. At first, Mme de Vercellis did show her 
interest in him and asked him about his letters to Mme de Warens in which Jean-Jacques 
expressed his feelings. But as a virtuous woman she did not show her emotions or 
affection after reading the letters, following the social convention at that time. People 
were to act and speak according to their social role; their inner self or feelings did not 
count in the social relation. There was to be no mutual sharing of ideas and feelings 
among different social classes. By following the social convention at that time, Mme de 
Vercellis’ cold manners prevented Rousseau from expressing his feelings to her as well. 
Thus, he replied to her in a low and timid voice, which bored Mme de Vercellis. She lost 
all interest in conversing with him and only talked to him about business. “She judged me 
less upon what I was than upon what she had made me, and as a result of seeing nothing 
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but a lackey in me, she prevented me from appearing as anything else to her.”73 He 
became reserved and timid in her house and behaved as nothing more than a lackey. 
Rousseau was convinced that the social order at that time in France produced only 
hypocrites who appeared virtuous to others but veiled their real personal feelings and 
self-interests.   
Moreover, Jean-Jacques believed that he was not being put in the right position in 
Mme de Vercellis’ house. He was talented and deserved more. Jean-Jacques’ 
performance threatened the interests of the head of household, M. Lorenzy and his wife. 
They were afraid that they might receive fewer bequests if Mme de Vercellis appreciated 
Jean-Jacques more. They kept Jean-Jacques from the eyes of Mme de Vercellis so she 
would forget about him when she wrote her will. When Mme de Vercellis died, Jean-
Jacques got only thirty livres and the new suit he had on. He inherited less than other 
servants. Rousseau thought that this was the result of a plot of the jealous Lorenzy; 
otherwise he would have got more. Working at the same place, it was inevitable that 
Jean-Jacques’s interests were in conflict with those of the other servants. He, as a weak 
and powerless lackey, was not able to compete with the head of household. Doomed to 
lose the game, Jean-Jacques, proud of his talent and jealous of his colleagues, was 
disappointed in the result. This feeling of frustration and injustice weakened his will to 
resist temptation. 
During the dissolution of the household after the death of Mme de Vercellis, 
many things were mislaid and this situation tempted Jean-Jacques, who took an old pink 
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and silver colored ribbon from Mlle Pontal. Later on, Mlle Pontal realized that the ribbon 
was missing and found it on Jean-Jacques. During the interrogation, Jean-Jacques 
struggled over whether to confess his crime or to insist on his innocence. “I faltered, I 
stammered, and finally, blushing, I said that it was Marion who gave it to me.”74 Having 
chosen the latter, he calumniated Marion, a servant in the house, as the thief. When M. 
and Mme Lorenzy called Marion to verify Jean-Jacques’ accusation, she denied she had 
done it, but Jean-Jacques insisted that Marion gave him the ribbon. Because the truth was 
unable to be verified, both were dismissed from service. For Rousseau this episode 
showed that the social environment and psychological state of man play a decisive role in 
human wrongdoings. To put it another way, man’s naturally good will was weakened by 
the social environment and by his psychological state of mind, and so one was unable to 
choose good as he otherwise would have chosen to do.  
Jean-Jacques committed two faults in this case: he stole the ribbon and he lied and 
calumniated Marion. The need for friendship motivated the first fault. “When I accused 
that unfortunate girl, it is bizarre but true that my friendship for her was the cause.”75 He 
wanted to give the ribbon to Marion since he liked her and would like to become her 
friend. With this in mind, the mislaid ribbon became a temptation to him. Thus he acted 
immorally out of a good motivation by violating the right of property. However, Jean-
Jacques might not have thought that it was a theft in the first place, since he believed that 
he was being mistreated in Mme de Vercellis’ bequest, in his mind, he just took what he 
deserved. He did not count it as theft, which is why he did not even try to hide it. In his 
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first fault, he was fooled by his imagination into subjectively thinking that it was not 
wrong to take the ribbon to give to Marion. The readers are supposed to understand the 
social and psychological factors that put Rousseau in an unexpected situation in which he 
felt compelled to do the second fault.  
In addition, three more factors of denaturation influenced him to commit the fault. 
First, he had learned from the experience of being falsely accused by M. Lambercier and 
the principle of judgment in Mme de Vercellis’ house: namely, one cannot know the 
inner self of others and man only judges by appearance, Rousseau manipulated both the 
discrepancy between the inner self and its appearance and the limitations of human 
reasoning to his advantage. He insisted on making an occasion that could not be 
adequately verified by the limited evidence.  
The second factor was that the end motivated by good feeling was implemented 
by bad means. He wanted to give the ribbon to Marion for the sake of friendship, which 
is a good feeling. Just as the journeyman who asked him to steal the asparagus for 
friendship had misled him, he was also misled by his imaginations persuading him that 
his talent deserved to have a higher place and to have received more from Mme de 
Vercellis’ bequest. Due to the badly directed good feeling, he took the ribbon. 
Finally, the bad judgment made under the influence of the badly directed feeling 
put Jean-Jacques in a situation that conflicted with Marion’s interest. In this situation, if 
Jean-Jacques were willing to accept the consequences of his public confession of 
wrongdoing, he would lose his public esteem and be shamed. If not, he had to find a 
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scapegoat or a victim. He acted on behalf of his public regard, the object of amour-
propre, at the expense of Marion’s reputation and her job.  
Shame was the artificial passion that was the key to his calumny of Marion. When 
the ribbon was found at his place, he knew he had committed a crime. In that unexpected 
situation, he was caught up in the double feeling of shame: he was ashamed of his private 
self, who stole the ribbon; at the same time, since he had been summoned to account 
amidst his colleagues, he was also ashamed of exposing his private self, which would 
ruin the esteem of his public self in the house. The latter shame compelled him to put on 
his innocent appearance, and to commit the second fault of lying and calumniating 
Marion. At the moment of the false accusation of Marion, even though he was willing to 
confess his fault to Comte de la Roque personally in private, fear of losing public esteem 
compelled him to insist on the false accusation. Shame kept Jean-Jacques’ will from 
choosing the good.  
Rousseau’s account emphasized the impact of shame in the decision-making 
process and on the movement of his soul. During the process, Jean-Jacques was fully 
aware that he could choose either to confess publicly or to calumniate Marion. His inner 
self urged him to confess to Comte de la Roque. “If they had allowed me to return to 
myself, I would have infallibly declared everything. If M. de la Roque had taken me 
aside, if he had said to me, ‘Don’t ruin this poor girl, if you are guilty admit it to me. I 
would have thrown myself at his feet instantly.’”76 Although he was free to choose, he 
lacked the liberty (in Augustine’s sense of efficacious freedom) to do what he thought 
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was right and what his inner self really intended to do. His fear of shame did not give him 
the freedom to admit his fault. “I fear only the shame; but I feared it more than death, 
more than crime, more than everything in the world…invincible shame outweighed 
everything, shame alone caused my impudence.”77  
Augustine felt a similar struggle during the period leading up to his conversion. 
He wanted to opt for God but his will at the same time was way laid by his sexual habit. 
Augustine’s will was so weak that he could only sigh for his miserable weakness of will 
and begged for God’s grace. Although he did not intend to continue in sin, his will 
consented to doing so. He was guilty of his sin and deserved punishment. He discovered 
that his perverse will was due to the first sin of Adam. While Jean-Jacques was struggling 
in the presence of Marion, his master and colleagues, he was overwhelmed by the fear of 
shame. The fear of shame came from his amour-propre. His public value was the highest 
good at that moment, and thus he was afraid of shame more than death. In other words, 
the value of his life was built upon the public opinion of others. He did not have the 
liberty to follow his heart in this situation. In sum, Jean-Jacques was naturally good but 
the social relations and the consequent psychological state of mind that weakened him 
became the source of his wickedness.  
In the account of the first confession of his fault, Rousseau first stated the remorse 
of his conscience for this fault before telling the story to the readers. After emphasizing 
the reproach of his conscience over the years when he wrote the Confessions, he then 
turned to the explanation of the cause of his fault. He claimed that his heart was pure and 
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did not depart from nature. “Never has wickedness been farther from me than in that 
cruel moment.”78 The readers would be confused if they believed that Rousseau wanted 
to excuse himself from the responsibility of his fault. In fact, Rousseau did not intend to 
excuse himself from blame but wanted to explain why and how he did wrong. In other 
words, his fault was explainable but not excusable. He lied and calumniated Marion 
because his will was weak and not free. Like Augustine and other sinners, Jean-Jacques 
did what he did not want to do. He did it with his consent and he was blameworthy. The 
remorse of his conscience made evident that his false accusation of Marion was wrong 
and so his heart reproached him for years. His false accusation of Marion was different 
from his theft in M. Ducommun’s house, which he regarded only as an act of mischief. 
Rousseau’s heart was not filled with remorse for his theft of the asparagus or apple. He 
was unjustly treated at M. Ducommun’s, so he needed to satisfy his natural needs by 
means of stealing. He was deprived of his basic needs for food and freedom in his 
master’s house. His act should not be counted as a theft. He just took what he naturally 
needed. Taking things without asking for its owner’s permission inevitably did physical 
harm to its owner. But Jean-Jacques did not take it because of his artificial passions but 
his natural passion, self-preservation. In contrast, his stealing the ribbon and lying in 
Mme de Vercelli’s house were real faults. He intentionally did harm to Marion. Rousseau 
admitted his fault and his responsibility. He regretted that he put Marion in disgrace and 
misery.  
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Moreover, he wanted to explain the source of evil by elucidating the cause of his 
behavior. For Augustine, man is weak largely because of being sinful by inheritance. 
Man’s sinfulness was contracted from the original sin of Adam. Rousseau was not 
satisfied with this answer because the doctrine of original sin could only explain the 
sinfulness of the already corrupted man, but not the true origin of Adam’s sinfulness. 
Rousseau asserted that shame played a significant role in his false accusation of Marion 
and the source of his fear of shame could be explained.  
Man commits wrongs not because of his corrupt will but because of his artificial 
passions, which were engendered by his social relations. In other words, the social 
relationships are the source of amour-propre. Jean-Jacques’ passions of pride and vanity 
could be traced back to his reading of novels. His fear of shame was formed when he was 
living with M. and Mlle Lambercier. He said, “To be loved by everyone who approached 
me was my keenest desire…everything nourished the inclination which my heart 
received from nature. I knew nothing as charming as to see the whole world content with 
me and with everything.”79 This echoed the genesis of amour-propre in the Second 
Discourse’s state of nature. When the natural men and women sang and danced together 
in front of the huts or around a big tree, “everyone began to look at everyone else and to 
wish to be looked at himself, and public esteem acquired a value…and this was the first 
step at once toward inequality and vice: from these first preferences arose vanity and 
contempt on the one hand, shame and envy on the other.”80 At the beginning of his social 
relationships, Jean-Jacques was very sensitive to other people’s opinions of him. The 
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yearning for love made him acutely sensitive to shame. Disappointment with some 
significant people in his life enhanced his feeling of shame. Jean-Jacques feared failure in 
public less than disappointing his beloved Mlle Lambercier. “For although little sensitive 
to praise I was always very much so to shame.”81 When Jean-Jacques was working in 
Mme de Vercellis’ house, he was no longer innocent but was susceptible to pride and 
shame. It was not surprising that shame played the major part in his false accusation of 
Marion.  
Rousseau’s explanation of the cause of his false accusation of Marion 
demonstrated to his readers the source of evil, what makes man does harm to others. 
Rousseau showed that human wickedness comes from the weakness of the will caused by 
shame.  Furthermore, he assured the readers that he was not wicked by nature or at birth. 
Augustine’s self-portrait depicted an innate sinner who was corrupted by original sin at 
birth. On the contrary, Rousseau’s self-portrait delineated a naturally good man who 
became wicked because of his weakness of will. Social institutions misdirect human self-
love, which becomes the source of their weakness. In his false accusation of Marion, 
Rousseau showed that although he did morally bad deeds, he was not basically wicked 
and he remained naturally good. He was a being with natural goodness mixed with 
denatured passions and intelligence. The idea of natural goodness and moral goodness are 
the key ideas in Rousseau’s thought. How can he reconcile them? We are going to 
examine them and see his change after his conversion in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX THE GOOD MAN AND GOOD LIFE AFTER 
CONVERSION 
 
I have demonstrated the different opinions of Augustine and Rousseau in the 
accounts of infant sinfulness or innocence; the motivation of theft; the approaches to the 
truth; the nature and source of evil; the conditions of conversion; and the answer to the 
problem of evil. Those chapters show their different answers to the source of evil and the 
understanding of human nature. Although God created man to be good, Augustine, by 
appealing to the doctrine of Original Sin, claimed that man inherited the punishment of 
Adam’s first sin by birth. Thus improper ends distorted man’s will and bad habits were 
formed over time. The inherited wickedness of man is the source of human weakness and 
evil. Even if man could acquire the truth by reason, man suffering from the defect of 
original sin cannot attain happiness without God’s grace. Augustine’s conversion journey 
delineates the picture of good man and good life.  
In contrast, Rousseau claimed that man is naturally good and it is the social 
institution that renders man wicked. All human wickedness stems from society. Amour-
propre, like shame and vanity, which weakens man’s will and leads man to do harm to 
others, was engendered from social institutions. Nonetheless, social institutions and 
amour-propre are only necessary but not sufficient conditions for vices. In his 
calumniation of Marion, shame weakened Jean-Jacques’ will and he was compelled to do 
harm to Marion. Rousseau distinguished natural goodness from moral goodness here. 
Jean-Jacques was morally bad as he calumniated Marion knowingly and willingly. He 
was morally blameworthy and was remorseful. However, he clearly claimed his 
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innocence and natural goodness because his heart did not depart from nature. He did not 
hold any wicked intention in the event. He was willing to confess but his will was too 
weak to comply. The distinction of natural goodness from moral goodness is essential to 
Rousseau’s ethics, and it is natural goodness that is his criterion for the judgment of good 
man and good life. I will deal with Rousseau’s ethics in contrast to Augustinian ethics in 
this chapter with respect to goodness, virtue, and moral obligation. This will demonstrate 
Rousseau’s theory of natural goodness of man as a reply to Augustinian moral theology. 
 
1. The Redeemed Sinner on the Pilgrimage to Heaven 
 
i.  A New Life in God After Conversion 
In Book Nine, Augustine depicted a picture of man living in the love of God. 
After his conversion, Augustine became a man who surrendered to God and totally 
renounced his temporal attachments. The meaning of his life was now determined by his 
choice of the object of love. The altering of his goal in life redefined Augustine’s life. In 
the beginning of Book Nine, he asked, “Who am I and what am I?”1 By then he could 
define himself with respect to God’s salvation. He gave a concise account of his own 
salvation history, which served as an example of universal human salvation. When he 
looked at himself, he realized that he was evil, either in deeds, words, or intentions. But 
he also saw from this account that God, who is good and merciful, sent Christ to save him 
from the depth of his sinful condition. The critical act of the will in search for salvation, 
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he said, was “to reject my own will and to desire yours.”2 He was too weak to turn his 
will to God, so he submitted to Jesus Christ, his succor and redeemer. Paradoxically, 
“what I once feared to lose was now a delight to dismiss.”3 This picture of a new self, 
however, poses some moral and socio-political questions for the Christian citizen.  
The effect of conversion was extended to different aspects of life. The submission 
of the will to God was not only an act of religious conversion but also an act of moral 
conversion. It consisted of a re-prioritization of values and a change of the form of life. 
Augustine was no longer interested in anything that would not lead him to God. Since his 
profession did not lead his student’s mind to God’s law and peace but to frenzied lies and 
law court squabbles, he did not want to be a salesman of words in the marketplace of 
rhetoric any more. Thus, Augustine decided to resign from his teaching post of rhetoric. 
The delight he felt in being with God liberated him from his attachment to earthly things. 
Augustine lost his taste for earthly success and wealth. In his retreat, he was deeply 
moved by God’s mercy when he read the Psalms. He said, “I read ‘Be angry and sin not’. 
How as I moved, my God! I had already learnt to be angry with myself for the past, that I 
should not sin in future…And I cried out loud when I acknowledged inwardly what I read 
in external words, I had no desire for earthly goods to be multiplied, nor to devour time 
and to be devoured by it.”4 It was delightful for Augustine to foretaste the heavenly joy in 
communion with God. However, the detachment from earthly things would impinge on 
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the duties of a citizen. If all Christians were to quit their professions, who will take up 
their jobs in a Christian society?  
In addition, besides the change of moral life and his fervent faith in God, he 
needed the Sacrament of Baptism to actualize what he had committed to in his soul and 
through which he could receive God’s forgiveness of his guilt. He said, “This faith did 
not allow me to be free of guilt over my past sins, which had not yet been forgiven 
through your baptism.”5 This shows that faith and grace should become visible through 
an action of man. However, one would wonder if a man who believes in God but did not 
have a chance to receive baptism could be saved from his sin? The need of baptism for 
salvation inevitably builds up a wall between believer and unbeliever. 
It is worth noting that Augustine concluded his autobiographical part of the 
Confessions with a vignette about Monica. Monica was presented as a model for a 
Christian. Her character brought out some questions about the relationship between the 
Christian and the world. Augustine said his mother was living under divine providence. 
God made use of people around Monica to lead her to Him. When she was a child, she 
learned to discipline drinking alcohol from the maidservant at her place. But later as a 
teenager, having forgotten the advice, she was addicted to alcohol without being aware of 
the addiction. One day Monica had a dispute with the slave girl who accompanied her. 
This girl insulted her young mistress on her foul addiction. Monica reflected upon her 
own behavior and she immediately gave up the bad habit. This incident showed how God 
could use any instrument to guide Monica to Him. Viewed from the perspective of divine 
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providence, all things can be a means to God. This is a common perspective in the 
Scripture. For instance, Joseph, who was sold by his brothers to Egypt, turned out to be a 
providential means to save Israel. (Genesis 37-46) The question of the value of secular 
things is at stake. Will God make use of a secular means, like the Roman Empire, to 
fulfill His Will? Or do secular means possess their own values, independent from God’s 
plan?  
Moreover, although Monica was faithful to her marriage, patient and gentle, 
merely living a virtuous life was not her ultimate goal. Monica was not complacent about 
her earthly fulfillment; she gazed upon heavenly happiness. During her conversation with 
Augustine before her imminent death, together they had a vision of an ecstatic experience 
of encountering God just like the saints in heaven. Their minds were lifted by an ardent 
affection towards eternal beings. They transcended from temporal beings to experience 
eternal wisdom. They heard God’s word directly without the mediation of temporal 
things. “We touched it in some small degree by a moment of total concentration of the 
heart. And we sighed and left behind us ‘the first fruits of the Spirit’ bound to that higher 
world.”6 This encounter with eternal wisdom gave them such immense inner joy that any 
delight of this world became worthless to them.7 Monica’s disinterest in this world freed 
her from the fear of death. When she spoke of her contempt for this life and of the 
beneficence of death to her friends, she said, “Nothing is distant from God, and there is 
no ground for fear that he may not acknowledge me at the end of the world and raise me 
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up.”8 God as the highest good of man is the goal and the criterion for judging all things. 
The virtuous character of Monica and the yearning of her total self for heavenly delight 
brought out the question of the limits of virtue and the significance of temporal things 
and politics. In sum, Augustine’s Christian self formed a new picture of morality with a 
new set of values. I will discuss the questions of virtue, the need for grace and the 
significance and value of earthly things later. 
 
ii.  The Divine and Natural Order of Morality 
In his conversion story and by the example of Monica, Augustine witnessed that 
man is a sinner at birth but God calls to man to love Him above all things and forgives 
man by His unconditional love. For Augustine, man praises God because of God’s love 
of him. Every human act is a response of love to God’s love. In other words, man is 
driven by caritas, the love of God, to act. One of Augustine’s famous sayings is “Love 
and do what you will…let the root of love be within, of this root can nothing spring but 
what is good.”9 But since God is invisible, how could man relate the object he loves in 
this world to his love of God? The question of morality becomes what man loves and 
how man loves. Man needs law or order to observe.  
The encounter with Platonism was a crucial episode of Augustine’s journey of 
seeking God and knowing the order of the universe. Augustine not only overcame the 
materialistic view of thinking and refuted Manichean dualism; he also recognized the 
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order of the universe and the hierarchy of being by reading Platonist books. By the aid of 
God’s grace, he reflected on the foundation of knowledge and his mind ascended to the 
threshold of eternal truth. He then saw the immutable light that is superior to him in 
being. God is Being to whom he owed his existence. It is noteworthy that he, with 
reference to God as Being, recognized the hierarchy of beings in the universe. “And I saw 
that each thing is harmonious not only with its place but with its time, and that you [God] 
alone are eternal and did not first begin to work after innumerable periods of time.”10 
Every being has its own place and time in the order of the universe. Each one acts 
according to its position in this order. For a rational being, the soul is superior to the body 
and God is superior to the soul. Hence, man, as a rational being, ought to pursue God, the 
Truth, as the goal of his being. Man becomes wicked if he acts against this order by 
pursuing the lower level of beings, e.g., bodily pleasure. “I inquired what wickedness is; 
and I did not find a substance but a perversity of will twisted away from the highest 
substance, you, O God, towards inferior things, rejecting its own inner life and swelling 
with external matter.”11 With the help of Platonism, Augustine not only refuted 
Manichean dualism, but also Epicureanism, a school of morality that was established 
upon the principle of increasing pleasure and diminishing pain. In respect to the hierarchy 
of being, the enjoyment of sensual pleasure is inferior to the enjoyment of pleasure 
proper to the soul. The joy of being in communion with God is far superior to the absence 
of pain as the Epicureans suggested.  
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Platonism guided Augustine to see the eternal truth, and with reference to that he 
saw the hierarchy of beings and the natural order of the universe. The eternal truth reveals 
the natural constitution of beings and this order. The nature of the order is metaphysical 
and divine. This order governs the movement of the universe and the acts of human 
beings. As Augustine described his infancy, “So I was welcomed by the consolations of 
human milk; …in accordance with your ordinance and the riches which are distributed 
deep in the natural order. You also granted me not to wish for more than you were 
giving, and to my nurses the desire to give me what you gave them.”12 This integration of 
the metaphysical and divine nature of the natural order provides the foundation of the 
human moral act. Augustine then called the order of beings either the eternal or natural 
law because God is the creator of this order. God created the natural order out of His Will 
and Augustine asserted, “The eternal law is the divine order or will of God, which 
requires the preservation of natural order, and forbids the breach of it.”13 The divine 
creation of the natural order provides the immutable objective ground for morality. All 
things act in harmony in accordance with the order of the universe. Due to its divine 
foundation, the natural order becomes the law that man ought to observe. No man can 
escape from God’s just judgment.  
The idea of divine sanction is what sets Augustine’s ethics apart from the Stoics. 
Neither Platonism nor Stoics teaches that the natural order is created. Just as Augustine 
learned in the light of faith from revelation, the Stoics also recognized the natural order of 
the universe, and that man should act in accordance with it. But the Stoics’ natural order 
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does not have any binding force; it only appeals to the internal sanction of reason. It is 
not reasonable to act against the natural order but wicked people do not pay heed to it; 
they enjoy doing injustice to others. Besides that, without divine sanction, legal sanction 
cannot guarantee justice in society. The external civil law does not deter the wicked from 
doing harm. It can only judge outward behavior but it is unable to detect the intention of 
man. Enforcement of the external civil law by implementing penal punishment may 
restrain the behavior of man, but it cannot lead to a change of heart. A wicked man can 
appear just but violates the law covertly. A wicked man may violate the civil law as long 
as he is not incriminated. The external civil law has no greater binding force than the 
internal sanction of reason. But God does not suffer the same limitation. God’s 
omniscience assures a just judgment and His omnipotence ensures a just reward and 
punishment. Divine sanction is the foundation of moral obligation and the guarantee of 
justice. It is Augustine’s ingenuity to integrate the natural and divine order and appealed 
to divine sanction as the ground for morality. Although Cicero also appealed to divine 
providence as the foundation of moral obligation, he applied it in a political rather than 
theoretical sense.14 As long as man transgresses the law knowingly and willingly, he shall 
bear the moral responsibility and deserves punishment.  
 As stated at the beginning of the Confessions, God is the ultimate happiness for 
man and man responds to God’s love through his life journey. Since man inherited the 
punishment of ignorance and weakness of will, he would seek for different resources to 
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overcome the obstacles to knowing and loving God. Struggling between love of God and 
love of self throughout the whole journey of life, with the help of reason and faith, man 
moves towards God in accordance with the natural order. In a nutshell, Augustine’s 
ethical thought is characterized by the love of God. Morality is an ordered love of God.  
 
iii.  Virtues, Vices and Two Kinds of Love 
 Virtue is a state or disposition of the soul towards happiness, according to Plato 
and to Aristotle’s ethics. Augustine Christianized the Greek concept of virtue and defined 
it as a perfect love of God. “As to virtue leading us to a happy life, I hold virtue to be 
nothing else than perfect love of God. For the fourfold division of virtue I regard as taken 
from four forms of love.”15 Christian virtue is the love that helps man to resist the love of 
self in order to love God perfectly. Thus Augustine reinterpreted the four cardinal virtues: 
“temperance is love keeping itself entire and incorrupt for God; fortitude is love bearing 
everything readily for the sake of God; justice is love serving God only, and therefore 
ruling well all else, as subject to man; prudence is love making a right distinction 
between what helps it towards God and what might hinder it.”16  
Some questions are raised. How can man discern whether his act is an act of love 
of God or otherwise? What is the difference between virtue and vice? Furthermore, since 
we are living in this temporal world, even though it is not the final destiny of our life, we 
require food and sex. Is it sinful to enjoy earthly things? For Augustine, the issue is not 
the actual acts, but the ends intended in the acts. “Virtues are distinct from vices by the 
                                                
15 Augustine, On the Morals of the Catholic Church, 15, 25. Emphasis added. 
16 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
 227 
ends of intentions, not by the acts in themselves.”17 He distinguished the ends from the 
means in terms of to enjoy (frui) and to use (uti).18 A thing that man enjoys has an 
intrinsic value and that is an end of the act. But the thing that man uses has an 
instrumental value only and it is only a means to an end. God is the ultimate end that man 
enjoys. The earthly things are only means for man to attain the ultimate end. All things 
are good but they are not the ultimate ends of human acts. Augustine called the thing that 
man enjoys as honorable and the thing that man uses as useful.  
Consequently every human perversion (also called vice) consists in the 
desire to use what ought to be enjoyed and to enjoy what ought to be used. 
In turn, good order (also called virtue) consists in the desire to enjoy what 
ought to be enjoyed and to use what ought to be used. Now honorable 
things are to be enjoyed, but useful things are to be used.19  
 
Man shall either enjoy or use things according to the natural order. Those things in the 
lower order are means for man to attain the end in the higher order. Thus virtue is to love 
properly according to the natural order, and vice is to love improperly. The properly 
ordered love leads man to God but the disordered love leads man away from God to the 
earthly things. Augustine called these two kinds of love the love of God and the love of 
self in the City of God, and they lead to two cities, the city of God and the city of man, 
respectively.  
                                                
17 Augustine, Against Julian, vi. 20-21. 
18 Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, Q. 30. Bigham, Thomas J. and Mollegen, Albert T., “The 
Christian Ethic”, A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, ed. by Roy W. Battenhouse, Baker Book 
House, Michigan, 1955, pp. 308-309. Chakwick, Henry, “The Influence of St. Augustine on Ethics”, Saint 
Augustine and His Influence in the Middle Ages, ed. by Edward B. Kong and Jacqueline T. Schaefer, The 
Press of the University of the South, 1988, p. 13. 
19 Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, Q. 30. 
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I divide the human race into two orders. The one consists of those who 
live according to man, and the other of those who live according to God. 
Speaking allegorically, I also call these two orders two Cities: that is, two 
societies of men, one of which is predestined to reign in eternity with God, 
and the other of which will undergo eternal punishment with the devil.20  
 
These two cities are not equivalent to the historical Church and the temporal state. 
We can find the citizens of the city of God in the state and the citizens of the city of man 
in the Church. Nevertheless, the morality of the love of God prefers the spiritual goal to 
the temporal goal. According to Augustine’s view of virtue and the purpose of the earthly 
city, it is not surprising he maintained that Roman virtues are inferior to Christian virtues. 
I will quote his comment on Brutus as an example, and I will compare it with Rousseau 
in the next part. Brutus slew his son when he found out that his son was fomenting a war 
to help Tarquinus back to the throne. As Virgil wrote, Brutus did it out of the love of his 
country and the immense love of being praised. Love of country and honor are two 
Roman virtues. However, they paled when compared with Christian virtues. “How is it 
any great thing, then, to despise all the blandishments of this world, however, sweet, for 
the sake of that heavenly fatherland when, for the sake of this temporal and earthly one, 
Brutus was able to kill even his own sons?”21 The lofty ideal of Christian virtue not only 
forbids man to kill his son, but to treat Christ’s poor as his own son.  
 
iv. The Struggle Against Temptation After Conversion 
Augustine surrendered himself to God and, by the redemptive grace of Jesus 
Christ in his conversion, resisted the dragging force of the flesh. He was called to live a 
                                                
20 COD, XV, 1. 
21 Ibid., V, 18. 
 229 
virtuous life with a clear goal in life. His faith in God’s mercy, his awareness of his sin 
and his commitment to the love of God transformed him. Nonetheless, it does not mean 
that he was free from temptation and his salvation was guaranteed. He was still 
susceptible to sensual pleasures. The sinful environment remained a threat to his faith in 
God and his virtuous life. He had not completely accepted God’s grace yet. “But for the 
present, because I am not full of you [God], I am a burden to myself…There is a struggle 
between my regrets at my evil past and my memories of good joys and which side has the 
victory I do not know.”22 His salvation was dubious, not because God would rescind His 
grace, but because Augustine might relapse into his sinful state.  
Augustine discussed the temptations of the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes 
and the ambition of the secular world in Book Ten.23 He might confound the pleasure of 
eating as an excuse for health. He did not clearly distinguish between the danger of 
pleasure and the beneficent effect of listening to liturgical music. There were blind spots 
in his mind in which he was unable to scrutinize his strengths and weaknesses. He said 
the temptation of power never ceased to trouble him. He always wished to be feared or 
loved by people for no reason other than the joy derived from such power. In short, on 
the one hand, he loved the truth and did not want to be deceived, but on the other hand, 
he hated the truth, which revealed his sin and how he had deceived himself.24 He was 
caught between the love of truth and the aversion to it. He viewed human life on earth as 
a trial and he had to strive for the love of God with great effort and great faith in God’s 
                                                
22 Aug. Confs., X, xxviii, 39. 
23 Ibid., X, xxx, 41-xli, 66. 
24 Paul Rigby takes this as an example of the essence of original sin in “Original Sin in Augustine’s 
Confessions,” University of Ottawa Press, 1987, pp. 96-99. 
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mercy. “No one should be complacent in this life which is called a ‘total temptation’. 
Anyone who could change from the worse to the better can also change from the better to 
the worse. There is one hope, one ground of confidence, one reliable promise—your 
mercy.”25 Although grace alone can save man, human effort can keep man from 
departing too far from God. 
 
v.  Politics: Tension between Eternal Law and Temporal Law 
 Every descendant of Adam suffers the punishments of original sin in different 
aspects of life. Augustine regarded the punishments, as ignorance and weakness of will in 
general, disobedient carnal concupiscence in marriage, and inequalities and submission to 
authority in politics. Augustine did not discuss the political aspect in the Confessions but 
did so in the City of God. Adam disobeyed God’s commandment and regarded himself as 
the Lord of good and evil. His penalty was the disobedience of his mind and body to 
God’s will. From then onward, man’s faculties are habituated against God’s will. He 
could not do what he willed.26 In sexuality, carnal concupiscence disobeys his will and 
captures his mind. Marriage was used as a remedy and cure for concupiscence. Likewise, 
before the Fall, men were equal among themselves and no one was subject to any other 
being other than God. After the Fall, following the development of society and the 
establishment of private property, slavery, and government, human freedom was 
disoriented and human acts were in need of being restrained. Temporal law in the society 
                                                
25 Aug. Confs., X, xxxii, 48. 
26 COD, XIV, 15. 
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regulated man’s freedom. Politics, including the establishment of government and law, is 
used as a remedy for sin. 
 Augustine made a clear distinction between the eternal law and the temporal law 
in Book One of the On Free Choice of the Will. Eternal law or natural law is made known 
by three different factors, namely, reason, conscience and revelation. Thus it is called the 
natural law because it is the law made known by reason or the law written in the human 
heart, or the law that was revealed to and promulgated by Moses.27 All three laws derived 
from the same eternal law, which is willed by God. The eternal law is to govern those 
who love eternal goods and the temporal law is established for those who love temporal 
goods. “The temporal law demands that they [those who love the temporal goods] 
possess those things in accordance with the law by which peace and human society are 
preserved.”28 It regulates the just distribution of goods, such as physical goods, freedom, 
and property by coercion. “The temporal law can punish evildoing only by taking away 
one or another of these goods from the one being punished. So it is by fear that the 
temporal law coerces human beings and bends the souls of its subjects in whatever 
direction it pleases.”29 However, it could only regulate the external behavior but fails to 
affect internal intention.30 Temporal law is not able to change the human heart and impel 
man to love God and his neighbor. 
Furthermore, the temporal law, which is derived from the eternal law, can be 
adjusted according to circumstances. For instance, if the people in one society were well 
                                                
27 Letter, 157, 3, 15. 
28 Free Will, I, 15. 
29 Ibid., I, 15, 64. 
30 Ibid., I, 3, 8. 
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ordered and loved eternal things, they are empowered to choose their ruler. On the 
contrary, if the people in another society placed their self-interests above the common 
interest, a good and wise man or a few good men should rule them. These two laws 
appear contradictory but both of them are just, as they lead the citizens to the common 
good of the society.31  
We saw the functions and the limitations of the temporal law. Since the ultimate 
goal of man is God; and because man urged by the love of God but carrying the 
punishment of original sin lives in the earthly society, man needs the coercion of the 
temporal law and the government to cure his wound of sin. Politics is only tolerated as a 
remedy for sin, as it cannot lead to virtue, the perfect love of God.  
For no state is perfectly established and preserved otherwise than on the 
foundation and by the bond of faith and of firm concord, when the highest 
and truest common good, namely, God, is loved by all, and men love each 
other in Him without dissimulation, because they love one another for His 
sake from whom they cannot disguise the real character of their love.32 
 
Without practicing true virtues, worshipping the true God and serving Him with 
true rites and good morals, a great empire is no more than a big gang of robbers.33 Love 
of God and love of one’s neighbor as oneself are the pillars of a just city. Formation of 
true virtues is not the responsibility of the secular social institution but of the Church. 
Politics inhibits man from doing harm to others by coercion. It is up to the Church to 
promote the true virtues as the ultimate goal of man.  
                                                
31 Free Will, I, 6, 15. 
32 Letter, 137, 5, 17. 
33 COD, IV, 3-4. 
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 Augustine, one of the greatest Latin Church Fathers, integrated Greek philosophy 
and the Christian faith. God, for the rational man or Christian, is the ultimate happiness of 
man. Augustine’s ethics is characterized by the love of God. Virtues consist of different 
aspects of the disposition of the soul towards God in accordance with the natural order of 
the universe. Morality is the rightly ordered love of God. God, the just Judge of the 
human heart, is the guarantee of the justice of morality. Divine Providence is the 
foundation of moral obligation. Man in this world, who suffers from the punishment of 
original sin, struggles between the love of God and the love of self. With the help of 
reason and faith, man strives for his happiness, which can only be fulfilled after death. 
All temporal goods are subordinated to God. 
 Augustine’s ethics influenced Western society for centuries. It is confronted by 
many problems in the modern era. If Christian morality did not apply to non-Christians in 
the modern society, what should be the foundation of moral obligation? Influenced by 
Platonism, Augustine also emphasized the role of reason in knowing the natural order or 
moral norms. Is his ethics only for the educated? Are the uneducated excluded from the 
knowledge of the natural law? If all temporal things were subordinated to God or spiritual 
things, are there any earthly goals for non-Christians to pursue? Does temporal reality 
possess any autonomous value from God? Augustine delineated morality as a struggle of 
will between the love of God and the love of self. Temporal law and government are not 
able to affect the internal intentions of man. In principle, only God can judge the human 
heart. However, in fact, it leaves the responsibility to the Church, and the spiritual 
confessor in particular. The Church judges and gives advice to her people but it also 
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opens up the possibility to the abuse of power, since the Church also consists of men 
from both the city of God and the city of man. Now we turn to see Rousseau’s theory of 
natural goodness in contrast to Augustine’s ethics. 
 
2. The Naturally Good Man in Civil Society 
 
Rousseau acquired the knowledge of nature and the source of evil in a sudden 
inspiration on the road to Vincennes, which became the turning point of his life. After the 
inspiration with the knowledge of nature, Rousseau reformed his moral life. Unlike 
Augustine who strived for the true goal of life, God, after his conversion, Rousseau did 
not commit to live up to the natural wholeness that he saw in the illumination, but he 
committed to live a virtuous life instead. He wrote the prosopopeia of Fabricius under the 
oak tree. With the encouragement of Diderot, he decided to write down the ideas he got 
in the inspiration and to compete for the prize. Rousseau endeavored to reform his life in 
accordance with his knowledge of nature. As with the life of the converted Augustine, 
Jean-Jacques, who had not yet completely returned to nature, struggled between life 
according to knowledge of nature and his amour-propre and imagination. He was 
susceptible to amour-propre and imagination but his awareness of nature led him to a 
different path from the one before the inspiration. Thus, after the inspiration, Rousseau 
depicted the picture of a man with the knowledge of nature, which strived to be a 
naturally good man in society. 
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i.  The Genesis of Human Morality 
After Rousseau obtained this intellectual insight into the natural goodness of man, 
he re-oriented his moral life. What is the relationship between naturalness and morality? 
In other words, what is the relationship between natural goodness and moral goodness? 
How was morality developed? Rousseau’s account of the genesis of morality in the 
Second Discourse can shed light on our questions. Man develops morality along with the 
development of their community and reason. Man recognizes the existence of others of 
his species by observing that their ways of thinking and feeling are similar. This shows 
that his mind is capable of forming ideas and comparing them. When new needs emerge 
due to the change of environment, men associate with one another for their common 
interests and they develop a set of rules of conduct for their interests and safety. Later on, 
they live together in the same area for the convenience of working, which provides the 
opportunity for forming families. “The habit of living together gave rise to the sweetest 
sentiments known to man, conjugal love and paternal love.”34 This sweet sentiment 
reinforces their desire for association. Along with the growing ideas of beauty and merit 
due to association, everyone begins to look at each other with envy and wishes to be 
looked at the same way. They form a sense of public regard in their mind. “From this 
arose the first duties of civility even among Savages.”35 In the description of the 
emergence of morality in the immediate state of nature, Rousseau asserted that the first 
movement of moral relation came out of the need for companionship and mutual 
recognition, which was reinforced by the sweetest sentiment of moral love.  
                                                
34 SD, pp. 173-4. 
35 Ibid., p. 176. 
 236 
Rousseau said that the morality of rights, duty, and obligation developed along 
with the emergence of private property. “And from property, once recognized, the first 
rules of justice necessarily followed: for in order to render to each his own, it has to be 
possible for each to have something.”36 Since the natural man only cares about his own 
good, what will make him do justice to his fellows? What is the foundation of justice? Is 
the golden rule “Do unto others as we would have them do unto us” sufficient? For 
Rousseau, morality in human relationship consists of reason and common interests. But 
reason alone cannot compel us to do justice to our fellows. If I were sure that I would not 
fall into the same suffering situation, would I be good to my fellows? Rousseau stated 
that justice and goodness are true affections of the soul enlightened by reason in Emile. 
Love of men, consisting of love of self and reason, is an extension of self-love. Man 
loves himself and identifies another man with himself. He who does not want to suffer 
finds seeing another man suffer repugnant. It is self-love that makes justice possible. 
Self-love of course draws one’s attention only to his own interest. But when one 
identifies his fellows as himself, he will love his fellows and be just to them. Rousseau 
explained this inference in Emile,  
But when the strength of an expansive soul makes me identify myself with 
my fellow, and I feel that I am, so to speak, in him, it is in order not to 
suffer that I do not want him to suffer. I am interested in him for love of 
myself, and the reason for the precept is in nature itself, which inspires in 
me the desire of my well-being in whatever place I feel my 
existence…Love of men derived from love of self is the principle of 
human justice. The summation of all morality is given by the Gospel in its 
summation of the law.37 
 
                                                
36 SD, p. 179. 
37 Emile, p. 235, note. 
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Rousseau shifted the ground for the love of one’s neighbor from the love of God 
to the love of self. Augustine talked about the summation of the law that is love of God 
and love of one’s neighbor as oneself in the On the Morals of the Catholic Church. Love 
of God is the ultimate aim of man. When he sees himself loving God with all his heart, 
strength and will, he will love himself as well because of his love of God. Likewise, he 
identifies himself with his neighbor and will try to draw him to the same good, the love of 
God. When his neighbor loves God as he does, his neighbor without doubt will love him 
as well.38 But Rousseau interpreted the summation of the law differently.  
In spite of the rule of the love of men, it is not easy to choose between one’s 
interests and the interests of his fellows. Other than the conflict of interests among 
individuals, it is clear that moral goodness, e.g., duty, can be in conflict with natural 
goodness, e.g., self-preservation. Rousseau summarized it well in the Letter to Beaumont, 
When all the agitated particular interests finally collide, when love of self 
put into fermentation changes into amour-propre, when opinion making 
the whole universe necessary to each man, makes them all each other’s 
born enemies and determines that none finds his own good except in 
someone else’s ill, then conscience, weaker than the excited passions, is 
stifled by them, and is no longer in men’s mouth except as a word made to 
deceive each other.39 
 
Rousseau brought out the essence of relationship in the modern commercial 
society, i.e., one cannot be good to oneself without it being at the expense of others. In 
order to preserve justice and the moral relationship among men, men have to compromise 
their own self-interests with the common interests and their duty as member of the 
community.  
                                                
38 Augustine, On the Morals of the Catholic Church, chapter 26, 48-49. 
39 Beaumont, p. 29. Emphasis added. 
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ii.  Virtue: The Strength to Fulfill Duty  
When Jean-Jacques got the inspiration on the Road to Vincennes, he said that he 
became another man. Although he saw that man is naturally good in the inspiration, he 
did not make a commitment to withdraw to the country to become a natural man. Rather, 
he wrote the prosopopeia of Fabricius under the oak, which indicated what was on his 
mind after the inspiration. The enthusiasm for virtue became the main drive of his life for 
four to five years.  
With the most inconceivable rapidity my feelings raised themselves to the 
tone of my ideas. All my little passions were stifled by enthusiasm for 
truth, for freedom, for virtue, and what is most surprising is that this 
effervescence maintained itself in my heart during more than four or five 
years to as high a degree perhaps as it has ever been in the heart of any 
other man.40  
 
It would seem to the readers that his vision of the natural goodness of man and of 
the social cause of evil would lead him to retreat to the forest. This was what his 
adversaries thought. “What, then? Must Society be destroyed, thine and mine annihilated, 
and men return to live in forest with Bears? A conclusion in the style of my 
adversaries…”41 His personal commitment to virtue, freedom and truth was a clear 
answer to his adversaries. Since Rousseau presented the natural state and the moral state 
of man in a chronological order in the Second Discourse, readers could misread it as two 
stages in history, thinking that if man wanted to recover the natural goodness of man, he 
would have to go back to the pre-historical stage.  
                                                
40 Confessions, p. 295. Emphasis added. 
41 SD, Note IX, 14, p. 213. 
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But it is reasonable to assert that the state of nature and the state of society are 
two dimensions of a human being. One is natural and the other is social and moral. The 
natural state of man rests upon the sheer existence of man, which is good. The social and 
moral state of man consists of the common good of the community and the duty to 
safeguard it. Thus, both aspects can coexist at the same time. The purpose of Emile is to 
educate a young man to become a natural man living in the civil society. In the 
Confessions, Jean-Jacques is the natural man living in a corrupt civil society. 
Accordingly, the vision of the natural goodness of man does not lead him to return to the 
natural state. Rather, it gave Jean-Jacques the insight into the remedy to stop the social 
cause of evil and live up to the principle of natural goodness in society. Rousseau said in 
the Third Dialogue, “So that his object could not be to bring populous peoples or great 
States back to their first simplicity, but only to stop, if it were possible, the progress of 
those whose small size and situation have preserved from such a swift advance toward 
the perfection of society and the deterioration of the species.”42 It was his mission of an 
author. “I cast my books into the public with the certainty of having spoken for the 
common good.”43  
Moreover, Jean-Jacques decided not only to share his insight in his books but also 
to live as a virtuous man in society. His intoxication with virtue made him think that 
virtue is the remedy to social evil. In other words, he tried to channel amour-propre to the 
right path for moral goodness. What is virtue for Rousseau? What is its nature and goal? 
For Augustine, virtue is a means to the ultimate end of man, God. It is a perfect love of 
                                                
42 Dialogues, III, p. 213. 
43 Confessions, p. 338. 
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God. It consists chiefly of courage, temperance, prudence and justice. Man who lives in 
the world is struggling between the love of God and the love of self. He needs God’s 
grace to grant him the strength to resist those temptations that distract him from God and 
to overcome the obstacles that hinder him from loving God and his neighbor.  
Rousseau observed that man living in society inevitably faces the conflicts of 
interests among men. “For in the social state the good of one necessarily constitutes the 
harm of another.”44 It is impossible to benefit oneself without doing harm to others. Since 
man as a moral being will face conflicts between self-interests and duty, he will endeavor 
to overcome the passion of self-interest for duty. Man tries to put aside his own needs and 
passions and cares only about his duty and the common good. Man replaces his private 
self with the social or public self. Virtue is a transformed amour-propre.45 For instance, 
Rousseau said that his inspired commitment to be virtuous was out of the noblest pride.46 
Like the Spartan woman mentioned in Emile, she asked for news not about her sons but 
whether they won the war. Rousseau said, “This is the female citizen.”47 Man faces the 
choice of either following his inclinations or fulfilling his duties in society. He, however, 
cannot keep lingering between them. “Always in contradiction with himself, always 
floating between his inclinations and his duties, he will never be either man or citizen. He 
will be good neither for himself nor for others. He will be one of these men of our days: a 
                                                
44 Emile, p. 104, note. 
45 Judith Shklar, Men and Citizen, p. 66. 
46 Confessions, p. 350. 
47 Emile, p. 40. 
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Frenchman, an Englishman, a bourgeois. He will be nothing.”48 The choice for duty is 
painful. 
Rousseau showed the painful struggle for virtue in his love affair with Mme 
d’Houdetot in the Confessions. The narrative of his love affair with Mme d’Houdetot 
shows the obstacles set by reason, passions and environment to practicing virtue and the 
source of strength. Mme d’Houdetot was the lover of Jean-Jacques’s friend, St Lambert. 
He fell in love with Mme d’Houdetot during her second visit to the Hermitage. 
She came, I saw her, I was intoxicated with love without an object, that 
intoxication fascinated my eyes, that object became fixed on her, I saw my 
Julie in Mme d’Houdetot, and soon I no longer saw anything but Mme 
d’Houdetot, but invested with all the perfections with which I had just 
adorned the idol of my heart.49 
  
Jean-Jacques was captured by his love of Mme d’Houdetot. When he expressed 
his love to her, she did not want to lose a friend and suggested forming an intimate 
society of friendship of three. This suggestion could not calm down Jean-Jacques’ love of 
her. He sought for different motives to quench his thirst for her love by reasoning. “What 
powerful motives did I not call to my aid to stifle it? My morals, my feelings, my 
principles, shame, the infidelity, the crime, the abuse of a deposit entrusted by 
friendship…”50 Jean-Jacques was caught between his love of Mme d’Houdetot and his 
duty as a friend. He did not want to hurt either Mme d’Houdetot or St Lambert. Finally 
he rationalized his love of her with the thought that the flame of his love did not injure St 
Lambert but Jean-Jacques himself. He had confidence in his behavior as a friend and 
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50 Ibid., p. 371. 
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trusted that his conscience could keep him from crossing the boundary. He accepted this 
manner of thinking because it favored his passions. However, Rousseau commented, “A 
great lesson for decent souls, that vice never attacks openly, but it finds the means of 
surprising by always masking itself with some sophism, and often with some virtue.”51 
Both Mme d’Houdetot’s suggestion and Jean-Jacques’ way of thinking were only 
excuses to justify their love affair. Passions could fool man’s reason. Reason, under the 
veil of passions, is not able to deliberate correctly. Rather, erroneous reasoning would 
justify his will to yield to the passions.  
Jean-Jacques tried hard to keep his behavior on track, but his love was a 
temptation for Mme d’Houdetot to be unfaithful to her lover. Rousseau claimed that he 
did not have any intention to make her unfaithful. “If I attempted to make her unfaithful 
sometimes when I was led astray by my senses, I never genuinely desired it…In my eyes 
the gleam of all the virtues adorned the idol of my heart.”52 Although he had no intention 
to seduce her, the environment and his intimate behavior were always a temptation for 
her to become unfaithful. 
When St Lambert was informed of their love affair, Mme d’Houdetot did not 
want to hide anything from her lover and decided to break off with Jean-Jacques 
completely. Jean-Jacques was ashamed of his fault and was angry with himself. 
However, his shame and indignation were not able to overcome his weakness. “The 
indignation I felt against myself from this perhaps would have been enough to overcome 
my weakness, if the tender compassion which its victim inspired in me had not softened 
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my heart again.”53 Rousseau admitted the difficulty of overcoming the weakness of will. 
When his indignation was gone, his love of her would come back to soften his will again.  
Later, Jean-Jacques wrote to St Lambert to ask why Mme d’Houdetot cooled off 
with him. In his reply, St Lambert admitted that it was he, who, motivated by good 
intentions, had brought Jean-Jacques and Mme d’Houdetot together. He had caused the 
three of them to be unhappy. He asked Jean-Jacques to forgive him and love him. 
“Regard me and treat me as your friend and be assured that this friendship will make up 
one of the greater charms of my life.”54 Jean-Jacques was moved and strengthened. Not 
the indignation against himself but the esteem and friendship empowered him to 
overcome the weakness of his will. The feeling of indignation enhanced the aversion to 
him, which impeded him from moving towards duty. Rather, esteem and friendship 
awakened the love of self and the pity of others. 
This answer brought me consolation which I needed very much at that 
moment, by means of the testimonies of esteem and friendship with which 
it was full, and which gave me the courage and strength to deserve them. 
From that moment I did my duty…This letter served me as an aegis 
against my weakness.55 
 
Jean-Jacques was enabled by St Lambert’s friendship to make this sacrifice to 
duty and friendship. This example shows the conflict between inclination and duty and 
the struggle to be virtuous. His love affair with Mme d’Houdetot demonstrates how 
difficult it is to overcome passion, which weakens the will to opt for duty. In addition, his 
struggle was a battle between the true source of strength, virtue and its pertinacious 
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enemy, passion. Thus, virtue is the strength that man needs to conquer his passions for 
the sake of fulfilling his duty. “This word virtue signifies ‘strength’. There is no virtue at 
all without struggle; there is none without victory. Virtue does not consist merely in 
being just, but in being so by triumphing over one’s passions, by ruling over one’s own 
heart.”56 Virtue is in the struggle and conquers passions for duty. 
Jean-Jacques’ struggle against passions in his love affair echoes Augustine’s 
struggle at the moment of his conversion. Augustine’s will was torn between the love of 
God and the love of self; he was too weak to opt for God and he begged for God’s grace. 
With God’s grace, Augustine could love God properly or virtuously, for virtue is the 
perfect love of God. Such struggle is not uncommon in human life. Man needs strength to 
conquer passion in order to opt for duty or God. Although they had different ideas of the 
source of strength and the ends of virtue, I think both Augustine and Rousseau would 
agree that “A person who knows how to govern his own heart, keep all his passions under 
control, over whom personal interest and sensual desires have no power, and who both in 
public and in private with no witness does only what is just and honest on every occasion, 
without regard for the secret wishes of his heart, he alone is a virtuous man.”57 
Since it is so difficult to conquer our passions and opt for duty, is it acceptable to 
succumb to our passion? Are all men capable of acting virtuously? Why should we be 
virtuous? Why should man be just? What is the foundation of moral obligation for 
Rousseau? 
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Rousseau proposed a legal foundation for moral obligation in the Social Contract, 
“Indeed, each individual can, as a man, have a private will contrary to or differing from 
the general will he has as a Citizen. His private interest can speak to him quite differently 
from the common interest…that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be 
constrained to do so by the entire body; which means only that he will be forced to be 
free.”58 The law dictates that citizens be virtuous. However, since his own interests 
preoccupy man, the law cannot guarantee that man does not perform acts of injustice 
covertly. Glaucon’s challenge to moral obligation in Plato’s Republic is not yet solved. 
An unjust man, while doing the greatest injustice, will by feigning to gain the greatest 
reputation for justice. The appearance of justice shields him from legal sanctions. He 
endeavors to deceive other people to believe that he is just without being so.59 Legal 
sanction is not sufficient to ensure moral obligation. 
 
iii.  The Foundation of the Moral Obligation 
In response to Glaucon’s question of the happiest life in Plato’s Republic, 
Socrates made a claim of the hope for eternal reward after death to ensure that the life of 
just man is the happiest one.60 He provided the metaphysical constitution of beings as the 
reason for being just and it is natural for man to prefer the truth to sensual pleasure.61 
Even if a just man suffered the reputation of being unjust when he was young, gods will 
never neglect his suffering; he will regain good reputation in his old age and receive his 
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reward after death. Socrates acknowledged the immortality of soul and the eternal reward 
after death. At the end of the Republic, Socrates said,  
But if we are persuaded by me, we’ll believe that the soul is immortal and 
able to endure every evil and every good, and we’ll always hold to the 
upward path, practicing justice with reason in every way. That way we’ll 
be friends both to ourselves and to the goods while we remain here on 
earth and afterwards—like victors in the games who go around collecting 
their prizes—we’ll receive our rewards. Hence, both in this life and on the 
thousand-year journey we’ve described, we’ll do well and be happy.62  
 
Augustine admitted the inadequacy of philosophy and introduced the Christian 
God as what underpins virtuous life. In response to Epicurean and Stoic morality, 
Augustine integrated Platonism and Christianity into a moral system based on the law of 
nature, of which God is the author. Human beings have to follow the law in accordance 
with their place in the order. As the author of the eternal law, God judges man at the Last 
Judgment with rewards and punishments with respect to man’s works in this world. God 
is just and good; although sometimes the just man suffers and the unjust man prospers, 
the just man maintains the hope for his reward after death. With faith in God’s grace and 
the hope for eternal happiness, man strives for a virtuous life on earth. God has promised 
eternal happiness to the virtuous man. Augustine provided a Christian answer to the 
problem of the virtuous life and the foundation of moral obligation. 
 
a. Eternal Reward 
Rousseau’s stance on moral obligation is ambiguous. He held different positions 
in different works. He agreed with Augustine and Socrates on the belief in the justice of 
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God. The just God will reward the just man after his death. Although he, like Mme de 
Warens, did not believe in Hell,63 he believed that God would maintain the just order of 
the universe in man’s life after death. In the Second Reverie, discussing his own 
sufferings over the years, he understood its cause to be due to the plotting of his enemies 
when he was young. But later he believed that there had to be a mysterious plan behind 
all that. He disagreed with Augustine’s belief in a predestination of the just according to 
God’s will. Rather, he simply believed in God’s justice. He said,  
God is just; He wills that I suffer; and He knows that I am innocent. That 
is the cause of my confidence; my heart and my reason cry out to me that I 
will not be deceived by it. Let me, therefore, leave men and fate to go their 
ways. Let me learn to suffer without a murmur. In the end, everything 
must return to order, and my turn will come sooner or later.64 
 
God, who is the author of the natural order, must restore the order and rectify the 
injustices in the world after death, if not in this world. Rousseau thus hoped for his turn to 
come. This hope for the eternal reward sustained his striving for virtue and helped him 
endure the pain. It seems that Rousseau affirmed the notion of eternal reward. People 
may object that man cannot prove or disprove the existence of God. Would it be risky to 
base our eternal happiness upon an uncertain truth? I think it is Rousseau’s rhetoric that 
regarding the belief in the existence of God and the eternal reward, he, as an ordinary 
man, put the emphasis on the usefulness of the belief for the moral life. Rousseau agreed 
that man is not able to prove or to disprove the existence of God by rational arguments. 
However, it is not unreasonable to accept the belief in the existence of God. In addition, 
that belief and the eternal reward are useful for the moral life of ordinary people because 
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it strengthens them with the hope for future reward. Rousseau said through the mouth of 
Julie, “Even if the immense Being on which it dwells did not exist, it still would do well 
on it endlessly the better to be master of itself, stronger, happier, and wiser.”65 Thus, 
although man is not able to prove the existence of God, it is good for him to believe it, 
which could be an encouragement and a consolation for virtuous people. 
In addition, in the Confessions, when he received the news of the death of Mme 
de Warens, he felt an irreparable loss and pain. He expressed his belief that she “left this 
Vale of tears to pass into the abode of the good, where the lovable remembrance of the 
good one has done here below forms the eternal recompense for it. Go, sweet and 
beneficent soul, among Fénelon, Bernex, Catinat, and those who in a more humble 
station have, as they did, opened their hearts to genuine charity.”66 Mme de Warens, a 
naturally good woman, was among the just people including Fénelon, (whom Rousseau 
regarded as virtuous) who would receive the eternal reward in Heaven according to the 
good she had done in this world. His belief in eternal reward is a corroboration that a 
virtuous person will be requited, which God’s omnipotence and omniscience ensures 
according to Christian tradition. This conviction of Rousseau seems to be religious. 
However, he added at the end of his moaning for Mme de Warens, “Soon I also will 
cease to suffer, but if I believed I would not see her again in the other life, my weak 
imagination would not accept the idea of perfect happiness that I promise myself there.”67 
It is Rousseau, not God, who promised himself the idea of perfect happiness. His attitude 
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differs from Augustine’s and it leaves room for his other viewpoint. Nonetheless, the 
above concept is only for believers. How about the unbeliever? What is the foundation of 
moral obligation for unbelievers or is there a universal foundation for all?  
Rousseau altered his position in regards to moral obligation in the Letter to 
Franquières. He criticized Socrates for not being able to respond to Glaucon’s question 
of moral obligation by philosophy only. Socrates relied upon the hope for reward after 
life to ensure the happiness of the just man. Rousseau said, “Socrates himself, appalled, 
cries out and believes himself obliged to invoke the Gods before answering; but without 
the hope of another life, he would have answered badly for this one.” 68 This is the 
common criticism of the hope for reward after death. Our desire for eternal happiness and 
justice will be rewarded only after death. Is religion opium to stupefy suffering people?  
 
b.  This-worldly Recompense 
Virtuous man can be obliged to fulfill his duty not out of hope for eternal reward 
but for the enjoyment of doing good deeds. This idea is well expressed in Rousseau’s 
Last Judgment narrative. Rousseau ended his description of the Last Judgment with the 
judgment of his fellows. There is neither reward nor punishment after the judgment. The 
silence in meting out due rewards and punishments after the judgment may imply that 
Rousseau did not believe in or care about eternal happiness in the life after death. His 
concern is this worldly. The good man enjoys the felicity of living according to his nature 
and the wicked suffers the pain in his heart for his crime in this world. Thus God is 
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neither the Judge nor the ultimate happiness of man. There is no summum bonum for 
man. Life is not a journey of knowing and loving God as Augustine thought. 
The virtuous man already enjoyed a good feeling when he does the good deeds. 
Thus, he does so because it is good to be virtuous and to live according to nature. He does 
not do it out of the hope for an eternal reward. He will be happy in this world as well in 
the other. Eternal happiness is not a reward for the merit of the good man but it is a 
compensation for his suffering in this world. “Nevertheless they suffered in this life; 
therefore they will be compensated in another. This sentiment is founded less on the 
merit of man than on the notion of goodness which seems to me inseparable from the 
divine essence.”69 Does the virtuous man enjoy the good feeling of doing good deeds in 
his suffering? If so, he does not need to receive eternal reward to be happy; then the idea 
of compensation does not make sense to Rousseau. In this case, the self-sufficiency of 
virtues excludes the need for the hope for eternal reward.  
On another occasion, Rousseau emphasized the sublime feeling associated with 
practicing virtue. During the trip to Montpellier, Jean-Jacques was strongly attracted by a 
woman, Mme de Larnage, who took care of him during the trip.70 He was captured by the 
sensual pleasure aroused by her. Jean-Jacques was spellbound; he forgot about his 
sickness and even Mme de Warens. Before leaving Jean-Jacques behind in Montpellier to 
meet the doctor, Mme de Larnage invited him to visit her in Bourg St Andéol. After the 
treatment in Montpellier, while he was going to her place, he reflected on his feeling and 
the motivation for paying her a visit. He was remorseful for indulging in sensual pleasure 
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to the point of forgetting Mme de Warens, who had sacrificed herself for him. He then 
was horrified by his thought of corrupting the daughter of Mme de Larnage. He made a 
resolution to combat and vanquish his passion. He said, “I executed it courageously with 
some sighs, I admit; but also with that internal satisfaction that I tasted for the first time 
in my life of saying to myself, ‘I deserve my own esteem, I know how to prefer my duty 
to my pleasure.’”71 Although he sighed for his loss of pleasure, he enjoyed the internal 
satisfaction and he received not other’s but his own esteem. He was proud of himself. He 
enjoyed the good feeling of practicing virtue. The internal satisfaction enhanced his love 
of self.  
In addition, his courageous virtuous act resulted in a disposition of his soul 
towards goodness. “One of the advantages of good actions is to raise up the soul and to 
dispose it to perform better ones.”72 When he was returning to the home of Mme de 
Warens, Jean-Jacques was only thinking of regulating his conduct upon the law of virtue. 
Rousseau also mentioned in the Moral Letters that the good memory of performing good 
deeds gave impetus to the virtuous man. “In whatever state a soul might be, there remains 
a feeling of pleasure in doing good that is never erased and that serves as a first foothold 
for all the other virtues, it is by this feeling cultivated that one succeeds in loving oneself 
and in being pleased with oneself.”73 The virtuous man does not need to wait for his 
reward or compensation after death. He enjoys the good feeling at the moment of doing 
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good. The memory of the good feeling conveys the message to the virtuous man that it is 
good to be virtuous.  
Besides the positive pleasure of virtue, the remorseful conscience of the wicked 
man is another element of moral obligation. In his calumniation of Marion, although 
Jean-Jacques did not have any intention of doing harm to her, he ruined her career and 
reputation as well. He said, “I carried away from it the long remembrances of crime and 
the unbearable weight of remorse with which my conscience is still burdened after forty 
years, and the bitter feeling of which, far from growing weaker, becomes inflamed as I 
grow older.”74 The bitter feeling of remorse that remained in his heart for many years was 
a punishment for his moral fault. But this incident also produced a positive effect in him. 
“It has even done me the good of protecting me for the rest of my life from every act 
tending to crime because of the terrible impression that has remained from the only one I 
have ever committed.”75 Nature rectifies the injustice of Jean-Jacques by this punishment. 
The good feeling of performing virtuous acts and the bitter feeling of committing crimes 
are the safeguard of justice and moral obligation. These feelings are the voice of the 
conscience. Rousseau asserted that the strong and salutary voice of the interior sentiment 
is a sure guide of moral behavior. He said to M. Franquières, “The sentiment of freedom, 
the charm of virtue, make themselves felt by you in spite of yourself, and this is how on 
all sides this strong and salutary voice of the interior sentiment recalls to the bosom of the 
truth and of virtue every man whose badly conducted reason leads astray.”76 The 
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safeguard provided by these feelings, unlike the faith in God, applies to either believers 
or unbelievers.  
Rousseau’s this-worldly oriented virtue is clearly contrary to Augustine’s other-
worldly oriented virtue. Augustine criticized Brutus, since man is not the master of life so 
it is wrong for Brutus to kill his son for the sake of the country. Killing his son for his 
glory and that of the country will not lead Brutus to heaven. “What great thing, therefore, 
is it for that eternal and celestial city to despise all the charms of this world, however 
pleasant, if for the sake of this terrestrial city Brutus could even put to death his son -- a 
sacrifice which the heavenly city compels no one to make?”77 Rousseau did not agree 
with Augustine’s idea of heavenly virtue, which weakened the love of country and the 
love of duty. He said,  
I am annoyed by the jokes St Augustine dared to make about this great and 
beautiful act of virtue. The church Fathers were unable to see all the harm 
they did to their cause by thus tarnishing all the greatest things that 
courage and honor had produced. By dint of wanting to elevate the 
sublimity of Christianity, they taught Christian to be cowardly men 
without…78 
 
For Rousseau, virtue consists of the strength to overcome passions for the sake of 
duty. He praised Brutus that he was virtuous, as he conquered his love of his son for the 
duty of a Roman citizen. “Virtue does not consist merely in being just, but in being so by 
triumphing over one’s passions, by ruling over one’s own heart… Brutus having his 
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children die might have been only just. But Brutus was a tender father; in order to do his 
duty he lacerated his insides, and Brutus was virtuous.”79 
Rousseau’s understanding of virtue is this worldly and it is practiced without the 
intention to love God. Virtue can be grounded upon conscience without appealing to 
God. However, as said before, the belief in the existence of God can be an 
encouragement and consolation for the virtuous. Thus, Rousseau said through the mouth 
of the Vicar, “Without faith no true virtue exists.”80 Nonetheless, religion or faith only 
plays a pragmatic function for morality. 
 
iv.  Divided Will and The Source of Strength 
Despite the safeguarding of the moral obligation either by God or by conscience, 
there is no easy way to conquer passions. Although man knows that it is good to be 
virtuous, he is weak in the execution of his will. The Vicar said, “I always have the power 
to will, I do not always have the force to execute. When I abandon myself to temptations, 
I act according to the impulsion of external objects.”81 Rousseau expressed the same sigh 
in the Confessions, “From this continuous opposition between my situation and my 
inclinations, one will see born enormous faults, unparalleled misfortunes, and all the 
virtues, except strength, which can honor adversity.”82 Without doubt, Rousseau was 
willing to practice virtue after the inspiration. It seems that the readers would expect to 
see a different Jean-Jacques after the inspiration. However, with the exception of the 
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incident of Mme d’Houdetot, he failed to practice it most of the time. As Augustine was 
after conversion, he was as weak as before and was susceptible to corruption by the social 
environment. His conversion enhanced his awareness of the natural goodness and the 
social evil but was not able to prevent his slavery to opinions and erroneous reasoning. A 
blind spot concealed his amour-propre and selfishness. The episode of his abandoning 
his children is an appropriate example of how little the inspiration had affected his life. 
Rousseau was accused of hypocrisy because on the one hand, he championed the 
duty of fatherhood but on the other hand, he abandoned his children to the Foundling 
hospital. Rousseau had already abandoned his first two children to the Foundling hospital 
before he came to fame by winning the Dijon competition. He did that because he 
accepted the common practice of the people in Paris at that time.83 When he was staying 
in Paris, he was acquainted with the people at Mme la Selle’s restaurant. He gradually 
acquired not only the morals but also the maxim of this group of people. Rousseau said, 
“Decent persons harmed, husband deceived, women seduced, clandestine births were the 
most common texts there, and the one who best peopled the foundling hospital was 
always the most applauded…and I said to myself: since it is the practice of the country, 
when one lives there one can follow it, here is the expedient I was looking for.”84 His 
principle of behavior was formed by the maxim of his social peer group in Paris, not 
because it was good but only inasmuch as he was just looking for an expedient.  
When he abandoned his first two children, he did not have any remorse in his 
heart. Not until Theresa was expecting their third baby did he start philosophizing about 
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the duties of man, he did not reckon the abandonment of his children as wrong or a fault. 
The decision to abandon the third child was the result of a careful reflection of his new 
principles of life and the knowledge of nature. He said, “I began to examine the 
destination of my children and my connection with their mother according to the laws of 
nature, justice, and reason, and according to those of that pure, holy religion eternal as its 
Author.”85 He reflected on this act based on moral and the religious principles. It was a 
very serious reflection. The most revealing part of this narrative was the contrast between 
his act of abandoning his children, and his soul, which was listening to the voice of 
nature. He was not a man without feeling, without innermost emotions, a denatured 
father. Rather, he was endowed with an innate good will for his fellows, a love for the 
great and virtuous, the repugnance to hate and to do harm to others. He claimed, “I might 
have deceived myself, but not hardened myself.”86 His reasons for abandoning his 
children were: “that by abandoning my children to public education for lack of power to 
bring them up myself; by destining them to become workers and peasants rather than 
adventurers and fortune hunters.”87 He believed that he was performing a proper action of 
a citizen and father.  
In conclusion, that arrangement appeared so good, so sensible, and so legitimate 
to him. Apart from reflecting seriously upon moral and religious principles, most 
importantly, he listened to the voice of his heart. Then he made his final decision. What 
else can people ask of him? He made the best decision he could although it was 
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objectively a mistake. He was naturally good and followed his natural passions. 
However, he did not reason out the situation correctly. He abandoned his duty as a father 
thinking that he did it for the good of his children. By an error of reasoning he was at 
fault. His heart was good. He said, “My fault is great, but it is an error: I neglected my 
duties, but the desire to harm did not enter my heart, and the innermost emotions of a 
father could not speak very powerfully for children one has never seen.”88 Despite that, 
he was punished by the remorse of his conscience. He was not excused from the 
punishment for his fault. This incident illustrated that the knowledge of nature enabled 
Jean-Jacques to reflect on the principle of natural goodness and to listen to the voice of 
his natural inclination. He was susceptible to error, but he was not a wicked man because 
he still respected the voice of his naturally good heart. 
Rousseau distinguished moral fault from natural fault. Abandoning children is a 
moral fault because the person eludes his moral responsibility as a father. Natural 
wickedness is the contrary to natural goodness, i.e., doing harm to others intentionally for 
one’s self-interests, having no compassion for others, chasing after vainglory at the 
expense of others. Rousseau alluded to Grimm as a typical example of the wicked. “The 
summary of his [Grimm] morality…namely the sole duty of man is to follow the 
inclinations of the heart in everything.”89 Grimm followed the inclinations of his heart at 
the expense of others. Accordingly, although Rousseau made moral mistakes and harmed 
his children, his natural goodness remained intact. He was still a naturally good person.  
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Rousseau pointed out that the natural goodness of the heart and his knowledge of 
nature did not prevent his reason from erring. In the first place, he accepted the current 
maxim of the social group in Paris. He rationalized his act blaming his ignorance of the 
duty of a father. After the inspiration on the road to Vincennes, he knew what he ought to 
do as a father. This invoked his many reflections on the way he treated his children. He 
explained in his letter to Mme de Francueil, “I have already told you that I do not see 
anything in this but something to feel sorry about and I am delivering them from poverty 
at my expense.”90  Insights and the natural goodness of the heart did not prevent wrong 
reasoning.  He thought he was doing something good for his children at his own expense. 
Erroneous reasoning is not uncommon in decision- making. It justified Jean-Jacques’ 
intimate relationship with Mme d’Houdetot in the name of friendship. If the natural 
goodness of the heart and insight into duty could not help, then what can keep man from 
erroneous reasoning in a moral struggle? 
 
  a. God’s Grace or Natural Inclinations 
Augustine prayed to God when he realized that he had gotten entangled in the 
temptation of lust and secular activities, “Grant what you command, and command what 
you will.”91 Although God’s grace operates immediately on the person’s soul, God works 
through the Church. The Church is called to be a servant of God’s grace and dispenses 
God’s grace through her ministers. In other words, God’s grace granted through the 
ministry of the Church is indispensable for man’s salvation. Augustine’s theology of 
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grace reaffirmed the soteriology of St Cyprian of Carthage, “Outside the Church there is 
no salvation”. However, this opens the door for the abuse of power of the Church 
ministers, who can be citizens of the city of man. In addition, unbelievers will have no 
way to attain eternal happiness.  
Rousseau did not follow Augustine’s path to ask God for the strength to conquer 
his passions. He believed that God had already given him what he needed to do good. He 
said through the mouth of the Vicar, “Nor do I ask Him for the power to do good. Why 
ask Him for what He has given me? Did He not give me conscience for loving the good, 
reason for knowing it, and liberty for choosing it?”92 It is worth noting that this claim is 
not so different from Augustine’s stance. Augustine was not lacking conscience, the 
ability to reason, and the freedom of choice. He asked God for the strength that he lacked 
to maintain the will to do good, which was distorted by the force of flesh.  
Nonetheless, it is true that Rousseau did not ask God for the strength to do good. 
He learned an important lesson about virtue in struggling with his conversion to 
Catholicism when he was young. He understood that by the time the majority of men 
realize they lack the strength to do good, it is already too late. They complain to God, 
“Why did You make me so weak?” Rousseau said, “But in spite of us He answers to our 
conscience, ‘I made you too weak to leave the chasm, because I made you strong enough 
not to fall into it.’”93 In other words, Rousseau thought that although it is possible for 
man to be virtuous, he was not made to be virtuous. Rather, he is made to be naturally 
good.  
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Jean-Jacques was portrayed not as a virtuous man but a naturally good man in the 
Confessions. His character was not made to be virtuous. During the time when he was 
enthusiastic about virtue, he said, “I became someone else, and ceased to be me.”94 It was 
difficult for him to retain his strength to conquer his natural inclinations in order to be 
virtuous. He lost the drive towards virtue when he left Paris. “When I no longer saw men, 
I ceased to despise them: when I no longer saw the wicked I ceased to hate them…I again 
became fearful, accommodating, timid, in a word the same Jean-Jacques I had been 
before.”95 When the environment changed, Jean-Jacques returned to his previous or 
corrupt civilized state.  
Instead of being virtuous, Jean-Jacques chose to succumb to his natural 
inclinations. However, Rousseau was well aware of the impact of the social environment 
on human passions. His natural inclinations were transformed into artificial passions in 
the society. “I felt myself made for retirement and the country; it was impossible for me 
to live happily anywhere else.”96 Country life fitted his natural temperament. And so, 
knowing that he could not live up to his principles in society with the rich and the literary 
people, Jean-Jacques decided to retreat to the country. When he was living in Paris, he 
was offered a job working for the journal of the Learned. But he refused it because he 
was required to write at their pace and was expected to write as a trade. He could only 
write out of passion. He said, “Everything that had just happened to me had absolutely 
disgusted me with literary people, and I had felt that it was impossible to follow the same 
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career without having some relations with them.”97 Moreover, he felt that his relationship 
with the rich was an obstacle to a simple life. Finally, “I was determined to perpetuate it, 
to renounce totally high society, the composition of books, all literary dealings, and close 
myself up for the rest of my days in the narrow and peaceful sphere for which I felt 
myself born.”98 He endeavored to avoid the emergence of amour-propre by keeping 
away from corrupt society. 
 
 b.  Morality of Abstinence 
Other than the morality of virtue, Rousseau proposed another kind of morality to 
the weak, the morality of the abstinence, with which it is easier to comply. Rousseau did 
not deny the value of virtue; he respected virtuous people, for instance, Fénelon and 
George Keith.  
If he [virtuous person] exists, I rejoice for the honor of the human race. I 
know that masses of virtuous men existed formerly on earth. I know that 
Fénelon, Catinat, others less known, did honor to modern times, and 
among us I have seen George Keith, still follow their sublime paths. With 
that exception, I have seen in the apparent virtues of men only boasting, 
hypocrisy, and vanity.99 
 
Only few of us can be virtuous. The environment influences most of us, and our 
souls become divided. Rousseau saw the true picture of the condition of human being in 
the inspiration, in which he saw that man is naturally good and human wickedness stems 
from the social institutions. The self-interests of one individual in the society will 
inevitably clash with another’s. “For in the social state the good of one necessarily 
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constitutes the harm of another. This relation is in the essence of the thing, and nothing 
can change it.”100 Rather than observing the golden rule of morality, “Do unto others as 
we would have them do unto us”, Rousseau suggested the negative maxim, “Do your 
good with the least possible harm to others”.101 An act of charity to one neighbor may 
harm many others. ‘One man’s medicine, another man’s poison’ can also be true. Man 
has to conquer his own passions in order to do good for the public. The golden rule is 
suitable for the virtuous but not for the weak. But how can we avoid doing harm to 
others? This maxim is related to another, i.e., “To avoid situations that put our duties in 
opposition with our interests, and which show us our good in the harm of someone 
else.”102 Living up to this principle, Jean-Jacques did not accept Lord Marshal’s offer to 
put his name in his will. He did not want to take advantage of the death of his good 
friend.103 
But in fact Jean-Jacques did not totally renounce society. He was determined to 
follow his natural inclinations instead of other people’s opinions. His morality of 
abstinence made him appear bizarre to the people in the society. First his indolence threw 
him into passivity, so he did not have a strong motivation to work. For instance, the 
reason he did not pay a visit to M. Le Blond was due to laziness, not because he disliked 
him. But this mistake gave people a wrong impression of him.104 When exiled to Môtier, 
his solitary behavior and the Armenian outfit gave him a misanthropic image to the 
                                                
100 Emile, p. 105, note. 
101 Rousseau first proposed it in the Second Discourse, in which he explained that this negative maxim, 
which is based upon the natural sentiment of self, is much more natural than the golden rule. SD, p. 163. 
102 Confessions, p. 47. 
103 Ibid., p. 47; pp. 498-501. 
104 Ibid., p. 426. 
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people there. Rousseau commented, “I was preached from the pulpit, named the 
antichrist, and pursued in the countryside like a Werewolf. My Armenian outfit served as 
an indication to the populace…and I calmly walked in the country with my caftan and my 
fur cap surrounded by the hoots of the rabble and sometimes by its stones.”105 It seems 
that he was not suitable for the city life but he did not harm others. He did good to 
himself by following his natural inclinations at no expense of others.  
Another characteristic of the morality of abstinence is his forgetfulness of the evil 
of others. When he knew that a warrant was issued for his arrest, he was compelled to 
flee Montmorency by taking a carriage. The postilion treated him poorly like a bumpkin. 
Interestingly, he easily forgot the poor treatment and did not hold a grudge in his heart, 
because he was preoccupied with foreseeing his misfortune in the future. Rousseau said 
that this was his character. His imagination of the future was so active that he forgot his 
current suffering. And the memory of past happiness also often recurred in his mind. It is 
natural for man to pursue pleasure and to avoid pain. Thus man prefers imagining the 
future happiness to remembering the painful past.106 This inclination to forget the 
suffering and evil enabled Jean-Jacques to accept his enemies. He needed not pardon his 
enemies, as there was no hatred in his heart. “Pardoning offenses is preached to us very 
much. That doubtless is an extremely fine virtue, but one that I do not practice. I do not 
know whether my heart would be able to dominate its hatred, for it has never felt it, and I 
think too little about my enemies to have the merit of pardoning them.”107 Forgetting evil 
                                                
105 Confessions, pp. 525-6. 
106 Dialogues, p. 154. 
107 Confessions, p. 490. 
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easily is a characteristic of the morality of abstinence. Rousseau did not need any strength 
to conquer the hatred in order to forgive and love his enemies. Since he did not hate 
them, there was no need to pardon them.  
In the Second Dialogue, Rousseau defended his character and the moral principle 
of abstinence; he made the pardon of wrong as an example.  
The most sublime of virtues, that which requires the most greatness, 
courage, and strength of soul is the pardon of wrongs and the love of one’s 
enemies. Can weak J.J., who doesn’t attain even mediocre virtue, achieve 
that? I am as far from believing it as from affirming it. But what does it 
matter, if his loving and peaceful nature leads him to the same place to 
which he would have been led by virtue?108 
 
Jean-Jacques was not virtuous, since he was weak in conquering his hatred, but he 
was not vicious either, since he did not hate and wish to harm his enemies. “He does not 
have the merit of forgiving offenses, because he forgets them. He doesn’t love his 
enemies, but he doesn’t think about them.”109 Here Rousseau brought out the importance 
of his morality of abstinence as it can help him achieve the same goal as the morality of 
virtue. Both moralities enable man to have a good relationship with his enemies. One 
achieves it by negative omission and the other by positive strength.  
Rousseau did not return to natural wholeness after the inspiration because he was 
captured by his amour-propre and imagination. He strived to be a virtuous man out of 
“noble pride”. But the environment, visitors, and his friends were obstacles to his reform. 
He was not able to be independent and indifferent to success and wealth. His relationship 
with noble friends and his writing of operas for kings and other people kept him 
                                                
108 Dialogues, p. 154. 
109 Ibid. 
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dependent. Unless he changes his living environment, his amour-propre would actively 
dominate his life. Although his needs and resources were in harmony when he was living 
in a natural environment in Montmorency, his imagination fascinated him to chase after 
romantic feelings. His relationship with Therese and Sophie d’Houdetot could not fill the 
void in his heart. Only when he moved to St. Peter’s Island, the simple daily routine and 
the lost of hope for future glory enabled him to live in the present moment. The idleness 
safeguarded him from his amour-propre and imagination, so he could adhere to his 
natural inclination. However, his return to natural wholeness in St. Peter’s Island was 
temporary. He was asked to leave the island later. By then, his mind and heart were 
occupied by his ambition to write the Constitution for Corsica. At the end of the 
Confessions, Jean-Jacques was in exile and he was still a man entangled with the 
knowledge of nature, natural inclinations and amour-propre. 
In sum, knowledge of nature is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of 
returning to natural wholeness. Amour-propre and imagination cannot be eliminated 
completely because they have already been developed in the civilized man. There is no 
return to the state of the natural man in the initial state of nature, who had not formed any 
amour-propre and imagination. Moral relationships in society nourish the civil man; thus 
the source of weakness is always in society. Rousseau proposed two kinds of morality to 
cope with social corruption. His personal testimony showed that they are not efficacious. 
Only a few men with strong will can be virtuous to conquer passions. Man could not 
eradicate amour-propre and the hope for future glory, and that prevent him from 
wholeheartedly following his natural inclinations. Rousseau’s Confessions illustrates that 
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man has to live sincerely. Before the inspiration, he followed both his natural and 
artificial passions without the knowledge of nature. After the illumination, he was still 
struggling between his natural and artificial passions but with the knowledge of nature, 
which brought him freedom to shape his life. Although he was influenced by amour-
propre, he endeavored to reduce its effect. His portrait of a naturally good man reminds 
the readers that there is no perfection in this world. Man is not able to return to the 
natural wholeness completely. He can only attain it temporarily. Life is a struggle and full 
of choices. Man cannot safeguard his moral goodness but if he lives sincerely, he has 
ensured his natural goodness. 
Close to the end of his autobiography, he concluded in his Confessions,  
I could leave them my life to censure from one end to another, I was sure 
that through my fault and my weakness, through my inability to bear any 
yoke, one would always find a man who was just, good, without bile, 
without hatred, without jealousy, prompt to acknowledge his own wrongs, 
more prompt to forget those of someone else; who sought his whole 
felicity in loving and gentle passions, and who in everything pushed 
sincerity to the point of imprudence, up to the point of the most 
unbelievable disinterestedness.110 
 
 
                                                
110 Confessions, p. 536. 
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CONCLUSION 
We have seen the portrait of a man according to nature in Rousseau’s 
Confessions. Jean-Jacques was a naturally good man, although he had been denatured 
since his childhood. His natural goodness was woven into his historical and moral self 
during his development. He became a being mixed with natural and denatured 
characteristics. The naturally good self, who follows the natural inclination, amour de soi, 
is the foundation of morality of abstinence. The naturally good self was the vantage point 
of the meaning of his life. In addition, Rousseau learned from the sudden inspiration on 
the road to Vincennes that evil is a rupture of being and appearance and it is the social 
institutions that gradually defile man. This insight enabled him to reconcile the 
contradictions between the natural goodness of man and the miserable social condition of 
man. By comparing it with Augustine’s Confessions, it is clear that Rousseau’s 
understanding of human nature and the source of evil rejects the traditional Christian 
view. Rousseau ingeniously composed his Confessions with a structural and thematical 
similarity to Augustine’s Confessions in order to refute Augustine’s theology and to 
convey his own answer to the problem of alienated secular society. 
 The structural and thematic comparison between Augustine’s and Rousseau’s 
Confessions showed their similarities and differences in philosophy and theology. Some 
scholars ascribe a pessimistic view of human nature to Augustine and an optimistic view 
to Rousseau. Our comparison showed that both of them are both optimistic and 
pessimistic. On the one hand, Augustine is optimistic about human nature because God 
granted the gift of the human heart, which makes it restless until man rests in God, and 
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Rousseau is optimistic about human nature because the natural goodness of man remains 
intact in the corrupt society. Man can retain his natural goodness in a corrupt society as 
Rousseau demonstrated in the Social Contract, Emile and the Confessions. On the other 
hand, they are also both pessimistic. Augustine is pessimistic about human nature 
because man suffers punishment for original sin. Man is ignorant of the truth and God, 
his ultimate happiness. He could be led astray by different philosophies and religions, as 
depicted in Augustine’s Confessions. Furthermore, man confuses his innate yearning for 
God, caritas, with the desires of the flesh, cupiditas. He chases after the wrong object of 
love without being aware of his error. Yet even when man knows the right object of love, 
he is too weak to follow the instruction of reason. Man’s disordered carnal desires do not 
obey his reason. Augustine traced the source of human weakness to the punishment for 
the original sin. Rousseau also held a pessimistic view of humanity. The civil man, driven 
by amour-propre, chases after vanity and recognition. Living in society in which self-
interests are in conflict with duty, he inevitably does himself good at the expense of 
others. Rousseau ascribed the source of evil to social institutions. Shame and pride, 
passions and erroneous reasoning, which are the sources of weakness, are engendered by 
society.  
Augustine knew that man, suffering from the punishment of original sin and from 
moral and physical evil, could not attain ultimate happiness in this world by himself. 
Thus human sinfulness and weakness establish the limits of virtue and politics. Both 
virtue and political authority are means to God, the supreme good of man. Although man 
is willing to practice virtue, he is too weak to do so effectively and consistently. Man is 
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not able to practice virtue habitually without God’s grace. For instance, man needs God’s 
guidance through Scripture and Church teachings to foster the virtue of prudence, which 
discerns the good action from the bad. The political authority of the earthly city only 
maintains a temporal peace in which man can pursue his material well-being. By coercive 
power temporal laws can regulate men to do no harm and to do good when necessary to 
his fellows; and submission to the temporal authority does teach man humility, which is a 
cure for sin. 
Rousseau also had a profound understanding of the limits of virtue and politics. 
He understood virtue as the strength to conquer passions, while holding that only very 
few men are really virtuous or morally strong. People are weak and they are only able to 
conquer their passions occasionally, as Jean-Jacques did. Moreover, he suggests that 
political society, based not on self-interest but the morality of duty, can only be realized 
under certain conditions. Consequently Rousseau recommended not only a morality of 
virtue but also a morality of abstinence; so that man can attain his goal by practicing 
either kind of morality. Both Augustine and Rousseau were pessimistic and optimistic, 
but in different ways due to their different understandings of the source of man’s natural 
goodness and evil. Why did Rousseau propose an alternative theory of human nature? He 
thought Augustinian theology of sin and salvation inadequate because it could not cope 
with the new challenges of the modern society, and so he rejected it radically.  
In Chapter One, I brought out the relationship between modernity and 
Christianity. I took Rousseau as an example of how the modern philosopher deals with 
this question. Is Rousseau’s thought a break from or in continuity with Christianity? Is 
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his thought a debased Christianity as Maritain claimed? Is Rousseau’s version of 
Christianity a natural child of the tradition of Christianity? If a naturalized Christianity 
could be called Christianity, Rousseau’s moral and social philosophy was a debased 
Christianity, as Maritain said. However, even if we accept his Christian claim, 
Rousseau’s Christianity was no longer the traditional Christianity tracing back to the 
apostles. He rejected the core of the apostolic Christian tradition, including God’s self-
revelation and the gracious redemption of mankind by Jesus Christ, the Savior. He 
rejected the doctrine of Original Sin and asserted that man is not a sinner but naturally 
good at birth. His naturalized Christianity breaks with the Christianity of either the 
Catholic or Protestant tradition. Instead, he proposed a theory of morality and politics 
based upon the principle of the natural goodness of man, as a reply to Augustinian moral 
theology based upon the doctrine of Original Sin, and the need for supernatural 
redemption. 
After the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church gradually lost its dominance in 
Western Europe. The rise of Renaissance humanism and the Protestant Reformation 
reconstructed the socio-political and religious contours of Western society. The Catholic 
Church was no longer the only Christian denomination in society in the West. One could 
be an unbeliever or a Protestant. A pluralistic secular society had taken shape. Traditional 
Christian doctrines on morality had difficulty coping with the challenges of this 
pluralistic secular society. Rousseau saw the disproportion between aspects of the 
Augustinian theology of two cities, as based upon Augustine’s theology of sin and grace, 
so he proposed a theory of ethics and politics founded upon the principle of the natural 
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goodness of man instead of God. Stated in modern parlance, he shifted the focus from 
theistic heteronomy to human autonomy, and from an alienating transcendence to an 
empowering immanence. The meaning of the human self is no longer related to the 
transcendent God but the immanent good self. Rousseau endeavored to establish a 
morality within a self-sufficient and immanent realm.  
Augustine had dealt with the problems of religion and society in the City of God. 
After the rise of Christendom and the decline of the Roman Empire, Augustine tried to 
develop a conceptual framework for the relationship between the religious community 
and the secular society, specifying the purpose of the secular society with respect to 
Christian faith. In Book XIX, he claimed that the supreme good for man is the eternal 
peace in the life after death. The earthly city worked for a temporal peace by conquering 
others. Since the rulers of the earthly city feared the threat of its neighboring cities, they 
waged wars continuously against others, so that no real peace on earth can ever be 
achieved; eternal peace can be attained only in heaven. Although there is no eternal peace 
on earth, there can be a temporal peace, which “consists in bodily health and soundness, 
and in fellowship with one’s kind; and everything necessary to safeguard or recover this 
peace,”1 which the people of the City of God need. “Thus even the Heavenly city in her 
pilgrimage here on earth makes use of the earthly peace and defends and seeks the 
compromise between human wills in respect of the provisions relevant to the mortal 
nature of man, so far as may be permitted without detriment to true religion and piety.”2 
                                                
1 COD, XIX, 13. 
2 Ibid., XIX, 17. 
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 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the people of the city of God make use of 
earthly things, such as temporal laws and earthly peace, as means to eternal peace in the 
world after death. However, since the city of God intermingles with the city of man on 
earth, Augustine’s theology of two cities provoked many questions. If Christian citizens 
only cared about the supreme good in afterlife, will they passionately labor for the glory 
and well-being of the earthly city? If man only learned humility by submission to either 
the domestic or political authority, is he slavish by nature? Will he care whether he is free 
or only a serf in this world? Furthermore, although the earthly city or the Church could 
not claim a direct institutional continuity with either the city of man and the city of God 
respectively, they nonetheless make separate contributions to the earthly and spiritual 
mission. If a Christian citizen confronts a conflict between the civil obligation and his 
faith, should he obey the prince or the priest? The tension between the church and the 
earthly sovereignty remained through the Middle Ages.  
In sum, Augustine understood the earthly secular society in relation to 
Christianity, whose goal is the supreme good in life after death. The life on earth is only a 
pilgrimage to the heavenly city, in which man enjoys eternal peace with God and his 
fellows. Earthly things possess only an instrumental value for the Christian citizens. On 
the contrary, Rousseau related religion to the secular society. What is the purpose of 
religion in the development of a secular society? Rousseau dealt with this question in the 
last Chapter of his Social Contract. Raising issues treated in the Augustinian theology of 
two cities, Rousseau distinguished three types of religion, namely, religion of man, 
religion of the citizens and religion of the priests. He referred to one of the religions of 
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the priests as the Roman Catholic Church, which acclaimed herself as the visible city of 
God at times. For Rousseau the institutional Church consists of only those who were 
saved by God through baptism. The body of the institutional church is the communion of 
churches in union with Rome. Rousseau said in the note, “Communion and 
excommunication are the social compact of the clergy, a compact by means of which it 
will always be master of peoples and Kings.”3 Priests, as the leaders of the community, 
are assigned by the Church to govern the people of God. They are called to serve the 
Christians by preaching the Gospel and to administer the sacraments, so that priests 
control the fate of all Christians, including peasants and kings, accepting them through 
baptism or rejecting them by excommunication. Rousseau objected that the religion of 
the priests inevitably imposes on men two legislative systems, two leaders, and two 
fatherlands, and subjects them to contradictory duties, thus preventing them from being 
simultaneously devout men and good citizens.4 Considering religion in relation to the 
secular society, Rousseau claimed, “Everything that destroys social unity is worthless.”5 
Moreover, Rousseau also criticized the devaluation of earthly things in the eyes of 
Christians. Christian citizens perform their duties but without ambitions for the glory and 
wealth of their earthly cities, since their eyes gaze upon the heavenly city only. They 
have no concern for the outcome of their effort. Christians do not care about social and 
political reformation. “And after all, what does it matter whether one is free or serf in this 
vale of tears? The essential thing is to go to paradise, and resignation is but an additional 
                                                
3 SC, IV, 8, note, p. 218. 
4 Ibid., p. 219. 
5 Ibid. 
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means of doing so.”6 Contrary to the spirit of capitalism, the exhortation to detachment 
from earthly things does not encourage Christians to pursue social development and 
wealth. Furthermore, Christian soldiers “do their duty, but without passion for victory. 
They know how to die rather than to win.”7 Thus due to theological intolerance and the 
negative attitude towards earthly things, Roman Catholics, in Rousseau’s eyes, are not 
good citizens in a modern secular society.  
From this perspective, it is not surprising that Rousseau endeavored to reply to 
Christianity, as based upon Augustinian theology of sin and grace, by proposing an 
alternative, which is based upon the principle of the natural goodness of man. He 
suggested a substitute for Christianity in the pluralistic secular society. 
 
                                                
6 SC, IV, 8, p. 221. 
7 Ibid. 
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